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Bankruptcy Risk Prediction and Pricing: 
Unravelling the Negative Distress Risk Premium 
ABSTRACT 
In sharp contrast to the basic risk-return assumption of theoretical finance, the empirical 
evidence shows that distressed firms underperform non-distressed firms (e.g. Dichev, 
1998; Agarwal and Taffler, 2008b). Existing literature argues that a shareholder 
advantage effect (Garlappi and Yan, 2011), limits of arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997) or gambling retail investor (Kumar, 2009) could drive the underperformance. 
Herein, I test these potential explanations and explore the drivers of distress risk. In 
order to do so, I require a clean measure of distress risk. Measures of distress risk have 
usually been accounting-based, market-based or hybrids using both information sources. 
I provide the first comprehensive study that employs a variety of performance tests on 
different prediction models.  
My tests are based on all UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment of 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE) between September 1985 and October 2010. It 
includes 22,217 observations with 2,428 unique firms of which 202 went bankrupt.  
I find that hybrid models clearly outperform the accounting-based z-score (Taffler, 
1983) and the market-based model of Bharath and Shumway (2008) (BS). Hybrid 
models forecast bankruptcies more accurately and they subsume the bankruptcy related 
information of z-score and BS. While there is little to distinguish between the hybrids in 
forecasting accuracy, tests of differential misclassification costs show that the highest 
economic value is delivered by the most parsimonious hybrid model of 
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Shumway (2001) (Shum). The forecasting accuracy between z-score and BS depends on 
the sample period while both carry complementary bankruptcy related information.  
My study provides confirmatory evidence on the puzzling negative distress risk 
premium. Moreover, my tests show that the distress risk premium is independent of the 
distress risk proxy (Shum, z-score or BS). Remarkably, z-score –the weakest 
bankruptcy prediction model - subsumes the return related information of Shum and BS 
in cross-sectional tests suggesting that it might not be distress risk per se that is priced. 
My results provide no evidence that the potential explanations in the existing literature 
are able to account for the distress puzzle. As such, I find no confirmation for the 
shareholder advantage effect. Although the characteristics of firms with high limits of 
arbitrage and gambling features are shared by distressed firms, tests provide no 
evidence for their pricing relevance or their impact on the distress risk premium.  
This is the first study that deconstructs the distress measures into their component parts 
to unravel the distress risk premium and shows that the profitability components of 
Shum and z-score drive the premium. The composite measure without the information 
carried by profitability is insignificant in the pricing tests. In time-series regressions, I 
show that the pricing information carried by a profitability factor is able to reduce the 
distress risk premium. Portfolio analysis identifies low distress risk-high profitability 
firms as the key driver of the mispricing. The distress anomaly is not driven by distress 
risk but by profitability. Another major contribution is the use of the three approaches to 
assess distress risk. Together with the full range of major performance measures, I 
provide the first comprehensive test of the competing approaches. This study has 
important implications for the future research agenda on both, how we measure distress 
risk and the pricing of distress risk. 
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Introduction 
One of the central tenets in theoretical finance is that higher systematic risk is rewarded 
with higher returns. If financial distress risk is systematic, then investors expect a 
positive premium for bearing distress risk.
1
 Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) and 
Chava and Purnanandam (2010) note that distress risk should be captured by standard 
asset pricing models unless firm failures correlate with deteriorating investment 
opportunities (Merton, 1973), unmeasured components of wealth such as human capital 
(Fama and French, 1996) or debt securities (Ferguson and Shockley, 2003). Chan and 
Chen (1991) and Fama and French (1992) argue that some empirical violations of the 
risk-return relationship are explained by relative financial distress risk. Following this 
argument, distress risk would result in the positive return patterns related to size and 
value as argued by Fama and French (1992).
2
 
There are few empirical studies that find a positive distress risk-return relation. While 
Vassalou and Xing (2004) find a positive distress risk premium using realised returns, 
Chava and Purnanandam (2010) find expected returns to be higher for distressed firms. 
On the other hand, in the majority of literature a negative relation between distress risk 
and realised stock returns is found (e.g. Dichev, 1998; Agarwal and Taffler, 2008b; Da 
and Gao, 2010). This is in sharp contradiction to the risk-reward assumption of 
theoretical finance, as well as rejecting the distress hypothesis proposed by Chan and 
Chen (1991) and Fama and French (1992). 
                                                 
1
 Following Agarwal and Taffler (2008b), the terms financial distress and bankruptcy risk are used 
interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
2
 Fama and French (1992) propose the argument for the first time while they confirm it in subsequent 
studies. Important contributions include the model in Fama and French (1993) as well as the often 
referred Fama and French Model in Fama and French (1996).  
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There are several potential explanations for the underperformance of distressed firms. 
Garlappi and Yan (2011) provide a risk-based explanation and argue that shareholders 
of highly distressed firms have an advantage as they can choose to strategically default 
at the cost of debt holders. Hence, equity risk decreases with high levels of distress risk: 
stocks of highly distressed firms are expected to earn low returns. An alternative 
explanation for the negative distress risk premium is that distressed stocks have 
characteristics that are associated with both limits of arbitrage and gambling retail 
investors (e.g. Coelho, Taffler and John, 2010). Limits of arbitrage hinder institutional 
investors’ ability to correct mispriced stocks (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) while the 
priority of gambling retail investors is not on profit maximisation (Han and Kumar, 
2011). As such, distressed firms could be mispriced because sophisticated investors are 
unable to correct the mispricing or because their lottery features attract gamblers.  
Exploring the pricing of distress risk requires models to proxy for the level of distress 
risk. The approaches to assess the risk that individual firms will go bankrupt differ in 
their information basis. Traditional models are predominantly based on either 
accounting information (e.g. Altman, 1968; Taffler, 1983) or market information (e.g. 
Vassalou and Xing, 2004). More recent literature provides hybrids using both data 
sources (e.g. Shumway, 2001).  
While some of the models are argued to be superior due to their conceptual nature (e.g. 
Shumway, 2001), the empirical performance is what really matters. The empirical 
literature provides performance tests of the three approaches using the (i) receiver 
operating characteristics (ROC) curves (Hanley and McNeil, 1982; Sobehart and 
Keenan, 2001), (ii) information content tests (Hillegeist, Keating, Cram and Lundstedt, 
 4 
 
2004), and (iii) test of differential misclassification costs (Stein, 2005; Blöchlinger and 
Leippold, 2006). However, existing literature does not provide clean evidence on the 
usefulness of competing approaches as (i) the studies fail to cover all three approaches 
in their tests (e.g. Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Reisz and Perlich, 2007), and (ii) none of 
the studies, except Agarwal and Taffler (2008a), use all three available tests to assess 
the empirical performance.  
Main Objectives of Thesis 
1. To identify the best bankruptcy prediction approach using the three different 
measures that test for forecasting accuracy, bankruptcy related information and 
economic value under differential misclassification costs.  
2. To review existing evidence on the underperformance of distressed firms 
controlling for the common risk factors and to test whether the 
underperformance is dependent on the distress risk proxy. 
3. To test empirically the potential explanations for the underperformance of 
distressed firms. 
4. To explore the drivers of the distress risk premium. 
I conduct the tests using all UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment 
of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) anytime between 1985 and 2010. The tests 
involve different methodologies. First, I use all three available bankruptcy prediction 
approaches, i.e. the accounting-based z-score model of Taffler (1983), the market-based 
model of Bharath and Shumway (2008) and three hybrid specifications (Shumway, 
2001; Campbell et al., 2008; Christidis and Gregory, 2010). I test three dimensions of 
relative performance of the bankruptcy prediction models: forecasting accuracy using 
 5 
 
receiver operating characteristics curve, bankruptcy related information using 
information content tests, and the economic value of models under differential 
misclassification costs. Second, in the pricing analysis I use individual securities as well 
as different portfolio formation methods and employ cross-sectional regressions (Fama 
and MacBeth, 1973) and time-series regressions (Fama and French, 1996; Carhart, 
1997). 
Main Findings 
1. Hybrid models clearly outperform the accounting-based z-score (Taffler, 1983) 
and the market-based model of Bharath and Shumway (2008) (BS). Hybrid 
models have a higher forecasting accuracy and they subsume the bankruptcy 
related information carried by z-score and BS. The forecasting accuracy between 
the hybrid models does not differ statistically. However, accounting for 
differential misclassification costs shows that Shum results in a higher economic 
value than the alternative hybrids. Results on the forecasting accuracy between 
z-score and BS are mixed but they both contain significant and complementary 
bankruptcy related information. 
2. The stocks of distressed firms underperform those of non-distressed firms 
independent of whether distress is proxied by Shum, z-score or BS. These 
findings are robust to time-series regressions and cross-sectional regressions. 
However, the cross-sectional regressions also show that z-score subsumes the 
bankruptcy related pricing information carried by Shum and BS. 
3. The potential explanations proposed in the literature cannot capture the negative 
distress risk premium. The predictions of Garlappi and Yan (2011) do not hold 
in the UK market. The characteristics and the areas under ROC curve of stocks 
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with limits of arbitrage and lottery features are similar to those of distressed 
firms. But surprisingly, they are not significant in subsequent stock returns and 
they have no impact on the negative distress risk premium. 
4. Profitability drives the distress risk premium. Cross-sectional tests show that net 
income over total assets (component of Shum) and profit before tax over current 
liabilities (component of z-score) are the components that drive the significance 
of Shum and z-score respectively. Using time-series regressions, I show that the 
pricing information carried by a profitability factor is able to reduce the distress 
risk premium. The distress effect is driven by the high returns of profitable 
firms.  
Structure of Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows: the next Chapter 2 reviews the literature 
on bankruptcy prediction models and the pricing of distress risk, Chapter 3 states the 
research questions and research propositions. Chapter 4 describes the data and methods 
applied in the empirical analysis. Chapter 5 tests the three bankruptcy prediction 
approaches using different performance tests. Chapter 6 tests for the distress risk 
premium employing the three approaches for bankruptcy prediction using time-series 
and cross-sectional regression tests. Chapter 7 tests whether the shareholder advantage 
theory, the limits of arbitrage, and the gambling retail investors account for the negative 
distress risk premium using time-series and cross-sectional regressions. Chapter 8 
unravels the negative distress risk premium. Chapter 9 draws conclusions from the 
analysis, describes limitations, and indicates potential for future research.   
 7 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
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2.1 Introduction 
This thesis is anchored within the pricing of distress risk. As such, the literature review 
encompasses two major fields: distress risk modelling and asset pricing.   
My literature review is organised as follows. First, I review the different approaches of 
bankruptcy prediction and highlight their main advantages and disadvantages. I also 
discuss studies that compare the different approaches. Then I review the literature on the 
pricing of distress risk while in the last part, I review literature on potential explanations 
for the return behaviour of distressed stocks.  
2.2 Distress Risk Models 
The approaches to bankruptcy prediction can be separated by the information basis they 
use. Traditional bankruptcy prediction models use accounting information (e.g. Altman, 
1968). Alternatively, there are theoretically-sound contingent claims models that draw 
information from market data (e.g. Vassalou and Xing, 2004). More recent literature, 
however, argues that bankruptcy prediction is most powerful when the two information 
sources are combined (e.g. Shumway, 2001).  
2.2.1 Accounting-Based Models 
Literature Review 
It is self-explanatory that annual accounts are one of the first sources when judging the 
financial health of a company. As such, there is a broad range of bankruptcy prediction 
models using accounting data. In fact, one can argue that financial analysis, and thus 
 9 
 
(informal) bankruptcy risk assessment, is as old as accounting data itself.
3
 The more 
recent literature can be classified into simple accounting ratio-based prediction, multiple 
discriminant models and conditional probability models.  
Simple accounting ratio-based prediction employs univariate analysis. Beaver (1966) 
analyses the predictive ability of individual accounting ratios in a bankruptcy context 
using a matched sample of 79 non-failed and 79 failed US firms listed between 1954 
and 1962. By selecting 30 ratios and grouping them by their information content (i.e. 
cash flow, net income, leverage, working capital and turnover), he compares the change 
over time up to five years before failure. He finds that while the ratios of non-failed 
firms are fairly stable, those of failed firms had deteriorated approaching failure. 
Further, while all the chosen ratios predicted failure, the cash flow-to-total debt ratio 
was the best in discriminating between failures and non-failures. The finding of Beaver 
(1966) that accounting ratios are able to predict failures built the basis for future 
accounting ratio-based research.  
Altman (1968) criticises the use of individual accounting ratios for their potential to 
give conflicting signals. He argues for a multi-ratio model to allow a more 
comprehensive assessment of potential failure. Using a matched sample of 33 non-
failed and 33 failed US firms listed between 1946 and 1965, he applies multiple 
discriminant analysis to choose from a basket of 22 ratios and finds five ratios that 
distinguish best between non-failure and failure. The resulting z-score model 
                                                 
3
 For instance, several studies refer to Rosendal (1908), and Beaver, Correia and McNichols (2010) note 
that the financial statements have been used for more than 100 years to assess financial distress 
likelihood.  
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incorporates ratios representing working capital, retained earnings, profitability, market-
to-book equity and sales.
4
  
Conditional probabilities models were introduced by Ohlson (1980). He criticises the 
multiple discriminant analysis as it employs matched samples that involve arbitrary 
choice and lead to an oversampling of bankrupt firms. Using all available failed and 
non-failed firms from 1970 to 1976 with most of them listed on New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (AMSE), his sample does not require 
any matching procedure and thus, represents a more realistic failure rate. He suggests a 
logit model that, in contrast to the multiple discriminant analysis, returns a default 
probability. The variables included in the model are market capitalisation, leverage, 
profitability, and measures of current liquidity. However, while the model uses better 
sample features, it is still pooling the data and thus, does not account for time-variations 
in distress risk.  
There have been a number of studies providing alternative accounting-based models by 
both refining existing models and applying different methodologies. However, the 
multiple discriminant analysis has dominated the failure prediction literature for several 
years. For instance, Deakin (1972) applies the discriminant analysis using the variables 
in Beaver (1966) while Blum (1974) develops the failing firms model and shows that a 
regular update of the model does not improve forecasting accuracy. Altman, Haldeman 
                                                 
4
 Strictly speaking, the z-score model of Altman (1968) is not a pure accounting-based bankruptcy 
prediction model as one of the five ratios contains market value of equity and thus, the model could be 
listed under hybrid models. However, I still classify z-score as an accounting-based model since its focus 
is primarily on accounting ratios. Also, at that time the intention of bankruptcy prediction research was 
not on researching the competing arguments of accounting-based and market-based models. In fact, 
market-based bankruptcy prediction models, and thus hybrid models, evolved much later. 
 11 
 
and Narayanam (1977) provide the proprietary Zeta™ model and Taffler (1983) offers 
an alternative accounting-based z-score model specifically developed for the UK 
market. His z-score model includes four ratios representing profitability, working 
capital, financial risk, and liquidity with the corresponding coefficients being first 
published in Agarwal and Taffler (2007). A conditional probability model using a 
cumulative normal distribution is provided by Zmijewski (1984).
5
  
Advantages of Accounting-Based Models 
Altman (1968) underlines the value of accounting information and argues that financial 
ratios should not be regarded as too simplistic. Taffler (1983) describes the information 
in financial statements to be distinct and fundamental and highlights its value when 
considered in multi-ratio models. 
Importantly, accounting information such as leverage or liquidity ultimately builds the 
decision basis for a bankruptcy filing. Legal decisions in relation to the bankruptcy 
event are based on accounting information and not on market data such as market 
volatility, for example.  
Financial statements have structural advantages: they are audited (annual) accounts and 
thus, can be regarded as being a valid information source. The double entry 
bookkeeping introduces automatic checks and balances making window dressing harder 
                                                 
5
 Besides the main approaches described here, there are a number of alternatives. Balcan and Ooghe 
(2006) summarise them as survival analysis, machine-learning decision trees, expert systems and neural 
networks.  
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(e.g. realising sales early increases the receivables).
6
 Legal requirements prescribe a 
frequent and timely publication of the information and thus, ensure the availability of 
financial information.  
Disadvantages of Accounting-Based Models 
Hillegeist, Keating, Cram and Lundstedt (2004) argue that accounting statements are 
prepared on a going-concern assumption and thus, by design limited in predicting 
bankruptcy. Agarwal and Taffler (2008a) point out some further structural 
disadvantages of financial statements in bankruptcy prediction (p. 1542): “(i) 
accounting statements present past performance of a firm and may or may not be 
informative in predicting the future, (ii) conservatism and historical cost accounting 
mean that the true asset values may be very different from the recorded book values, 
(iii) accounting numbers are subject to manipulation by management.” Apart from that, 
accounting data is subject to different accounting policies e.g. complicating a 
comparison of accounting ratios of different companies.  
Although listed firms are required to publish their accounts in a timely manner, it is also 
well-known that some firms (especially distressed firms) are prone to publish their 
accounts late or not at all (Keasey and Watson, 1988). This can lead to an imprecise or 
out-dated bankruptcy probability assessment, especially for the firms in the most critical 
position. 
                                                 
6
 Window dressing is “the deceptive practice of using accounting tricks to make a company's balance 
sheet and income statement appear better than they really are” (See: www.investorwords.com, accessed 
5th February 2012). However, window dressing is substantially different to outright fraud (e.g. Enron, 
Worldcom).  
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Empirical literature also documents a change in accounting ratios over time. However, 
the static and time-independent approach of discriminant analysis is unable to account 
for it (Mensah, 1984). The change in accounting ratios is also neglected due to the 
pooling of sample firms (matched firms approach). Further, Begley, Ming and Watts 
(1996) show that updating the coefficients alone is not enough and the models have to 
be periodically re-developed (see as well Hillegeist et al., 2004; Agarwal and Taffler, 
2007).  
Besides the conceptual shortcomings, Hillegeist et al. (2004) criticise accounting-based 
models for not including a measure of asset volatility that captures the likelihood that 
the value of total assets will be lower than the value of liabilities. 
2.2.2 Market-Based Models 
Literature Review 
An alternative approach for modelling bankruptcy risk draws from contingent claims. 
Since the contingent claims approach is based on market information, I refer to such 
models as market-based models. In implementation, market-based models follow the 
definition that a firm is bankrupt if the value of total assets is lower than the value of 
liabilities.  
The set-up of market-based models is given by the option pricing approach of Black and 
Scholes (1973) and the derivative pricing model of Merton (1973) (BSM). Market-
based models regard firm equity as a call option on the value of the firm’s assets with a 
strike price that equals the face value of liabilities. The firm is bankrupt when the call 
option expires worthless. It follows that the probability of bankruptcy is the probability 
of a worthless option i.e. that the value of assets is less than the face value of liabilities 
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at the end of the holding period. McDonald (2002) defines the probability using a 
standard normal cumulative distribution as 
   ( 
  (    )  (         
 ) 
  √ 
) 
(1) 
where P is the probability of default, N(·) is the cumulative normal density function,    
is the value of assets, X is the face value of debt (i.e. total liabilities),   is the expected 
return,   is the dividend rate,    the asset volatility, and T is time to maturity. It follows 
that the measurement of default probability requires three unobservable variables:   ,   
and   . Empirical studies implementing the option pricing framework differ in the way 
they infer the unobservable variables. Generally,    and    are obtained by an iterative 
process that is initiated by setting    equal to the sum of the market value of equity and 
total liabilities and    equal to the equity volatility.  
There are a number of empirically studies that apply the BSM approach. Vassalou and 
Xing (2004) apply the BSM to the US data available on the database of The Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) that covers (among others) stocks listed on New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) from 1971 to 
1999. They define the face value of debt as the sum of debt with a maturity of one year 
or less plus half of the long-term debt and calculate the equity volatility over the prior 
twelve months using daily returns. The expected return is proxied by the risk-free rate 
and the model is not adjusted for expected dividends.  
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Hillegeist et al. (2004) use US stocks available on CRSP between 1980 and 2000 and 
infer the value of total assets by starting the iterative process with the proxy of market 
value of equity and total liabilities. Expected returns are estimated by taking the change 
in market value of total assets adjusted for expected dividends.  
Campbell et al. (2008) employ the BSM framework to the US market (CRSP, 1963 to 
2003). They use a debt proxy similar to that of Vassalou and Xing (2004) and infer asset 
volatility from equity volatility using the optimal hedge equation while they calculate 
equity volatility over the prior three months using daily returns. To proxy expected 
returns, they take the sum of the equity premium and risk-free rate. Dividends are not 
considered.  
Crosbie and Bohn (2003) differ in determining the default probability. Instead of using 
a cumulative normal distribution, they use actual default probabilities drawing from the 
Moody’s KMV database with over 250,000 company-years and over 4,700 
bankruptcies. As such, they calculate the default score and take the number of actual 
failures to derive the expected default frequency. Literature often refers to the model in 
Crosbie and Bohn (2003) as Moody’s KMV model.  
An alternative is offered by Bharath and Shumway (2008) who employ US market data 
on CRSP between 1980 and 2003. They argue that the benefit of the traditional market-
based model lies in its functional form rather than in the complex calculation. As such, 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) provide a naïve version of the market-based model to 
calculate the default score. They define asset volatility as the weighted average of equity 
volatility and debt volatility while debt volatility is defined as a linear function of equity 
volatility. Expected returns are proxied by the prior-year stock return. Importantly, they 
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find their naïve distance to default measure to be superior to the standard market 
approach in a hazard model and out-of-sample tests. Similar results are provided in 
Agarwal and Taffler (2008a) who apply the model in Hillegeist et al. (2004) and 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) on the UK market.  
While the previous studies differ in terms of their calculation of the unobserved 
parameters or the bankruptcy probability assessment, Brockman and Turtle (2003) 
argue that the vanilla call option does not appropriately reflect reality because the debt 
holders can force bankruptcy before the expiry of the equity holders’ call option as soon 
as the asset value falls below the face value of debt. Similarly, Reisz and Perlich (2007) 
claim that this early bankruptcy option with the debt holders implies that the equity 
holders have a down-and-out barrier call option rather than a vanilla call option.
7
 They 
apply the down-and-out barrier call option framework using a sample of 5,784 US 
industrial firms listed between 1988 and 2002.  
Advantages of Market-Based Models 
The primary advantage of the market-based models is their sound theoretical grounding. 
However, there are a number of other advantages that are of particular interest when 
compared to accounting-based models. Agarwal and Taffler (2008a: p. 1542) 
summarise them as follows: (i) in efficient markets, stock prices will reflect all the 
information contained in accounting statements and will also contain information not in 
the accounting statements, (ii) market variables are unlikely to be influenced by firm 
                                                 
7
 A further implication of viewing equity as a call is that managers (if they are acting in the best interests 
of the shareholders) should increase the firm’s riskiness without bound. However, we do not observer this 
in practice and down-and-out framework shows that option value does not increase with volatility after a 
certain barrier.  
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accounting policies, (iii) market prices reflect future expected cash flows, and hence 
should be more appropriate for prediction purposes, and (iv) the output of such models 
is not time or sample dependent. 
While accounting-based models have high data requirements, market-based models are 
less limited since the general market-based model requires only market return data and 
book value of debt. This is important for empirical studies because it allows for a 
greater sample size. Also, market data is available with a much higher frequency.  
Disadvantages of Market-Based Models 
Saunders and Allen (2002) argue that market-based models assume normally distributed 
stock returns. They also assume that the input variables are observable. Since especially 
asset volatility is not directly observable, market-based models eventually only offer an 
approximation of the real inputs. Moreover, the reliability of market data could be 
questioned due to several empirical findings that conflict with the assumption of 
efficient markets and that especially distressed assets are subject to e.g. market liquidity 
constraints (Avramov, Chordia, Jostova and Philipov, 2010).  
Further, the BSM framework assumes a single zero-coupon bond maturing at the end of 
the forecasting horizon (one year). However, most firms have more complex capital 
structures with several coupon bearing loans with different maturities. Agarwal and 
Taffler (2008a) also argue that the BSM framework assumes costless bankruptcy, no 
safety covenants, and, unless the down-and-out barrier option framework is applied, 
default is triggered only at maturity without taking into account that the company can 
default earlier.  
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2.2.3 Hybrid Models 
Literature Review 
The two approaches described above base their predictive ability on either accounting or 
market information. Beaver (1968) notes that financial ratios and market prices are 
neither mutually-exclusive nor competing predictors of failure. While accounting data 
can be seen as a subset of market information, recent research similarly argues that both 
data sources could be complementary (Pope, 2010). For the purpose of increasing the 
explanatory power of bankruptcy prediction models, recent studies implement hybrid 
models that use both accounting and market information.  
Shumway (2001) uses hazard models on a sample of US industrial firms listed between 
1963 and 1992 (NYSE and AMEX). He claims that many of the previously applied 
accounting ratios have little statistical significance. On the other hand, he finds firm 
size, past stock returns and idiosyncratic stock return variability to be statistically highly 
significant. Combining these market-based variables with the accounting-based 
profitability and leverage, Shumway (2001) proposes the first hybrid model. Apart from 
that, he highlights the statistical advantages of his hybrid model over existing linear and 
conditional probability accounting-based models. He notes that hazard models allow for 
time-varying covariates and that they reduce sample selection biases as they do not 
employ matched samples.  
In line with the model of Shumway (2001) there are a number of studies. Chava and 
Jarrow (2004) further refine the hazard model including different variables and 
adjusting for industry effects. Beaver, McNichols and Rhie (2005) and Beaver, Correia 
and McNichols (2010) examine the predictive power of accounting-based and market-
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based variables. Campbell et al. (2008) test the model in Shumway (2001) and 
alternative hybrid model specifications. Especially, they find the variables in Shumway 
(2001) to be more meaningful when adjusted by a market-based denominator, i.e. 
market value of total assets (book value of debt plus market value of equity) instead of 
book value of total assets. They also add two variables to the Shumway (2001) 
specification (book-to-market equity and share price). Anginer and Yildizhan (2010) 
apply the model in comparison with corporate credit spreads (CDS) and argue that CDS 
are more accurate. However, the results of Anginer and Yildizhan (2010) are less robust 
as no formal performance test is actually applied.
8
 Also, their sample (US market data) 
ranging between 5,175 and 8,069 firms (43 and 94 failures) is quite small and thus, 
might impede the results.  
Recent hybrid models have also been applied to the UK market. For instance, 
Charalambakis, Espenlaub and Garret (2009) provide a hazard model similar to the one 
in Shumway (2001). Christidis and Gregory (2010) provide a range of specifications 
arguing that the inclusion of macro-economic variables increases the explanatory power 
of existing hybrid models. 
Advantages of Hybrid Models 
The competing arguments in accounting-based and market-based bankruptcy prediction 
enforce a trend in the literature that argues for combining the two information sources. 
Sloan (1996) finds that market prices do not accurately reflect the information from 
company accounts and hence, accounting data can be used to complement market data. 
                                                 
8
 They apply simple hazard models but not information content tests. Additional tests, neither with sorts 
nor ROC curve analysis is provided. 
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Hybrid models use hazard models that are time-independent and thus, allow a 
bankruptcy risk assessment at each point in time. Since hazard models include all 
healthy and distressed firms, the trend of bankruptcy risk can be observed. In addition, 
hybrid models allow for the inclusion of macro-economic variables that affect the 
general bankruptcy risk of firms. 
Disadvantages of Hybrid Models 
Due to the inclusion of various variables and the fact that all of the variables are able to 
predict bankruptcy, hybrid models are prone to suffer from multicollinearity. As 
McLeay and Omar (2000) argue, the independent variables do not necessarily have to 
be normally distributed while extreme non-normality can adversely affect results.  
Ideally, market data reflects all available information. Including accounting data should 
therefore add no explanatory power unless market prices do not fully incorporate 
accounting data. As such, the combination of accounting and market data is a very 
practical approach and motivated by an increase in explanatory power. 
2.2.4 Empirical Tests 
There are different approaches to assess the performance of bankruptcy prediction 
models. Early tests mainly focus on simple performance indicators such as portfolio 
sorts or cut-off points (Beaver, 1966; Beaver, 1968) and a classification matrix of type I 
and type II errors (Altman, 1968). More sophisticated approaches have become 
available in recent years: (i) the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves (Hanley 
and McNeil, 1982; Sobehart and Keenan, 2001) to test for forecasting accuracy, (ii) 
information content tests (Hillegeist et al., 2004) to test for bankruptcy related 
information carried by the prediction model, and (iii) evaluation of the economic value 
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with differential misclassification costs (Stein, 2005; Blöchlinger and Leippold, 2006). 
The latter one is of great importance because, in contrast to ROC curve analysis and 
relative information content tests, it takes into account differential misclassification 
costs. Agarwal and Taffler (2007; 2008a) adjust the approach to assess the profitability 
of each model in an illustrative credit market.  
In the literature review above I describe the three basic approaches to assess bankruptcy 
risk using accounting and/or market information. Literature often highlights the 
principal advantages of the respective approaches (e.g. Shumway, 2001; Vassalou and 
Xing, 2004). However, the advantages of each approach do not per se imply better 
forecasting predictions. In the end, what really matters is empirical performance. 
In the following, I present the studies that analyse the performance of (i) accounting-
based vs. market-based models, (ii) hybrid vs. accounting-based models, and (iii) hybrid 
vs. market-based models. 
Accounting-Based vs. Market-Based Models 
Brockman and Turtle (2003) compare their down-and-out call option approach with the 
z-score using a sample of industrial firms on CRSP between 1989 and 1998. In simple 
distress risk sorts, the market approach outperforms z-score. Using information content 
tests, they find that both approaches have significant and incremental bankruptcy related 
information over a one-year prediction horizon. Reisz and Perlich (2007) use two 
accounting-based measures, i.e. z-score and z’’-score (Altman, 1968; Altman and 
Hotchkiss, 2006), and two market-based approaches, i.e. call option and down-and-out 
call option, to test for discriminatory power using 5,784 US industrial firms (CRSP) 
listed between 1988 and 2002. They choose ROC curve analysis to test for forecasting 
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accuracy. For the one-year prediction horizon, they find that the accounting-based z-
score model outperforms the market approaches. Unsurprisingly, the longer the time 
horizons, the worse is the forecasting accuracy of the models while the relative 
performance of the market-based models increases.  
Hillegeist et al. (2004) compare the market approach with the z-score and o-score 
model. They also provide updated versions of the two accounting-based models by 
employing the variables in a hazard model and assess the relative performance by 
information content tests. They find that the market approach carries significantly more 
bankruptcy related information than any of the accounting-based measures. The 
outperformance is robust to the use of z-score or o-score (original and updated) as well 
as to industry adjustments.  
Agarwal and Taffler (2008a) compare the Taffler (1983) z-score with the market-based 
approaches of Hillegeist et al. (2004) and Bharath and Shumway (2008) on the UK 
market using firms listed in the Main market segment anytime between 1985 and 2001 
using ROC curve analysis and information content tests. They also assess the 
differential misclassification costs of the bankruptcy prediction models in an illustrative 
loan market. Using ROC, they find that z-score has higher predictive accuracy than both 
market-based models but the outperformance over the Bharath and Shumway (2008) 
model is insignificant. Using relative information content tests they find both the 
accounting- and the market-based models to be significant and argue that both 
approaches carry incremental bankruptcy related information. Allowing for different 
misclassification costs in an illustrative loan market, they find that z-score has greater 
economic value than the model of Bharath and Shumway (2008) because a bank using 
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z-score has a greater market share and a lower share of loans defaulting, resulting in 
both higher profits and profitability. 
Hybrid vs. Accounting-based models 
Shumway (2001) uses US industrial firms listed between 1963 and 1992 (NYSE and 
AMEX) to compare the predictive power of hybrid and accounting-based bankruptcy 
prediction models. In order to do so, he uses hazard functions and employs the variables 
of his hybrid model and the accounting ratios of Altman (1968), Begley et al. (1996) 
and Zmijewski (1984). Alternatively, he includes the original coefficients of the 
accounting-based models in the hazard functions and tests forecasting accuracy using 
portfolio sorts. His results show that the hybrid specification has higher forecasting 
accuracy than the accounting-based models (both original and hazard coefficients).  
Beaver et al. (2005) test for changes in the forecasting ability of accounting-based and 
market-based ratios for two sub-periods (1962 to 1993 and 1994 to 2002) and industrial 
firms listed on NYSE and AMEX. Simple performance tests are applied using hazard 
models and predictive ability by decile portfolios. They find that the predictive ability 
of financial ratios is offset by the forecasting ability of the market variables. Combining 
the accounting-based and market-based model, the hybrid model outperforms the 
accounting-based model. Similar results are obtained in Beaver, Correia and McNichols 
(2011).  
Charalambakis et al. (2009) use a sample of UK firms listed between 1980 and 2006 on 
London Stock Exchange. They employ z-score (Taffler, 1983) as well as its components 
to compare it with variables similar to Shumway (2001) using hazard functions. They 
show that the coefficients for z-score are insignificant when combined with the 
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Shumway (2001) variables in a hazard function. Also, the hybrid model allocates more 
failures to the high risk decile portfolio.  
Chava and Jarrow (2004) use a sample of US firms listed between 1962 and 1999 and 
available on CRSP. They make use of the variables from the accounting-based Altman 
(1968) and Zmijewski (1984) model and compare it with the Shumway (2001) model. 
They apply simple performance comparisons as well as ROC curve analysis. Chava and 
Jarrow (2004) confirm the outperformance of the Shumway (2001) model over both 
accounting-based models. Moreover, they also show that a model that is only based on 
market value, i.e. prior-returns and idiosyncratic volatility, is nearly as good as 
Shumway (2001) arguing that (i) the accounting-based models do not contribute much 
to the predictive ability of the Shumway (2001) model and (ii) the three market-based 
measures perform better than the two accounting-based models.  
Hybrid vs. Market-Based Models 
While there were only few studies testing hybrid models against accounting-based 
models, there is even less evidence on the performance of hybrid vs. market-based 
models. Campbell et al. (2008) is the only paper that compares their hybrid model with 
the market approach using a sample of CRSP firms listed between 1963 and 2003. They 
use hazard functions (in-sample tests) and information content tests (out-of-sample 
tests). Unfortunately, the results presentation is very brief and it does not provide the 
coefficients with the respective significance for the out-of-sample tests (Table V, p. 
2916). Their in-sample tests show that the market-based model carries significant 
bankruptcy related information when included in a univariate regression and when 
controlled for the variables of the Campbell et al. (2008) model, i.e. the market-based 
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model carries bankruptcy related information incremental to the control variables. 
However, the significance of the control variables is not provided. The results on out-of-
sample tests only show that the pseudo R² is higher for the hybrid than for the market-
based model. As such, the evidence is non-transparent on the performance of the two 
bankruptcy prediction approaches and only suggests that both carry significant 
information in out-of-sample tests. 
2.2.5 Summary Distress Risk Models 
The literature presented above can be summarised as follows: 
1. There are three major approaches to assess bankruptcy risk. They differ in the 
information basis they use. The traditional approach is accounting ratio-based. 
The second alternative is market-based employing the BSM. The third approach 
consists of hazard models that combine accounting ratios and market 
information. 
2. Besides simple tests that use hazard functions and risk sorting, there are three 
performance tests provided. The two most frequently used are ROC curve 
analysis for testing forecasting accuracy and the relative bankruptcy information 
content tests. However, both assume that the costs of erroneous misclassification 
are the same. The method of Stein (2005) and Blöchlinger and Leippold (2006) 
account for the economic impact of differential misclassification costs. 
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3. The evidence on empirical performance of accounting-based and market-based 
models is mixed. Reisz and Perlich (2007) find evidence in favour of the z-score 
while Hillegeist et al. (2004) argue in favour of the market-based approach. The 
results in Agarwal and Taffler (2008a) suggest a higher economic value of the 
z-score when differential misclassification costs are taken into account. 
4. Hybrid models outperform accounting-based models. Chava and Jarrow (2004) 
find that hybrid models carry more bankruptcy related information while others 
find hazard models to have higher predictive power (Shumway, 2001; Beaver et 
al., 2005; Charalambakis et al., 2009; Beaver et al., 2010).  
5. Indicative evidence of the performance of hybrid models vs. market-based 
models is only available in Campbell et al. (2008). Their out-of-sample results 
are non-transparent and indicatively suggest that both approaches carry 
significant bankruptcy related information in information content tests. 
6. None of the existing studies considers ROC, information content tests, and 
differential misclassification costs to test the bankruptcy prediction models, 
except for Agarwal and Taffler (2008a) who compare the market and accounting 
approaches.
9
 
7. None of the present studies compares the accounting, market and hybrid 
approach in a unified test. 
                                                 
9
 Agarwal and Taffler (2007) apply all three tests to examine the performance of the z-score model 
against profit before tax but with binary rather than continuous measures.  
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2.3 Negative Distress Risk Premium 
2.3.1 Positive Distress Risk Premium 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM, Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966) 
predicts that only the systematic risk measure BETA is a complete measure of risk of 
each security i.
10
 However, early tests of the CAPM provide evidence on the forecasting 
ability of characteristics in addition to BETA. Seminal contributions are provided by: 
 Basu (1977) using a sample of US industrial firms listed on NYSE between 1956 
and 1971 finding that stocks with low price-earnings-ratios (PE) outperform 
stocks with high PE, 
 Banz (1981) using a sample of US firms listed on NYSE between 1926 and 1975 
finding that stocks with low market capitalisation outperform stocks with high 
market capitalisation (size effect),  
 Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985) using a sample of US listed firms between 
1980 and 1984 finding that stocks with high book-to-market ratio (BM) 
outperform stocks with low BM, 
 and Bhandari (1988) using a sample of US firms listed on NYSE between 1948 
to 1979 finding that high leverage firms outperform low leverage firms.  
Chan and Chen (1991) examine why small stocks outperform large stocks using a 
sample of US firms listed on NYSE and NASDAQ (1956 to 1985). They use proxies for 
marginal firms (substantial dividend cut and high leverage) which have poor future 
                                                 
10
 BETA is the covariance of return of security i and market return divided by the variance of the market 
return. 
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prospects and find that the returns of the marginal firms explain the size effect. Fama 
and French (1992) study the size and the BM effect on a sample of industrial firms 
listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ between 1962 and 1989. They show that 
market capitalisation and BM are able to subsume the return patterns associated with PE 
and leverage. Similar to Chan and Chen (1991), they argue that the returns of high BM 
stocks are associated with poor prospects firms that are in relative distress. Motivated 
by these findings, Fama and French (1996) adjust CAPM for the two factors SMB and 
HML to mimic the returns earned by small stock and high BM stocks respectively.
11
 
The literature often refers to the two studies as they postulate the “distress hypothesis” 
in explaining the size and BM effect: relative to non-distressed firms, distressed firms 
earn high returns due to the high loadings on SMB and HML. 
The probability of bankruptcy is a natural proxy for the distress risk factor. Several 
studies make use of the accounting-based, market-based and hybrid models introduced 
in the previous sub-chapter. Vassalou and Xing (2004) are the first to employ the 
market-based approach using BSM in the context of stock returns (US data on CRSP 
with a sample period from 1971 to 1999). First, in line with the distress hypothesis, they 
use simple sorts on the BSM score and find a weak but positive distress risk premium 
(present for equally but not for value-weighted portfolio sorts). Second, they use 
sequentially-formed portfolios sorted on distress risk then on size (or BM) and show 
that the size (BM) effect is only present in the highest (highest two) distress risk 
quintiles. They reverse the order of their sorts finding distress risk to be positive and 
                                                 
11
 SMB is Small Minus Big and represents the return of a portfolio that is long on small stocks and short 
on big stocks. HML is High Minus Low and represents the return of a portfolio that is long on high BM 
stocks and short on low BM stocks.  
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significant only in the small (high BM) quintile. They argue that the size and BM effect 
are largely a distress effect though, there is additional return predictability covered by 
SMB and HML. Using a measure of aggregate distress risk, they further claim that 
distress risk is indeed a systematic risk factor.  
However, the results of Vassalou and Xing (2004) are less robust. First, the positive 
distress risk premium in their Table III (p. 845) is weak as it depends on the weighting-
scheme applied. Robustness tests are not provided. Tables VI and VII (p. 852 and 854) 
do not provide the H-L premium for the whole sample on the distress sort, but 
remarkably, it is presented for all other sorts (Tables IV and V). Second, the objective of 
sorting is to control for a certain variable. It is doubtful whether this is possible using 
sequential sorts. For instance, Table IV Panel C (p. 847), the argued size effect in the 
high DLI portfolio can also be driven by distress risk: DLI reduces from 27.45 in the 
small to 14.30 in the big portfolio. A similar problem occurs in Tables V to VII.  
Da and Gao (2010) also raise significant concerns with the findings in Vassalou and 
Xing (2004). In replicating the analysis using US firms on CRSP (1983-1999), they 
show that the positive distress risk premium is (i) only apparent in the first month after 
portfolio formation, and (ii) it is confined to a small subset of stocks with similar default 
likelihoods. In addition, they find that these stocks experienced heavy recent losses 
leading to the conclusion that the positive return premium is due to a short-term return 
reversal.  
Chava and Purnanandam (2010) offer an alternative study using a hybrid model similar 
to Shumway (2001) and an expected default frequency based on a market-based model. 
They use a sample of US firms (excluding financial and utility firms) listed on AMEX, 
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NYSE, or NASDAQ during 1963–2005. In contrast to most empirical stock market 
studies, they employ expected returns (sample period 1980 to 2005) instead of realised 
returns arguing that realised returns are a noisy estimate of expected returns (see as well 
Elton, 1999). They calculate expected return by the implied cost of capital, i.e. the 
discount rate at which the expected cash flows equal the current price. Using consensus 
estimates from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) to estimate expected 
returns, they find that expected returns are positively associated with distress risk using 
sorts on both the hybrid and the market-based model. Further, their cross-sectional 
regressions show that distress dummy variables (derived from decile portfolios) have a 
positive and significant loading. In sharp contrast to that, they find a negative distress 
risk-return relation when they use realised returns instead of expected returns. They 
attribute this contrary finding to investors who were not able to anticipate the risk 
because of unexpectedly high default rates, unexpectedly low cash flows of distressed 
firms and the large negative forecast errors of analysts during the 1980s. 
However, a substantial drawback of studies deriving expected returns using analyst 
forecasts is the low sample size. Although Chava and Purnanandam (2010) are unclear 
about the actual size of their analyst forecast sample, it can be reasonably suspected that 
the analyst coverage is quite low, especially for high distress risk firms as they are 
usually small and not followed by analysts. Several studies provide evidence for this 
assumption (Diether, Malloy and Scherbina, 2002; Taffler, Lu and Kausar, 2004; Da 
and Gao, 2010). As such, while the use of analyst forecasts avoids some drawbacks of 
realised returns, it imposes high limitations on researching expected returns on 
distressed firms.  
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Although the findings in Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Chava and Purnanandam 
(2010) could be argued to be in line with the distress hypothesis, the results are not 
robust as described above. There is no further evidence suggesting a positive distress 
risk-return relation.  
2.3.2 Negative Distress Risk Premium 
Dichev (1998) is the first to research the pricing impact of a distress risk measure using 
Altman’s (1968) z-score and Ohlson’s (1980) o-score on US industrial firms listed at 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ between 1981 and 1995. He finds that for the firms listed 
on NYSE and AMEX, there is a negative distress risk premium for both z-score and o-
score (decile portfolios). However, for NASDAQ stocks there is only a significant 
distress risk-return relationship for o-score; the return relation in z-score is hump-
shaped. He also shows time-series returns long on non-distressed and short on distressed 
firms that earn significant positive returns over the observation period. 
Dichev (1998) also argues that size and BM are not proxying for distress. While 
distressed firms (both z-score and o-score) generally tend to be small and have high 
BM, the most distressed firms do not have the highest BM ratios. As such, in contrast to 
Vassalou and Xing (2004), Dichev (1998) finds a hump-shaped rather than a monotonic 
relation between BM and distress risk (see also Garlappi and Yan, 2011). Further 
rejecting the distress hypothesis, cross-sectional regressions show that size is 
insignificant independent of distress and BM is significant independent of distress. 
However, Dichev (1998) fails to account for the systematic CAPM risk factor beta or 
additional risk-adjustments following Fama and French (1993). 
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Griffin and Lemmon (2002) use Ohlson’s (1980) o-score to analyse the relationship 
between distress, BM and returns for US non-financial firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, 
and NASDAQ between 1965 and 1996. They find an underperformance of high distress 
risk firms that is only present for low BM stocks; the returns of high distress risk stocks 
with high BM are twice as large.
12
 In contrast to the distress hypothesis, risk-adjusted 
returns using the Fama and French (1993) model still exhibit a large underperformance 
of the high distress risk-low BM stocks although they load high on SMB and HML. 
High distress risk firms have characteristics that have a greater chance of being 
mispriced. As such, they find distressed firms to have large return reversals around 
earnings announcements, small market capitalisation and low analyst coverage.  
Ferguson and Shockley (2003) offer a theoretical argument for the risk factors in the 
Fama and French (1993) model and thus for the outperformance over CAPM. They 
argue that the equity only beta, i.e. a beta that is solely derived from an equity only 
index, underestimates systematic risk. Factors related to leverage and distress are 
expected to improve the explanatory power of the CAPM. Since SMB and HML are 
correlated with distress and leverage, the Fama and French (1993) model outperforms 
CAPM. However, their empirical tests using US firms available on CRSP between 1964 
and 2000 show that there is actually a negative distress risk-return relation.  
Although the theoretical explanation of Ferguson and Shockley (2003) is appealing, 
Agarwal and Poshakwale (2010) point out two major empirical problems with their 
study. While the theoretical propositions of Ferguson and Shockley (2003) argue for a 
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 These results are further confirmed using z-score (Altman, 1968). 
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positive distress risk premium, their empirical results (US data) show the opposite. 
Agarwal and Poshakwale (2010) test the implications of the Ferguson and Shockley 
(2003) model using UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment of 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) between 1979 and 2006 and further confirm that (i) 
CAPM (equity only) betas systematically underestimate risk for distressed and levered 
firms while distress (z-score) and leverage factors are correlated with SMB and HML, 
and (ii) there is no outperformance of the Ferguson and Shockley (2003) model over the 
Fama and French (1993) model and that the negative distress risk premium leads to 
large pricing errors. 
These findings cast doubt on the ability of the Fama and French (1993) model to 
account for the distress risk premium. Apart from the underperformance of distressed 
firms, the literature focused on anomalies has identified a robust stock return 
momentum. Jegadeesh (1990) conducts tests using US firms on CRSP (1929-1987) and 
finds stocks that earned high (low) returns in the last three to twelve months earn high 
(low) returns in the following three to twelve months (see as well Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993; 2001). Due to its robustness Fama and French (1998: p. 1653) admit that 
momentum is the "premier anomaly". Similarly, Lewellen (2002) finds momentum to 
be robust to the Fama and French (1993) SMB and HML premia. Carhart (1997) 
recognises as well the importance of the momentum factor and proposes an extension of 
the Fama and French (1993) model to include the momentum factor WML accounting 
for return continuation.
13
 As such, there is an additional benchmark model for distress 
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 WML is Winner Minus Loser and represents the return of a portfolio that is long on prior-winners and 
short on prior-losers.  
 34 
 
risk pricing. However, as the following two studies show, the distress risk premium is 
also robust to the WML factor. 
Campbell et al. (2008) use a hybrid model to assess bankruptcy risk for listed US firms 
(CRSP) between 1981 and 2003. They report a negative relation between distress risk 
and risk-adjusted returns, independent of whether CAPM, the Fama and French (1993) 
model or the Carhart (1997) model is applied. Even more puzzlingly, the loadings on 
the explanatory factors of the alternative models are positively related to distress risk. 
Testing the distress risk premium across size and BM quintiles, Campbell et al. (2008) 
find that the distress anomaly is more pronounced within small or growth stocks but 
generally robust and independent of size and BM. 
Agarwal and Taffler (2008b) establish a link between returns and financial distress risk 
measured by the UK accounting-based z-score model for non-financial firms listed in 
the Main market of LSE between 1979 and 2002. They find that distressed stocks 
underperform although they load high on risk factors i.e. distressed firms have high 
betas and high loadings on SMB and HML. Agarwal and Taffler (2008b) also find that 
distress risk is related to return momentum since the market is likely not to anticipate 
the bad news associated with distress risk. This leads to continuing underperformance of 
distressed firms and drives the medium-term return continuation. In fact, distress risk 
largely subsumes return momentum. Avramov, Chordia, Jostova and Philipov (2007) 
study credit ratings and the momentum effect of US firms on CRSP from 1985 to 2003. 
Similar to Agarwal and Taffler (2008b), they argue that the momentum effect is mainly 
driven by low-graded firms. 
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The above cited studies use available approaches to measure distress risk. However, 
none of the studies actually combines the accounting-based, market-based, and hybrid 
approach to examine the relationship between distress risk and stock returns with the 
benefit of a consistent methodology. Since previous literature shows mixed results 
while using the same distress risk measure (e.g. Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2010), it seems important to provide definite and robust evidence.  
Beside the use of distress risk measure, there are a number of studies that use more 
direct distress risk indicators. For instance, Lamont, Polk, Saá-Requejo (2001) construct 
a financial constraints index for US manufacturing firms on CRSP between 1968 and 
1997. They show that constrained firms earn low average stock returns (after risk-
adjustment for beta, size, BM and momentum). Moreover, Lamont et al. (2001) argue 
that the returns of financially-constraint firms tend to move together supporting the 
view that constrained firms are subject to common shocks. Alternatively, Avramov, 
Chordia, Jostova and Philipov (2009) analyse stock returns and credit ratings for US 
firms on CRSP from 1985 to 2007. They document low average returns for low-graded 
firms (after risk-adjustment for beta, size, BM and momentum). More specifically, 
Avramov et al. (2009) observe that the underperformance is substantial in the three 
months prior and subsequent to credit rating downgrades. Anginer and Yildizhan (2010) 
provide a return analysis using credit spreads for industrial US firms on CRSP listed 
from 1980 to 2006. Consistent with related studies, they argue that returns of firms with 
higher credit spreads are anomalously low (after risk-adjustment for BETA, SIZE, BM 
and momentum). In addition, they argue that the distress anomaly does not stand on its 
own but is an amalgamation of anomalies associated with leverage, volatility and 
profitability. However, as described earlier, the use of sequential sorts is less robust. 
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2.3.3 Summary Negative Distress Risk Premium 
1. Chan and Chen (1991) and Fama and French (1992) provide a distress related 
explanation for the high returns earned by small and high BM stocks. Motivated 
by these findings, Fama and French (1992) suggest a model that adjusts the 
CAPM by the factors SMB and HML that account for the size and BM effect. 
The distress hypothesis is: relative to non-distressed firms, distressed firms earn 
high returns due to their high loadings on SMB and HML. In addition to that, 
Carhart (1997) suggests a further extension to account for return momentum.  
2. Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Chava and Purnanandam (2010) find general 
evidence for the distress hypothesis as they find distress risk to be positively 
associated with subsequent returns. However, the results are limited and not 
confirmed in similar studies (Da and Gao, 2010).  
3. Majority of studies find a negative distress risk premium (e.g. Dichev, 1998; 
Agarwal and Taffler, 2008b). Even more puzzlingly, distressed firms score high 
on the usual risk measures as they show high loadings on the risk factors (e.g. 
Campbell et al., 2008; Avramov et al., 2010).  
4. Although there is substantial evidence for the negative distress risk premium 
using different distress risk proxies, none of the studies actually tested the price 
impact of all three available approaches to measure distress risk in a unified test. 
This could provide additional reliability in the pricing of distress risk. 
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2.4 Explaining the Negative Distress Risk Premium 
2.4.1 Introduction 
While there is little and weak evidence on a positive distress risk-return relation 
(Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010), the majority of studies find 
a negative distress risk premium (e.g. Dichev, 1998; Griffin and Lemmon, 2002; 
Agarwal and Taffler, 2008b). Although this seems to be at odds with the traditional 
finance paradigm, there are studies seeking an explanation of the distress puzzle. In the 
following, I review and summarise the literature on the risk-based shareholder 
advantage explanation, the limits of arbitrage, and the gambling retail investors. 
2.4.2 Shareholder Advantage 
Zhang (2012: p. 225) provides a definition of shareholder advantage: “When liquidation 
upon default results in a significant amount of losses in firm values, creditors may 
forgive some of the debt if doing so gives debt holders more than the recovery rate they 
would otherwise obtain from a complete liquidation. This creates incentives for 
shareholders to default opportunistically.” The definition implies that shareholders 
strategically default on debt to enforce a firm restructuring at cost of debt holders. This 
advantage of shareholders becomes more valuable with increasing distress risk and thus, 
changes equity risk fundamentally. Garlappi, Shu and Yan (2008) and Garlappi and Yan 
(2011) recognise the effect of shareholder recovery in their valuation model that 
explicitly accounts for leverage (BM) and distress risk. They argue that at low levels of 
default probability, higher leverage increases equity beta. At high levels of default 
probability, the shareholder advantage de-levers the equity risk. As such, they predict a 
hump-shaped relation of equity beta and expected returns in distress risk. 
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The shareholder advantage theory provides three main testable implications. First, it 
provides a direct explanation for the distress risk premium: since equity beta is hump-
shaped in distress risk, stock returns are expected to decrease for high distress risk 
firms. As such, the relative low returns earned by distressed firms are actually in line 
with the equity risk once strategic default is taken into account. The empirical analysis 
of Garlappi and Yan (2011) is based on a sample of US non-financial firms on CRSP 
for the years 1969 to 2007. Using CAPM and Dimson (1979) portfolio betas (both 
equally- and value-weighted) and decile distress risk portfolios, Garlappi and Yan 
(2011) find a hump-shaped relation between beta and distress risk. Consistent with their 
predictions, beta increases up to the 7
th
 decile and drops in the highest distress risk 
deciles (p. 809). 
Second, the theory predicts that the value premium (i.e. stocks long on high BM, short 
on low BM) is also hump-shaped in distress risk: the relation between BM and stock 
returns depends on the level of distress risk. Since returns on distress risk are hump-
shaped, the value premium is also expected to be hump-shaped. For low levels of 
distress risk, the value premium is positive while for high levels of distress risk the 
value premium is negative. Garlappi and Yan (2011) use independent sorts on distress 
risk (deciles) and BM (terciles) to show that the value premium increases with distress 
risk up to the 8
th
 distress risk decile and drops for the high distress risk portfolios (p. 
811). The findings are robust to equal- and value-weighting as well as risk-adjusted 
value premia using CAPM, the Fama and French (1993) model, the Carhart (1997) 
model and the model of Pástor and Stambaugh (2003).  
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Third, the theory predicts that momentum profits are more pronounced in high distress 
risk firms: for low levels of default risk, negative price shocks increase both distress risk 
and expected returns. Thus, there is a negative autocorrelation. For high levels of risk, a 
negative price shock increases distress risk but, due to the shareholder advantage effect, 
it lowers both equity risk and expected return. Thus, there is a positive autocorrelation. 
Garlappi and Yan (2011) use quintile distress risk portfolios and quintile prior-return 
portfolios (resulting in a 5x5 return matrix) in two way sorts to examine the relation 
between distress risk and momentum (p. 817). They find that momentum profits 
increase with distress risk. In an additional analysis including proxies for shareholder 
recovery (size of total assets, R&D expenditures, industry concentration), they show 
that momentum profits are most pronounced in high distress risk-high shareholder 
recovery portfolios (p. 815).
14
 
However, the results in Garlappi and Yan (2011) are less transparent on critical issues. 
For instance, they argue that equity risk and expected stock returns are hump-shaped in 
distress risk but in Table II (p. 809) they only report beta, not returns. As such, they 
miss the definite evidence for a hump-shaped relation of distress risk and returns which 
is the basis for all predictions. The results presented in Garlappi et al. (2008) are 
similarly inconclusive. The scepticism on the return pattern also applies to the use of a 
market-based measure as distress risk proxy. As the literature review in the previous 
sub-chapter shows, the evidence on the stock price impact of market-based measures is 
mixed (Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010). As such, clarity on 
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 Garlappi et al. (2008) provide similar results while including the size of tangible assets as an additional 
proxy. 
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the returns is required as well as additional robustness by using alternatives to the 
market-based distress risk measures. 
In addition to that, their theoretical model assumes that the resolution of distress risk is 
costless and frictionless. Zhang (2012) tests the predictions in Garlappi and Yan (2011) 
using US non-financial firms on CRSP between 1975 and 2006. He uses bondholder 
and shareholder dispersion as well as short-term debt as proxies for renegotiation 
frictions. However, he finds that the shareholder advantage effect on returns is only 
present where renegotiation frictions are less distinct or where the shareholder 
advantage effect is particularly strong. Though, the effect is observed for firms with 
private debt only. This limits the explanatory power of the theoretical framework of 
shareholder advantage. 
On the other hand, there is indicative and supporting evidence for the predictions and 
results in Garlappi and Yan (2011). Hackbarth, Haselmann and Schönherr (2011) argue 
that the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act (BRA) unexpectedly augmented shareholders’ 
bargaining power. For instance, they claim that violations of the absolute priority rule 
increased as a consequence of the introduction of the BRA. Examining the returns of 
US firms on CRSP from 1972 to 1984, they find that the positive distress risk premium 
found before the introduction of BRA turns negative after the introduction of the BRA. 
Hackbarth et al. (2011) deduce that the sign change in distress risk premium is due to 
the shareholders’ bargaining power and thus, the lower risk exposure of shareholders of 
highly distressed firms.  
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Besides the empirical proof of Garlappi and Yan (2011) and the indicative evidence of 
Zhang (2012) and Hackbarth et al. (2011), there is no study that tests the empirical 
predictions of the shareholder advantage theory. The very basic predictions related to 
equity risk, returns, value premium, and return momentum in distress risk are 
uncontested in literature. Moreover, Garlappi and Yan (2011) use a market-based 
distress risk measure which has mixed return impact in previous studies (e.g. Vassalou 
and Xing, 2004; Campbell et al., 2008). As such, their results lack robustness. Although 
Garlappi and Yan (2011) downplay the importance of violations of the absolute priority 
rule, the theory has to be tested in different bankruptcy regimes since the legal settings 
might restrict violations of the absolute priority rule or resolutions of financial distress.  
The literature on shareholder advantage can be summarised as follows: 
1. Shareholders are able to derive some recovery value from the resolution of 
financial distress (shareholder advantage). As this becomes more likely the 
closer the firm is to bankruptcy, the shareholder advantage effect de-levers 
distress risk and equity risk decreases for high levels of distress risk. Thus, 
equity risk and returns are hump-shaped in distress risk. 
2. The valuation model of Garlappi et al. (2008) and Garlappi and Yan (2011) 
accounts for leverage and shareholder advantage and predicts a hump-shape of 
equity risk and returns in distress risk, a positive value premium for low distress 
risk firms, a negative value premium for high distress risk firms, and a more 
distinct momentum effect for high distress risk firms.  
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3. Empirical tests are limited in literature. Zhang (2012) provides first evidence 
and shows that the shareholder advantage affect is restricted to private debt 
firms. Hackbarth et al. (2011) provide indicative supporting evidence. 
4. None of the studies examines the robustness of the very basic predictions in 
relation to different distress risk measures and bankruptcy regime. 
2.4.3 Limits of Arbitrage  
Modern portfolio theory assumes that market prices fully reflect all available 
information (Fama, 1970; Fama, 1991). However, the existence of stock market 
anomalies is often referred to be due to investor’s inability to assess the value of a firm 
according to its underlying risk (Barberis and Thaler, 2003).
15
 La Porta, Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1996) argue that a significant portion of the value premium is due 
to earnings surprises, that is, investors underestimate (overestimate) the future earnings 
of high (low) BM securities. As investors slowly acknowledge the underlying risk of the 
security, prices gradually drift towards their fair values. Similarly, Dichev and Piotroski 
(2001) find that stocks earn significant negative abnormal returns in the first year 
following rating downgrades. Since this is not found for rating upgrades, they claim that 
investors underreact to bad news (see as well Hong, Lim and Stein, 2000). In a similar 
vein, Taffler et al. (2004) find a significant market underreaction to UK firms disclosing 
going-concern audit reports. Although behavioural-based asset pricing models 
deliberately account for such misjudgements (Subrahmanyam, 2008), the question still 
is why these profit opportunities persist without being exploited by arbitrageurs.  
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 Barberis and Thaler (2003) summarise the irrational behaviour as people form beliefs due to investor 
overconfidence, optimism and wishful thinking, representativeness, conservatism, belief perseverance, 
and anchoring. 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that for mispricings to persist in the presence of 
sophisticated investors there must be some limits of arbitrage. They claim that in real 
world arbitrageurs face some long run fundamental risks and their pay offs are not 
certain.  
Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) and Pontiff (2006) argue that arbitrage is not costless. 
For instance, Pontiff (1996) analyses the market values of 52 close-end funds between 
1965 and 1985 and finds that investors are unable to trade opportunistically on the 
discounts of close-end funds due to high arbitrage costs (proxied by price and market 
value). Taffler et al. (2004) analyse the return of first-time going concern modified 
(GCM) audit reports of 108 non-financial UK firms listed on LSE and the Unlisted 
Securities Market (USM) between 1995 and 2000 and find a robust underperformance 
of -24% to -31% in the year following the GCM audit report. In spite of this substantial 
underperformance, they show that an illustrative arbitrage trading strategy is 
unprofitable due to high implementation costs (proxied by bid-ask spread, shorting and 
trading commission costs). Kausar, Taffler and Tan (2009) reach similar conclusions 
using a US sample of non-financial, non-utility firms with 1,293 GCM audit reports 
between 1993 and 2005. As such, the studies show that high transaction costs impede 
the observed profit opportunities. 
Ali, Hwang and Trombley (2003) use a sample of US firms listed on NYSE and AMEX 
between 1976 and 1997 to examine the returns on the BM anomaly (Rosenberg et al., 
1985). Besides a range of proxies for arbitrage costs (e.g. bid-ask spread, price, and 
volume), investor sophistication, and firm size, they use as well idiosyncratic volatility 
(arbitrage risk) to explore the impact on BM returns. While all limits of arbitrage 
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proxies are associated with a higher predictability of the BM returns, it is strongly and 
most consistently related to idiosyncratic volatility. As such, they show that it is not 
only transaction costs that limits arbitrage activity but as well arbitrage risk. These 
findings are consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1997) who argue that arbitrage risk 
deters arbitrage activity.  
Mendenhall (2004) examines the post-earnings announcement drift for US firms 
available on CRSP between 1991 and 2000. He applies several proxies for arbitrage 
costs (price and volume), arbitrage risk (idiosyncratic volatility following Wurgler and 
Zhuravskaya (2002)) and investor sophistication (institutional ownership and analysts 
following). Using cross-sectional tests, he finds that the magnitude of post-earnings 
announcement drift is strongly decreasing with trading volume and strongly increasing 
with idiosyncratic volatility. Mashruwala, Rajgopal and Shevlin (2006) use similar 
proxies and transaction costs (price, volume, size) to study the accruals and cash flow 
anomaly (Sloan, 1996). Employing a sample of US industrial firms between 1975 and 
2000 and cross-sectional tests, they find that the anomaly is more pronounced for low 
priced/low volume stocks and abnormal returns are higher for high idiosyncratic risk 
firms. Thus, both Mendenhall (2004) and Mashruwala et al. (2006) further confirm that 
the existence of the respective anomaly is due to both arbitrage costs and arbitrage risk. 
Pontiff (1996) argues that even without arbitrage costs or arbitrage risks involved in 
exploiting arbitrage opportunities, the existence of sophisticated investors does not 
guarantee that prices will reflect fundamental values due to the institutional 
environment. Almazan, Brown, Carlson and Chapman (2004) examine US funds’ SEC 
filings from 1994 to 2000 and find that while 31% have investment policies allowing 
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them to short sell, only 10% of those eligible to short sell actually do. Moreover, Nagel 
(2005), using US firms on CRSP between 1980 and 2003, highlights problems in 
implementing short selling strategies. He argues that the main stock suppliers for short 
trades are institutional investors. Since institutional holdings in overpriced firms are 
typically low, there is no stock supply for a short trade strategy. Indeed, his empirical 
tests show that return predictability of stock returns is more pronounced in stocks with 
low institutional ownership. Similarly, D’Avolio (2002) analyses proprietary data of a 
US security lender between April 2000 to September 2001 and finds that 16% of the 
stocks in CRSP are potentially impossible to borrow (and hence, to sell short).  
As with other underreaction anomalies, it is possible that the distress anomaly is also 
driven by arbitrage costs and arbitrage risk. Campbell e t al. (2008: p. 2935) close their 
study with “The limits to arbitrage help us to understand how the distress anomaly has 
persisted into the 21st century.” Given this request, it is surprising that none of the 
present studies explicitly tests for the limits of arbitrage using different distress risk 
measures.  
The literature review on limits of arbitrage can be summarised as stated below: 
1. Arbitrage is subject to trading costs and volatility. Market mispricing is more 
pronounced for stocks that have high transactions costs (e.g. high bid-ask 
spread, low price, low volume, stock borrowing costs, trading commissions) and 
high volatility. 
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2. Against the textbook descriptions, institutional investors make very little use of 
the perceived arbitrage opportunities. They either do not short sell (e.g. due to 
their investment charter) or they are unable to implement their strategy due to a 
paucity of stock supply. 
3. Present studies fail to assess the potential of limits of arbitrage to explain the 
negative distress risk premium using different distress risk proxies. 
2.4.4 Lottery Stocks 
Friedman and Savage (1948) as well as Markowitz (1952) incorporate the option of 
buying lottery tickets as opposed to insurances in defining the utility from investments. 
Both studies note that utility is not a constant function and that the level of income or 
socio-economic class of the investor determines the willingness to gamble. Statman 
(2002) explains the phenomena of lottery playing by arguing that some people see 
buying lotteries or equivalently, trading on the stock market, as the only option to 
increase social status. Barberis and Huang (2008) model this preference to gamble by 
introducing a model of cumulative prospect theory using transformed rather than 
objective probabilities. This involves people’s preference for positively skewed returns 
leading to an overpricing of such stocks. 
Kumar (2009) uses socioeconomic characteristics to infer gambling preferences for 
stock investment decisions. This requires a definition of both the socioeconomic 
characteristics and lottery-type socks. For the socioeconomic characteristics, Kumar 
(2009) draws on the evidence on state lotteries that finds the propensity to play the 
lottery to be higher for poor, young, and relatively poorly educated single men, who live 
in urban areas and belong to minorities and religious groups. To identify investors with 
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these characteristics, Kumar (2009) uses a proprietary dataset of a US discount 
brokerage house that contains investor information (e.g. age income, location) from 
1991 to 1996. In addition to that, he attributes racial and ethnic characteristics from 
various databases (e.g. US Census) to the investor by his location (assumption: people 
in zip-code area 1 are more educated so investors in zip-code 1 are educated). Lottery-
type stocks are defined following Markowitz (1952: p. 1555): “Lotteries have large 
chances of a small loss for a small chance for a large gain.” As such, Kumar (2009) 
identifies lottery-type stocks by their low prices, high volatility and high skewness. He 
uses firms available on CRSP from 1980 to 2005. 
First, consistent with the research on state lotteries, Kumar (2009) finds that the salient 
socioeconomic factors that are associated with higher expenditures in lottery stocks are 
also associated with higher investments in lottery-type stocks. While individual 
investors exhibit a distinct preference for lottery-type stocks, institutional investors 
avoid them. In a subsequent study, Han and Kumar (2011) use US stock market data 
between 1983 and 2000 and show that the retail trading proportion (defined as the 
monthly dollar value of trades with a volume smaller than $ 5,000 divided by the total 
monthly trading volume) is higher for lottery-type stocks. They conclude that 
speculation in lottery-type stocks is not only conducted by gamblers but by retail 
investors in general. Importantly, institutional investors are found to underweight those 
stocks. 
Second, Kumar (2009) observes low average returns for investments in lottery-type 
stocks. Han and Kumar (2011) argue that lottery-type stocks are held by retail investors 
and thus, they generalise the findings as they document an underperformance of stocks 
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with high retail trading proportion. Similarly, Statman (2002) argues that stock 
gambling, as opposed to stock holding, leads to negative returns. Previous studies also 
have examined the impact of characteristics that are associated with lottery-type stocks. 
For instance, Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang (2006; 2009) provide US and international 
evidence that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility earn low subsequent stock 
returns. Similarly, Bali, Cakici and Whitelaw (2011) examine the impact of highly 
skewed returns (i.e. maximum daily return in the prior-month) using US market data 
(CRSP) between 1962 and 2005. They show that individual investors are willing to pay 
more for stocks with an extreme positive historical daily return leading to low future 
returns. However, they also show that the negative return relation with idiosyncratic risk 
found in Ang et al. (2006; 2009) is reversed once they control for the lottery feature of 
extreme past return. As such, literature provides evidence that lottery-type 
characteristics such as idiosyncratic volatility and high daily past month returns have a 
negative relation with subsequent stock returns as well as that the lottery-type 
characteristics might be related to each other. 
Instead of filtering lottery-type stocks by certain characteristics, Coelho et al. (2010) 
take a sample of 351 non-finance, non-utility industry Chapter 11 firms between 1979 
and 2005 that remain listed on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ.
16
 Indeed, they argue that 
consistent with Markowitz (1952) definition of a lottery, Chapter 11 firms trade at a few 
cents while offering a low probability of a huge future reward but very high probability 
of a small loss. In line with the other lottery-stock studies, they find that, on average, 
                                                 
16
 The study of Coelho and Taffler (2009) is assumed to be an earlier version of the paper. 
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individual investors own 90% of firms under Chapter 11. Also, those firms earn a 
negative return of -28% over the year following the Chapter 11 filing.  
Coelho et al. (2010) is the only study that explores the connection between lottery 
characteristics and bankruptcies, i.e. Chapter 11. The potential power of lottery-type 
stocks to explain the overpricing of distressed stocks before the Chapter 11 filing, i.e. 
using distress risk measures, is not yet explored in literature.  
Before summarising the literature on lottery-type stocks, please note that the lottery 
stock literature shares some commonalities with the limits of arbitrage literature. On a 
general basis, the limits of arbitrage literature employs proxies mostly identical to those 
of lottery-type stocks. For instance, studies on limits of arbitrage usually apply share 
price, idiosyncratic volatility, idiosyncratic skewness, bid-ask spread, institutional 
ownership, low analyst coverage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 
2002; Ali et al., 2003). More specifically, Mendenhall (2004) and Mashruwala et al. 
(2006) use the identifiers of lottery-type stocks, i.e. low price, high volatility and high 
skewness, to proxy for limits of arbitrage. As such, there is high commonality in the 
variables that are used to proxy for limits of arbitrage and lottery-type stocks.  
Further, the literature provides direct evidence for the connection between limits of 
arbitrage and lottery-stocks. Han and Kumar (2011) note that lottery-type stocks face 
high limits of arbitrage as they tend to have a very low market capitalisation, low price, 
high idiosyncratic volatility, low institutional ownership and low analyst coverage. Bali 
et al. (2011) argue that the stocks they define as lottery-type stocks are also the ones that 
are hard to arbitrage. Coelho et al. (2010) conclude that the post-Chapter 11 filing drift 
is caused by both gambling retail investors and limits of arbitrage. Thus, one can argue 
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that lottery-type characteristics describe the market frictions associated with limits of 
arbitrage or vice versa. 
My literature review on lottery stocks can be summarised as follows: 
1. Typical lottery-type stocks are low-priced, have high volatility and highly 
skewed stock returns. Literature finds that lottery-type stocks are primarily 
traded by retail investors. 
2. Lottery-type stocks underperform. 
3. Chapter 11 firms have lottery-type characteristics, they are traded by retail 
investors and they underperform after the Chapter 11 filing. 
4. There is a high commonality with limits of arbitrage. Especially, share price and 
volatility are frequently used for proxying for implementation costs and risk of 
arbitrage.  
5. Existing studies have not yet analysed the impact of lottery characteristics on the 
negative distress risk pricing using distress risk measures.  
In the next chapter I define my research questions and research propositions that address 
the gaps in the literature described in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3:  RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND PROPOSITIONS 
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3.1 Which of the alternative approaches to predict bankruptcies is 
the best? 
Bankruptcy prediction measures differ in their information basis. There are accounting-
based models (e.g. Altman, 1968), market-based models (e.g. Vassalou and Xing, 
2004), and hybrid models (e.g. Shumway, 2001). The performance of bankruptcy 
prediction models can be assessed by their forecasting accuracy using ROC curve 
analysis (Hanley and McNeil, 1982; Sobehart and Stein, 2000), by their bankruptcy 
related information using information content tests (Hillegeist et al., 2004), and by their 
economic value under differential misclassification costs using an illustrative credit loan 
market following Stein (2005) and Blöchlinger and Leippold (2006). Existing literature 
fails to provide a comprehensive test that compares the three different approaches with 
the full range of performance tests. I establish the following propositions:  
P1: The three different bankruptcy prediction measures have different predictive ability. 
P2: All three measures carry bankruptcy related information incremental to each other. 
P3: There is a difference in performance once misclassification costs are taken into 
account. 
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3.2 Is there a distress risk premium and does it depend on the 
distress risk measure? 
While Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Chava and Purnanandam (2010) report a positive 
distress risk-return relation, the majority of studies find a puzzling underperformance of 
distressed firms (e.g. Dichev, 1998; Griffin and Lemmon, 2002; Agarwal and Taffler, 
2008b). However, none of the present studies compares the influence on subsequent 
stock returns using the three alternative distress risk measures. I thus review existing 
evidence and test the following research propositions: 
P4: There is a distress risk premium in stock returns. 
P5: The distress risk premium depends on the proxy for distress risk. 
3.3 Can shareholder advantage, gambling retail investors or limits 
of arbitrage explain the negative distress risk premium? 
Literature provides several potential explanations to explain the empirically found 
underperformance of distressed firms. These include shareholder advantage (Garlappi et 
al., 2008; Garlappi and Yan, 2011), limits of arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), and 
gambling retail investors (Kumar, 2009; Han and Kumar, 2011).  
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Shareholder advantage 
Within their valuation framework that explains the low returns of distressed firms, 
Garlappi et al. (2008) and Garlappi and Yan (2011) predict that beta and the value 
premium are hump-shaped in distress risk. I therefore test the following proposition: 
P6: There is a hump-shaped relation between BETA and distress risk as well as between 
the value premium and distress risk. 
Limits of arbitrage 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that due to the existence of sophisticated investors, 
there must be limits of arbitrage for mispricings to persist. Distressed firms have 
characteristics that are usually associated with limits of arbitrage (Taffler et al., 2004; 
Kausar et al., 2009). Thus, my research proposition is: 
P7: Limits of arbitrage hinder sophisticated investors’ ability to correct the overpricing 
of distressed firms. 
Gambling Retail Investors 
Kumar (2009) argues that the priority of retail investors is on gambling, not on profit-
maximisation. Coelho et al. (2010) find that Chapter 11 firms have lottery-type 
characteristics. As such, the demand for lottery-type stocks like distressed firms could 
lead to their overpricing. I test the following proposition: 
P8: Gambling retail investors drive the overpricing of distressed firms. 
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3.4 Does one of the components of the distress risk measures drive 
the returns or is it the composite? 
The research questions and research propositions above aim to test explanations of the 
negative distress risk premium. An alternative is to unravel the negative distress risk 
premium by exploring the drivers of it. Distress risk measures are composite measures 
drawing their explanatory power from accounting- and/or market-based variables. Since 
the composite distress risk measures are found to be significant in subsequent stock 
returns, one or more of its components must be significant in subsequent stock returns. 
Therefore, I test the following proposition: 
P9: One or more of the components of the distress risk measures drive the observed 
distress risk premium.  
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CHAPTER 4:  DATA AND METHOD 
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4.1 Sample Selection 
4.1.1 Selection Criteria and Data Sources  
The sample contains all UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment of 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE). In the following, I outline the selection process and 
the data sources used.  
The primary data source is the London Share Price Database (LSPD) with a total 
number of over 20,000 firms. Stepwise, I discard firms irrelevant for this research or 
where market or accounting data is not (sufficiently) available. First, I exclude 
secondary and non-equity listings, non-UK companies, companies not denominated 
in £, and financial industry firms (e.g. banks, insurance companies, trusts and 
investment companies).  
Second, the LSPD sample is matched with Datastream, the source of market data i.e. the 
sample is limited to the firms that have market data available in Datastream. I further 
exclude companies that Datastream classifies as secondary and non-equity listings, non-
UK/£ companies, or financial industry firms.  
Third, the market data sample is then checked for available accounting data on 
Datastream. I also match the sample (by e.g. company name, SEDOL, ISIN) with other 
accounting data sources such as Exstat and Company Analysis. For some failed firms I 
use hand-collected data from Fame (Bureau van Dijk) and the London Business School 
Library (LBS). Exstat is the primary accounting data source for the early sample years 
while Datastream and Company Analysis have good coverage in more recent years. The 
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following order is generally used when accounting data is available from multiple 
sources: Datastream, Exstat then Company Analysis.  
4.1.2 Market Segments and Empirical Studies 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) offers primarily two market segments for equity listings, 
the Main market and the Alternative Investment Market (AIM).
17
 There are a number of 
structural differences between the two segments: 
 As with other prime standards in the EU, Main market is regulated by EU law. 
In contrast, AIM is privately operated by LSE, implements less strict trading 
rules, and falls under the classification of the Multilateral Trading Facility 
(MTF).  
 Main-listed firms require a minimum free-float of 25% and a minimum market 
capitalisation of £ 700k. In contrast, AIM rules do not prescribe such minimum 
liquidity requirements. 
 AIM firms are required to have a nominated advisor that is responsible for all 
transactions and liaises with AIM regulation to confirm that admission criteria 
and AIM rules are met.  
 Main-listed firms must provide financial information in a more frequent and 
timely manner than AIM-listed firms. For instance, annual and half-year 
accounts are required to be published within four months after the financial 
closing date (for AIM it is six months). Interim management statements must 
only be provided for Main-listed firms. 
                                                 
17
 The Unlisted Securities Market (USM) was closed shortly after the introduction of AIM.  
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 International Financial Accounting Standards were introduced for Main-listed 
firms from January 2005 while for AIM firms from January 2007. 
 Main market firms have to conform with the corporate governance rules of the 
Financial Service Authority (FSA) while for AIM firms there is no official 
requirement (expected market practice). 
 AIM firms are eligible for tax benefits schemes (e.g. Venture Capital Tax relief) 
that are designed to encourage investment in small-high risk firms (HM Revenue 
& Customs). 
These arguments illustrate that Main and AIM have fundamental differences in their 
listing requirements. The effect is illustrated by the following two examples. The 
average failure rate of Main is 0.91% compared to an average failure rate of 2.80% at 
AIM (not tabulated) implying that AIM firms are more risky than Main firms. Further, 
firm characteristics are significantly different between the two segments. As of January 
2012, 884 UK firms were listed on Main while approximately the same number of firms 
was listed on AIM (902). However, UK Main firms have about 97.49% of the total 
market capitalisation.
18
 I apply the selection process described above as well to firms 
listed on AIM or Unlisted Securities Market (USM) and compare the market 
capitalisation (median) of the sample with Main firms (from portfolio year 1981). 
Figure 1 illustrates that there is a substantial difference in annual market capitalisation 
especially for the more recent years. Based on the differences in listing requirements 
(e.g. minimum liquidity requirements, introduction of IFRS) and firm characteristics I 
                                                 
18
 Trading Summary Statistics January 2012, London Stock Exchange, See: London Stock Exchange, 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/home/statistics.htm (accessed 10th Feb 2012). 
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argue that studies have to differentiate between market segments and that combining 
firms of different market segments in the same analysis leads to less robust results. 
My sample is limited to firms listed on the Main market segment of London Stock 
Exchange. 
 
Figure 1 Market Capitalisation Main and AIM/USM 
This figure shows the median market capitalisation of UK non-financial firms listed in the 
Main, AIM and USM segment of the London Stock Exchange. Market capitalisation is taken at 
the end of each September between 1981 and 2009.  
4.1.3 Key Dates and Time-Subscripts 
Empirical studies on stock markets use information cut-off dates where data is available 
or assumed to be available. This cut-off date is the portfolio formation date (PFD). US 
studies usually choose the PFD to be at the end of June. It is assumed that most firms 
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have their financial year-ends at the end of December and thus, with a time-lag of six 
months accounting data is made public by the end of June latest.
19
 
Agarwal and Taffler (2008b) find that for the UK, financial year-ends are more 
distributed in the calendar year. In their sample, 37% of the firms have financial year-
ends in December while about the same number of firms have year-ends between 
January and April with approximately 22% of firms having March year-ends. Agarwal 
and Taffler (2008b) choose the PFD to be at the end of September. I indicatively check 
the financial year-ends of my sample and make a similar observation as Agarwal and 
Taffler (2008b). Figure 2 reports that 39% of the companies have a financial year-end in 
December and 22% in March. The line shows the average age of the accounting data 
using a time-lag of five months allowing for accounting data to made public.
20
 It shows 
that the most up-to-date accounting numbers are available using a PFD at the end of 
August (average age 8.8 months). However, for UK studies it became standard to use a 
portfolio formation date at the end of September (e.g. Agarwal and Taffler, 2008b; 
Christidis and Gregory, 2010) and thus, I follow their approach and set the PFD to the 
end of September/beginning of October. In fact, Figure 2 shows that the average age of 
accounting data at the end of September (9.0 months) is only marginally higher than at 
the end of August. 
                                                 
19
 This stems from listing requirements. Today, firms listed at NYSE Amex are required to submit their 
annual reports to shareholders and to the exchange not later than four months after the close of the last 
preceding fiscal year of the company (NYSE Amex LLC Company, § 611 TIME OF PUBLICATION).  
20
 Similar to NYSE, UK Main market (LSE) firms are obliged to submit their annual reports no later than 
four months after the close of the last preceding fiscal year of the company. See: London Stock Exchange, 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/Main market/documents/brochures/Main 
market-continuing-obligations.pdf (accessed 20
th
 Oct 2011). 
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Figure 2 Financial Year-Ends 1979 to 2009 
This figure shows indicative information on financial year-ends of the sample from 1979 to 
2009. The sample includes UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the 
London Stock Exchange. Financial Year-End presents the Percentage of Companies in the 
sample with financial year-ends in the respective month averaged across years. Average Age 
Accounting Data is the average time from the financial year-end month until the respective 
month. The average is weighted by the share of financial year-end and includes a five month 
time lag. 
This study uses annual data intervals. A portfolio year is thus defined as the twelve 
months from October to September. Throughout this document, subscript t denotes the 
beginning of each portfolio year (i.e. October). Subscript m is an integer between 1 and 
12 and denotes the month-ends of the portfolio year from October to September. As 
such, t denotes the beginning of October in portfolio year t, t+1 is the end of October in 
portfolio year t, t+2 the end of November,…, t+12 is the end of September in portfolio 
year t. Likewise, t-1 denotes the previous portfolio year. 
To be included in the sample, companies must be listed for at least 12 months. While 
market data is taken at the end of September, while accounting data is used with a lag of 
five months i.e. to be included at t, companies must have the fiscal year-ends between 
May t-1 and April t. I relax this restriction for failed firms: in the portfolio year of 
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failure I use the most recent accounting data with fiscal years ending between May t-2 
and April t. 
4.1.4 Bankrupt Firms 
An important part of this study is to identify firms that went bankrupt. However, neither 
bankruptcy nor failure is a strictly defined term. Karels and Prakash (1987) identify this 
problem and clearly illustrate it with a summary of terms that have been used (Table 1 
page 576, Karels and Prakash (1987)). To have a clean definition of economic failure, I 
identify it by equating it with one of the following failure-terminology: liquidation, 
administration/ receivership or valueless company.
21
 The following sources are used to 
identify and cross-check the sample of failed firms. 
First, I use the death codes given in LSPD. Death codes 16 (receiver 
appointed/liquidation, probably valueless, but not yet certain) and 20 (in 
administration/administrative receivership) are included according to the failure-
terminology. Firms with codes 7 (liquidation, usually valueless, but there may be 
liquidation payments) and 21 (cancelled and assumed valueless) are included unless 
shareholders received any terminal payment. In contrast to Christidis and Gregory 
(2010), I exclude all other cases of cancellations or suspensions. Second, I manually 
complement the sample with the failures provided by the Capital Gains Tax Book/HM 
Revenue & Customs (companies in receivership and/or liquidation or companies of 
negligible value). Third, I use Factiva (primary source is Regulatory News Service) to 
                                                 
21
 As Agarwal and Taffler (2007) point out, in the UK the term bankruptcy applies only to persons. To 
conform to other studies, I use it interchangeably with failure or liquidation/receivership and valueless 
companies. 
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manually complement and cross-check all failures (receivership or administration 
announcements).  
The failure date is given by the last trading day of the failed company. It is found in the 
Regulatory News Service, LSPD or Datastream (in that order). The failure date is 
generally found to be identical across the sources. 
Following Agarwal and Taffler (2008b), the monthly return is set to -100.0% in the 
month of failure.  
4.1.5 Final Sample 
Table 1 reports the observation and failures per portfolio year. The total sample covers 
the portfolio years 1979 to 2009 (2,748 unique firms of which 274 failed and in total 
28,804 firm years/observations). There are usually not many failures per portfolio year 
but to be calibrated, the logit regressions of the hybrid bankruptcy prediction models 
require a certain amount of failures to be calibrated. I use the first six years for 
calibration (portfolio years 1979 to 1984) and the remaining portfolio years for my 
analysis (portfolio years 1985 to 2009).  
The final sample contains the 300 months from October 1985 to September 2010 and is 
represented by portfolio years 1985 to 2009. It includes 2,428 unique firms of which 
202 failed and a total of 22,217 firm years/observations. The average failure rate is 
0.91%.  
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Table 1 Observations in Sample  
This table gives an overview of my sample based on all UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market 
segment of the London Stock Exchange. A Portfolio Year is the twelve month period starting with 
October each year from 1979 to 2009. No. Observations is the number of sample firms. No. Failures is 
the number of failed firms during the portfolio year. Failure Rate is failures over observations. Failures 
are from LSPD (death codes 7, 16, 20 and 21), the Capital Gains Tax Book (receivership and/or 
liquidation, negligible value) and the Regulatory News Service from Factiva (receivership, 
administration). 
Portfolio Year No. Observations No. Failures Failure Rate 
1979 1,067 8 0.75 
1980 1,141 13 1.14 
1981 1,132 20 1.77 
1982 1,108 8 0.72 
1983 1,089 13 1.19 
1984 1,050 10 0.95 
1985 1,018 4 0.39 
1986 954 1 0.10 
1987 907 2 0.22 
1988 866 1 0.12 
1989 841 9 1.07 
1990 811 19 2.34 
1991 824 17 2.06 
1992 1,011 8 0.79 
1993 1,015 4 0.39 
1994 1,064 6 0.56 
1995 1,213 7 0.58 
1996 1,265 9 0.71 
1997 1,280 14 1.09 
1998 1,235 13 1.05 
1999 1,111 10 0.90 
2000 987 9 0.91 
2001 916 20 2.18 
2002 843 12 1.42 
2003 747 7 0.94 
2004 669 6 0.90 
2005 606 1 0.17 
2006 559 2 0.36 
2007 510 9 1.76 
2008 493 8 1.62 
2009 472 4 0.85 
Total Sample 28,804 274 0.95 
Firms 2,748 
  Final Sample 1985 to 2009 22,217 202 0.91 
Firms 2,428 
  Obs/Firm 9.15     
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4.2 Distress Risk Models 
There are a number of bankruptcy prediction models (distress risk measures) available 
in literature. In the following, I describe the models I employ in my study starting with 
the hybrid approach and followed by the accounting-based and market-based 
approaches with a description of the required input variables (see Table 2A on page 91 
for a summary of the key variables). 
4.2.1 Hybrid Model 
Model 
Hybrid models are defined as models that use both accounting and market data to assess 
the risk of a firm going bankrupt. In the literature, hybrid models frequently take on the 
functional form of discrete hazard models using logistic regression functions. Shumway 
(2001) introduces a discrete hazard model of the basic form to estimate bankruptcy risk: 
 i,t 
e t+  i,t
 +e t+  i,t
 
 
 +e  t   i,t
 
(2) 
where      is the probability at time t that firm i will go bankrupt in t+m,   is the 
coefficient vector and   is the explanatory variables matrix. This study uses annual data 
to assess each year the risk that a firm will go bankrupt in the next twelve months. I 
apply an expanding window approach with a fixed start date and annual observations.  
Dependent Variable 
The probability of default for firm i at time t is conditional on survival until t. The 
dependent variable is of binary form i.e. survival or failure in t+m. Following Chava 
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and Jarrow (2004) and Campbell et al. (2008) I specify the discrete probability of failure 
at time t as  
 i,t( i,t    | i,t   0) 
 
 +e  t   i,t
 
(3) 
where        is coded 1 if the company failed (0 if not) in t+m and      is the vector of 
the time varying covariates known at time t and with its coefficients given by  .  
Independent Variable 
At the beginning of each portfolio year t, I take the independent variables for each firm. 
The analysis tests the basic model of Shumway (2001) (Shum) and the specifications in 
Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) (CHS) and Christidis and Gregory (2010) (CG). 
In the following, I introduce the variables required for the hybrid models. They are 
classified as accounting variables, market variables and macro-economic and other 
variables. 
Accounting Variables 
Accounting variables are taken at t with a minimum time-lag of five months between 
the fiscal year-end and PFD. 
 TA is book value of total assets. 
 BV is book value of shareholders’ equity less preference shares and minorities. 
 TL is the difference between TA and BV. All obligations except those 
attributable to common equity holders are treated as liabilities. 
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 MTA is the market alternative to TA. It is the sum of market value of common 
equity (SIZE) and book value of total liabilities (TL). 
 NITA and NIMTA are profitability ratios. It is net income - after minorities and 
preference shares - over TA or MTA.  
 TLTA and TLMTA represent the leverage of the firm from a shareholder 
perspective. It is TL over TA or MTA. 
 CASHMTA and NCASHMTA is cash or net cash over MTA. Cash consists of 
cash and cash equivalents. For net cash (NCASH), I deduct bank overdrafts (i.e. 
short-term debt).  
 BM is the commonly used book-to-market equity ratio i.e. BV over SIZE. 
 CFMTA is cash flow over market value of total assets. For cash flow I take net 
income and add back depreciation and amortisation and deduct (add) the change 
in current assets excluding cash (current liabilities excluding short-term debt).  
Market Variables 
Market variables are taken at t. 
 SIZE is the market value of common equity.  
 RSIZE is a relative size measure. It is the natural log of the firm’s SIZE over the 
aggregate market value of the FTSE All Share index.  
 PRICE is the unadjusted or raw stock price.  
 EXRET is the company’s log excess return over the FTSE All Share over the 
prior twelve months (EXRET = log(1+Ri,12m) – log(1+RFTSE All,12m)) 
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 SIGMA is the annualised standard deviation of daily returns over the three 
months prior to t.
22
 I follow Campbell et al. (2008) and use the cross-sectional 
average for companies that have less than five non-zero observations in the 
three-month window. There are on average 3.3% observations (with a maximum 
of 8.8% in 1995 and a minimum of 0.4% in 1986) and 30 failures with less than 
five non-zero observations in my study.  
Macro-Economic Variables 
Since hybrid models contain market prices or market-based variables, one would expect 
hybrid models to take account of macro-economic information. However, Christidis and 
Gregory (2010) find several macro-economic variables to be significant in their 
bankruptcy prediction models. Based on their results, I incorporate similar macro-
economic variables. I follow their argument that the deflated one-month Treasury Bill 
rate (DEFTBR) will affect the firm’s financing. As such, a secure financing strengthens 
the solvency of a company and reduces the risk of going bankrupt. Further, I include the 
term structure premium (LONGSHT) which is the yield difference between the long-
term government bond and the one-month Treasury Bill rate. A negative term structure 
(short-term yield is higher than long-term yield) is generally perceived as a recession 
indicator. Since failure rates are higher in recessions (Campbell et al., 2008), I test as 
well for significance of LONGSHT. For the same reasons, I test whether the change in 
the UK industrial production index (INDPROD) is significant in bankruptcy prediction. 
All macro-economic variables are taken at t. 
                                                 
22
 For calculation details see Campbell et al. (2008: p. 2936). 
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4.2.2 Accounting-Based Model 
Z-score is the seminal accounting-based model. It was originally introduced by Altman 
(1968) and is a widely used benchmark in bankruptcy prediction literature. With the use 
of multiple discriminant analysis, Altman (1968) chooses from different ratios the linear 
combination that best differentiates between non-failure and failure. Taffler (1983) uses 
a similar approach to introduce a UK-version of the model. The full z-score model is 
published in Agarwal and Taffler (2007): 
           .2 +  2.  x + 2.50x2    0.  x + 0.029x  (4) 
where  
    measures profitability by taking profit before tax over current liabilities 
(PBTCL). 
    is a working capital ratio and defined as current assets over total liabilities 
(CATL). 
     represents financial risk and is current liabilities over total assets (CLTA). 
    is the No-Credit Interval (NCI) and measures the degree of liquidity. NCI is 
calculated as: 
     
                                
                                    
   
 
(5) 
Variables are defined as above or directly taken from the balance sheets. Agarwal and 
Taffler (2008a) note that the model was constructed in 1977 and thus, it is completely 
out-of-sample. 
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Please note that a higher z-score is associated with lower default risk. Following 
Hillegeist et al. (2004) I change the sign of z-score for the correlation analysis, the 
cross-sectional and logit regressions (information content tests) to conform to the other 
alternative hybrid and market-based bankruptcy prediction models that associated a 
higher score with higher default risk. This has no effect on the results but makes the 
coefficients more comparable and easier to interpret jointly.  
4.2.3 Market-Based Model 
The third default prediction model is a market-based approach. Traditional market-
based models apply the derivative pricing model of Merton (1973) and the option 
pricing approach of Black and Scholes (1973) (BSM) and derive the distance to default 
that is implemented in a cumulative density function. The use of the option pricing 
formula requires two assumptions: the total firm value follows a Brownian motion and 
total debt is a single discount bond with time T to maturity. Equity value is then defined 
by the option pricing formula: 
MV   A (d ) e
 rfT T  (d2) (6) 
where   is the value of equity,   the value of the firm,    is the risk-free rate, MTL the 
market value of total liabilities and  ( ) describes the cumulative standard normal 
distribution.   is given by 
d  
  (
 
   
) (        
 )  
   
 
(7) 
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And    is given by 
d2 d   A√T. (8) 
where    is the firm volatility and defined as: 
 A  
(
 
  
) (  )
  
 
(9) 
where    is equity volatility. McDonald (2002) shows that distance to default is 
calculated and implemented in a cumulative density function as 
      (      )  ( 
  (
 
   
) (       
 ) 
  √ 
) 
(10) 
where   is the expected return over the forecasting period.  
The calculation of the BSM function requires solving Eq. (6) and Eq. (9) 
simultaneously. However, Bharath and Shumway (2008) offer a less sophisticated 
version of the distance to default measure. 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) separate the informational benefit of the BSM 
framework. Their empirical results suggest that the value of traditional market-based 
models lies in the functional form rather than in solving the BSM function. As such, 
their naïve distance to default measure retains the functional form of the option pricing 
model but bypasses the simultaneous calculation of unobservable parameters. 
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According to Bharath and Shumway (2008), firm volatility can be written as the 
weighted average of equity and debt volatility: 
         
  
   
   
  
   
   
(11) 
Note that Eq. (11) uses TL (book value of total liabilities) as an indicator for the market 
value of total liabilities. Debt volatility is estimated by: 
                      (12) 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) use the five percentage points to represent the term 
structure and allow for a variation of 25.0% of the equity volatility.  
With these variables Bharath and Shumway (2008) (BS) define their naïve distance to 
default measure and probability of default as: 
        (        )  ( 
  (
   
  
) (                
 ) 
        √ 
) 
(13) 
where        is the probability of default for the BS model,  ( ) describes the 
cumulative standard normal distribution,      is the return over the previous year. The 
strike price is TL that is assumed to be a single discount bond maturing at  . T is set to 
one year since this study uses a one-year prediction horizon. 
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The data requirement for the BS contingent claims model is: 
 MTA, the market value of total assets measured as the current market value of 
common equity (SIZE) and the market value of total debt (i.e. strike price) 
proxied by TL. 
 Equity volatility    is SIGMA 
 ER1y is the return over the previous twelve months. 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) find that their naïve approach performs slightly better 
than the BSM approach while Agarwal and Taffler (2008a) show that there is no 
difference between the two. As such, the naïve BS measure is a validated alternative to 
the more sophisticated BSM function.  
4.2.4 Data Winsorisation  
Empirical studies in finance manipulate the data to remove outliers from the sample. 
The data in this study is manipulated as well because I winsorise all variables or ratios 
at the 5.0% level across all firm year observations. That is, I rank the sample on each 
variable or ratio and replace the lowest (highest) 5.0% with the 0.05 (0.95) fractile of 
each variable. Similar to Hillegeist et al. (2004), I truncate distress risk scores at 
±18.4207. This equals a default probability of 0.00000001 and 0.99999999.  
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In contrast to other studies, there are no further data manipulations. For instance, 
Campbell et al. (2008) winsorise share price above $ 15 without providing a clear 
rationale for doing so.
23
 Campbell et al. (2008) and Christidis and Gregory (2010) add 
10.0% of the difference between market and book equity to total assets. They adjust the 
book value of equity in a similar manner. The adjustment is argued to be valid since ‘it 
corrects book values that are probably mis-measured’ (Campbell et al., 200 : p. 2905). 
On this basis, I find it hard to judge on mis-measurement and whether this adjustment 
actually captures the mis-measurement. In fact, I argue that it fails to identify the mis-
measurement since the market value of total asset-ratios (containing the book value of 
total liabilities and market value of equity) might still carry the assumed ‘mis-
measurement’. 
4.3 Evaluating Distress Risk Models 
Studies testing the performance of distress risk measures use the receiver operating 
characteristics curves to test for forecasting accuracy, information content tests to test 
the bankruptcy related information carried by the distress risk measures, and the test of 
economic value with differential misclassification costs. In the following, I present the 
method of each. 
4.3.1 Receiver Operating Characteristics 
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curves is a method to assess the 
appropriateness of prediction parameters. It has been widely used in the field of 
                                                 
23
 Campbell et al. (200 : p. 29 2): ‘Exploratory analysis suggests that price per share is relevant below 
$15, and so we winsorise price per share at this level before taking the log.’ 
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medicine (Hanley and McNeil, 1982). Today it is as well an established tool to validate 
bankruptcy prediction models (Sobehart and Keenan, 2001; Chava and Jarrow, 2004; 
Agarwal and Taffler, 2008a). 
Vassalou and Xing (2004) provide a precise description: Let   be the percentage of 
firms that default (  
        
 
). Let λ be an integer between   and 100. λ represents the 
λ% of firms with highest default risk known at time t (  
     
 
). For each λ at time t, 
the firms that fail in t+m are counted. Let  ( ) be a function of   that divides the 
number of failures in the  % by the total number of failures. It follows: 
 ( )  
 
 
               
(14) 
  ( )              (15) 
A perfect bankruptcy prediction model - that is the ranking on default probability at 
time t is equal to the ranking of failures at time t+m – would be able to capture all 
defaults for each integer λ. The function  ( ) would take the value of 1. If we were to 
plot the ROC curve – that is the plot of integer λ against  ( ) – the graph would be at 1 
for each λ. See Figure 3. 
A random bankruptcy prediction model – that is the ranking at time t is not correlated 
with the ranking of failures at time t+m – would have the same percentage of failures 
across each integer λ. The function  ( ) would take the value of λ. The ROC curve 
corresponds to a  5° line between the integer λ and  ( ). See Figure 3. 
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For each other model, the function  ( ) would take the value 
 
 
. Since we expect a 
bankruptcy prediction model to be better than a random model, the ROC curve is 
expected to be between the perfect and the random model. 
 
Figure 3 Receiver Operating Characteristics Curve 
The figure illustrates the receiver operating characteristics curves for a perfect and random 
bankruptcy prediction model. λ is an integer between 0 and  00 and describes the λ% of the 
highest bankruptcy risk firms.  ( ) is a function of λ that divides the number of failures in the 
highest λ% of default risk by the total number of failures. 
0
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To compare the predictive ability of two models one has to calculate the area under the 
ROC curve (AUC). Sobehart and Keenan (2001) argue that the AUC is the decisive 
indicator of a model’s predictive ability. I calculate AUC using the Wilcoxon statistic 
(Hanley and McNeil, 1982). Sobehart and Keenan (2001) further show that the standard 
error of the AUC is given by  
  ( ) √
   (     ) (    )(       ) (     )(       )
     
  
(16) 
where AUC is the area under the ROC curve,    the number of failed firms and     the 
number of non-failed firms.    is defined as 
   
( -   )
 and    is defined as 
     
(     )
. 
The test-statistic to compare the area under the curves of two different models follows a 
normal distribution and is suggest by Hanley and McNeil (1983): 
  
         
√(  (    ))
 
 (  (    ))
 
     (    )  (    )
 
(17) 
where SE is the standard error and r the Pearson correlation between the two areas.  
Engelmann, Hayden and Tasche (2003) put the ROC curve into the context of the 
cumulative accuracy ratio (AR) and show that the AUC contains the same information 
as the AR. They find that AR is just a linear transformation of the area below the ROC 
curve. To compare the AUC of two models AR is defined as 
    (         ) (18) 
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4.3.2 Information Content Test 
Model 
I use information content tests to examine bankruptcy prediction models. Information 
content tests reveal whether bankruptcy prediction models carry more information than 
another set of variables. They complement the ROC curve analysis since Hillegeist et al. 
(2004) argue that (i) ROC curve analysis leaves users with a dichotomous option but in 
reality users are not faced with such a decision. Moreover, users of bankruptcy 
prediction models are likely to determine credit terms. (ii) ROC curve analysis is based 
on type I and type II errors that are context specific and thus do not give information 
about the associated error costs. As such, Hillegeist et al. (2004) propose a hazard 
model of the following form:  
       
         
           
 
 
            
 
(19) 
where        is the actual failure probability of firm i at time t+m.    is the baseline 
hazard rate (proxied by the trailing one-year failure rate),      is a matrix of independent 
variables and   is a column vector of estimated coefficients. 
Dependent Variable 
       is the actual failure probability. As such, the actual probability is of binary form 
and takes the value of 1 if the company failed and 0 if not. 
Independent Variable 
The difference to the hazard model in Eq. (2) lies in the independent variables and their 
timing. First, Eq. (19) includes the baseline hazard rate   . Second, the independent 
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variables      are taken at t. Since I use scores from the hybrid, accounting-based and 
market-based models and to avoid look-ahead bias, these have to be estimated over the 
previous months in order to be known at t.
24
 To be consistent with the underlying 
assumptions of the logit model, I follow Hillegeist et al. (2004) and transform the 
default probabilities from the market and hybrid model into logit scores: 
        (
 
   
) 
(20) 
The scores are truncated at ±18.4207 i.e. I winsorise the probabilities to be between 
0.00000001 and 0.99999999.  
                                                 
24
 For robustness, I include as well established risk factors in the vector     . 
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4.3.3 Economic Value of Distress Risk Measures 
Agarwal and Taffler (2008a) argue that while the ROC curve analysis assumes equal 
costs for lending to a firm that subsequently fails and not lending to a firm that does not 
fail, in practice, the costs associated with the two misclassifications are different. While 
refusal to lend to a subsequently non-failed firm simply leads to the loss of extra 
revenue, lending to a firm that subsequently fails can lead to substantial losses. I follow 
the approach of Agarwal and Taffler (2008a) to assess the economic impact of using 
different models in a competitive market. I use the loan pricing model of Stein (2005) 
and Blöchlinger and Leippold (2006) to derive the credit spread as a function of the 
credit score (S) by: 
R 
p(   |S t)
p(  0|S t)
  D+k 
(21) 
where R is the credit spread, p(Y=1|S=t) is the conditional probability of failure for a 
score of t, p(Y=0|S=t) is the conditional probability of non-failure for a score of t, LGD 
is the loss in loan value given default, and k is the credit spread for the highest quality 
loan.  
I closely follow the method in Agarwal and Taffler (2008a) and assume a simple loan 
market worth £ 100.0 billion with banks competing for business each using a different 
bankruptcy prediction model. To keep the analysis tractable and objective, I assume all 
loans are of same size and have same LGD. The banks reject customers that fall in the 
bottom 5.0% according to their respective models and quote a spread as defined in 
Eq. (21) for all the other customers. The customer chooses the bank which quotes the 
lower spread. If the quoted spreads are equal, the customer randomly chooses one of the 
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banks (or equivalently, the business is split equally between the banks). For each year, I 
independently sort my sample firms on their probability of failure based on different 
bankruptcy prediction models and group them into 100 categories for each of the 
models.  
Due to the number of defaults and the 100 categories, I recognise that some of the 
categories are sparsely populated with failures. In extreme cases, this could lead to a 
lower default probability for the next higher risk category and thus, to a lower credit 
spread although failure risk is higher. In order to have a monotonic increase in credit 
spread with credit risk, I apply the method described in Burgt (2007) to smooth default 
probabilities of the categories.  
To assess the economic value of using different models for mixed regime loan pricing, I 
use two measures to evaluate bank profitability, return on assets (ROA) and return on 
risk-weighted assets (RORWA): 
ROA 
 rofit
Assets lent
 
(22) 
and 
RORWA 
 rofit
risk weighted assets
 
(23) 
Unlike ROA, which ignores the inherent riskiness of profits, RORWA considers the risk 
of the outstanding loans and hence, is a more suitable performance measure. Similar to 
Agarwal and Taffler (2008a), I use the Basel III Foundation Internal Ratings-Based 
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Approach to derive the value of risk-weighted assets (Basel Committee, 2011). The 
details are in the appendix to this chapter. 
4.4 Pricing Distress Risk 
4.4.1 Cross-Sectional Regression Tests 
Model 
Following Fama and MacBeth (1973), I conduct cross-sectional regression tests on 
individual stock level using annual independent variables: 
                                         (    )          (  )             (24) 
where subscript t denotes the portfolio year starting at the beginning of October each 
year from 1985 to 2009 and t+m for integer m = 1 to 12 denotes the month-ends of the 
portfolio year. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is excess returns of individual securities.        is the return of 
firm i in month m (integer 1 to 12) in portfolio year t,        the one-month UK 
Treasury Bill rate during month t+m. As such, the dependent variable is the return of 
firm i at time t+m in excess of the risk-free rate. 
Independent Variable 
Independent variables are taken for each firm at t. BETA is the beta factor calculated for 
each firm according to Dimson (1979) over the previous 24 months with a one month 
time-lag. In cross-sectional regressions, SIZE and BM are included as the natural log. 
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PYR represents the 11-month return prior to t excluding September (i.e. 11-months 
period from October t-1 to August t). I also run specifications of this model while 
including the score of one of the distress risk measures (Shum, z-score and BS), the 
individual variables of the default measures (e.g. NITA or PBTCL) or distress risk 
measures orthogonalised by NITA (Shum) and by PBTCL and NCI (z-score).  
4.4.2 Times-Series Regression Tests 
Model 
In this study, I use the Fama and French (1993) model and the augmented version of 
Carhart (1997) which includes the momentum factor to measure risk-adjusted returns. 
While the models are originally developed using US data, it has been used for risk-
adjustment in the UK as well (Agarwal and Taffler, 2008b).  
Michou, Mouselli and Stark (2010) show that there is no standard approach for 
estimating the factors in the UK and conclude that the results can be sensitive to the 
manner in which the factors are constructed. They thus argue that researchers should be 
aware of the level of robustness of the estimates of abnormal returns. In a similar study, 
Gregory, Tharyan and Huang (2009) suggest the use of characteristics-matched 
portfolios to measure abnormal returns in the UK. Both Gregory et al. (2009) and 
Michou et al. (2010), however, fail to provide evidence that the alternative methods 
produce estimates that are superior to that of Agarwal and Taffler (2008b). Further, my 
results show that the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) models are superior to 
the CAPM in explaining stock returns; e.g. Tables 15 (Shum), 17 (z-score) and 19 (BS) 
show that the average adjusted R² of the factor models is between 83 % and 85% while 
for CAPM the average adjusted R² is only between 62 % and 69 % (not tabulated). This 
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shows indeed the empirical value of the models and that the different risk factors are 
priced in the UK.  
Since the Fama and French (1993) model (RmRf, SMB and HML) is a reduced version 
of the Carhart (1997) model (RmRf, SMB, HML and WML), I only present the Carhart 
(1997) model here: 
                                                                     (25) 
where        is the return on portfolio i during month m (integer 1 to 12) in portfolio 
year t,        the one-month UK Treasury Bill rate at the beginning of month t+m, 
        the return difference of the FTSE All Share Index and the one-month UK 
Treasury Bill rate during month t+m,        the return on the mimicking portfolio for 
the size factor,        the return on the mimicking portfolio for the BM factor, 
       the return on the mimicking portfolio for the return momentum factor during 
month t+m, and  i,t+m is the error term. 
Dependent Variable 
Test assets for time-series regressions are monthly portfolio excess returns (value-
weighted or equally-weighted).  
Independent Variable 
Factors are formed following Fama and French (1993): (i) at the end of each September 
from 1985 to 2009, I rank all stocks on market capitalisation and sort them into two 
equally populated portfolios using median. (ii.i) For SMB and HML, I independently 
rank the stocks on BM and sort them into three portfolios using the 30
th
 and 70
th
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percentile. Six portfolios are then formed at the intersections of the break-points i.e. 
small-low BM, small-medium BM,…, large-high BM. I calculate value-weighted 
monthly portfolio excess returns for the subsequent twelve months (t+m). SMB is the 
difference between average returns of the three small and the three large portfolios 
(equally-weighted). HML is the difference between average returns of the two high and 
the two low BM portfolios (equally-weighted). (ii.ii) For WML, I independently rank 
the stocks on PYR and sort them into three portfolios using the 30
th
 and 70
th
 percentile. 
Six portfolios are then formed at the intersections of the break-points i.e. small-low 
PYR, small-medium   R,…, large-high PYR. I calculate value-weighted monthly 
portfolio excess returns for the subsequent twelve months (t+m). WML is the difference 
between average returns of the two high and the two low PYR portfolios (equally-
weighted).  
4.5 Explanations Negative Distress Risk Premium 
4.5.1 Shareholder Advantage 
Garlappi and Yan (2011) predict a hump-shaped relation of BETA, returns, and value 
premium with distress risk. As such, I form portfolios on the distress risk proxies 
(hybrid, accounting-based, and market-based) and test whether portfolio BETA and 
returns (value-weighted and equally-weighted) are hump-shaped with distress risk. In 
order to do so, I use decile portfolios. That is at the end of each September, I rank the 
sample firms on default probability and sort into equally populated decile portfolios.  
To test the relation of distress risk and the value premium, I independently split all firms 
into low and high BM using median at the end of each September. I form 20 portfolios 
at the intersections of the decile distress risk sort and the median BM sort and calculate 
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the value premium for each distress risk portfolio, i.e. the return on a portfolio that is 
long on high BM stocks and short on low BM stocks in the respective decile distress 
risk portfolio. Similar to Garlappi and Yan (2011), the value premia (value-weighted 
and equally-weighted) are risk-adjusted using time-series regressions following Carhart 
(1997) and as defined in Eq. (25).  
4.5.2 Limits of Arbitrage and Lottery Stocks 
My literature review finds that the proxies for limits of arbitrage are identical to the 
proxies of lottery-type stocks. As such, my tests are designed to explore whether these 
characteristics are relevant in pricing distress risk. I follow closely the method of Han 
and Kumar (2011) to construct a lottery index (LOTT) for each security in my sample. 
LOTT consists of share price (PRICE), idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) and idiosyncratic 
skewness (ISKEW). IVOL and ISKEW are derived as follows: at the end of each 
September from 1985 to 2009 for each security, I run the regression using the Carhart 
(1997) model as defined in Eq. (25) over the previous 24 months and collect the 
residual terms per firm. IVOL is the variance of the residual terms and ISKEW the 
skewness of the residual terms. I then construct each security’s  OTT as follows: at the 
end of each September from 1985 to 2009, I rank the sample firms on PRICE and form 
virgintile portfolios. I repeat that for IVOL and ISKEW. LOTT is the sum of each 
security’s virgintile assignments for the sort on PRICE, IVOL and ISKEW divided by 
60: 
      
                            
  
 
(26) 
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where LOTT is the lottery-index for security i,           the assignment to the virgintile 
portfolios formed on PRICE,          the assignment to the virgintile portfolios formed 
on IVOL, and           the assignment to the virgintile portfolios formed on ISKEW.  
For summary statistics and time-series regression tests I form decile portfolios on LOTT 
at the end of each September from 1985 to 2009. For cross-sectional tests, I employ 
LOTT and its individual components PRICE, IVOL and ISKEW. 
4.6 Unravelling the Negative Distress Risk Premium 
4.6.1 Cross-Sectional Regressions 
In Chapter 8 I explore the pricing impacts of the individual variables of the distress risk 
measures. In order to do so, I break each distress risk measure (Shum, z-score and BS) 
down into its individual variables and test for relevance in subsequent stock returns 
using the regression of Fama and MacBeth (1973) as defined in Eq. (24).  
In order to remove the impact on subsequent stock returns of a chosen individual 
variable of the composite distress risk measure, I employ orthogonalised composite 
measures. That is, at the end of September of each year, I run the following cross-
sectional regression with the composite measure as dependent variable and the chosen 
variable as independent variable: 
                         (27) 
I then collect the intercept and the error terms, i.e. the part of the composite distress risk 
measure that is unexplained by the chosen variable.  
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where Scoret is the score of the distress risk measure at portfolio year t and at the 
regression intercept, bt the coefficient of Variablet, and    is the error term. In my analysis 
I employ four orthogonalised distress risk scores: I orthogonalise (i) the score of 
Shumway (2001) by NITA, (ii) the z-score (Taffler, 1983) by PBTCL, (iii) the z-score 
(Taffler, 1983) by NCI, and (iv) the z-score (Taffler, 1983) by PBTCL and NCI.  
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4.6.2 Time-Series Regressions 
To test for the impact of profitability on distress risk I use portfolios sorts on 
profitability (distress) to conduct time-series regressions. I employ the standard asset 
pricing models as defined in Eq. (25). Similar to Novy-Marx (2010), I also use a 
profitability factor and add it to the Carhart (1997) model as defined in Eq. (28). The 
profitability factor is formed in the same way as SMB, HML and WML following Fama 
and French (1993). At the end of each September from 1985 to 2009, I rank all stocks 
on market capitalisation and sort them into two equally populated portfolios using 
median. I independently rank the stocks on PBTCL and sort them into three portfolios 
using the 30
th
 and 70
th
 percentile. Six portfolios are then formed at the intersections of 
the break-points i.e. small-low PBTCL, small-medium  BTC ,…, large-high PBTCL. I 
calculate value-weighted monthly portfolio excess returns for the subsequent twelve 
months (t+m). PMU is the difference between average returns of the two high and the 
two low PBTCL portfolios (equally-weighted). As such, the factor is labelled PMU 
(“ rofitable-Minus-Unprofitable”) as it represents the return of a portfolio long on 
profitable firms and short on unprofitable firms. The five factor profitability model 
therefore is:  
                                                   
                              
(28) 
where        is the return on portfolio i during month m (integer 1 to 12) in portfolio 
year t,        the one-month UK Treasury Bill rate at the beginning of month t+m, 
        the return difference of the FTSE All Share Index and the one-month UK 
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Treasury Bill rate during month t+m,        the return on the mimicking portfolio for 
the size factor during month m in portfolio year t,        the return on the mimicking 
portfolio for the BM factor,        the return on the mimicking portfolio for return 
momentum,          is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the profitability 
effect, and  i,t+m is the error term. 
In order to test whether the information carried by PMU is already covered by the 
common risk factors, I run the following time-series regression: 
                                                              (29) 
where  MUt+m is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the profitability effect during 
month m of portfolio year t. All other variables are as defined above.   
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4.7 Appendix 
Table 2A Key Variables and Definitions 
Variable Description 
BETA Beta factor calculated according to Dimson (1979) over the previous 24 months 
with a ± 1 month lag 
BM Book value of shareholders’ equity less preference shares and minorities over 
market value of common equity (BV / MV) 
BV Book value of shareholders’ equity less preference shares and minorities 
CASH Cash and cash equivalents 
CASHMTA Cash and cash equivalents over market value of total assets (CASH / MTA) 
CATL Current assets over total liabilities (TL) 
CF Net income plus depreciation and amortisation plus (minus) change in current 
assets excluding cash (current liabilities excl. short-term debt) 
CFMTA Operating cash flow over market value of total assets (CF / MTA) 
CLTA Current liabilities over total assets (TA) 
DEFLTBR Deflated one-month Treasury Bill rate 
ER1y Return over the previous year 
EXRET Log excess return over the FTSE All Share Index over the prior 12-months 
(EXRET = log(1+Ri,12m) – log(1+RFTSE All,12m) 
INDPROD Change in UK industrial production index 
LONGSHT Difference between the long-term government bond and one-month Treasury Bill 
rate 
MTA Market value of total assets (TL + MV) 
NCASH Cash and cash equivalents minus bank overdrafts (i.e. short-term debt) 
NCI No-credit interval: (quick assets – current liabilities) / ((sales – profit before tax – 
depreciation) / 365) 
NI Net income after minorities and preference shares 
NIMTA Net income over market value of total assets (NI / MTA) 
NITA Net income over total assets (NI / TA) 
PBTCL Profit before tax over current liabilities 
PRICE Unadjusted or raw stock price 
PYR 11-month return for the period from October t-1 to August t 
RSIZE Log of market value of security i over the market value of the FTSE All Share 
Index 
SIGMA Annualised standard deviation of daily returns for the prior 3-months following 
Campbell et al. (2008) 
SIZE (MV) Market value of common equity 
TA Book value of total assets 
TL Book value of total liabilities (TA - BV) 
TLMTA Total liabilities over market value of total assets (TL / MTA) 
TLTA Total liabilities over total assets (TL / TA) 
  
 93 
 
Basel Committee (2011): Risk-weighted assets 
According to the latest version of the International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards document prepared by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (2011), for obligations not already in default, risk-weighted assets 
are computed as follows: 
            ( ) [    
        
      
] [    (  
        
      
)] 
(30) 
                    ( ) [                  (  )]  (31) 
                    ( )  
[     ((   ) (    )  (  ) (  (   ))      (     ))       ]  
(       ) (  ) (  (     )  ) 
(32) 
                     (   )            (33) 
where: 
PD = probability of default (at least 0.03%), 
LGD = loss given default, 
N(·) = cumulative normal density function, 
G(·) = inverse cumulative normal density function, 
M = effective maturity, and 
EAD = exposure at default. 
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CHAPTER 5:  EVALUATING DISTRESS RISK MODELS 
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5.1 Introduction 
The risk of going bankrupt is of major interest to shareholders, creditors, and employees 
of a firm. There is a vast body of literature on assessing the risk that individual firms 
will go bankrupt. There are three main approaches in the literature: (i) traditional 
models predominantly based on accounting information (e.g. Altman, 1968), (ii) 
contingent claims based models that view equity as a call option on assets (e.g. 
Vassalou and Xing, 2004), and (iii) more recent hybrid models that assess bankruptcy 
risk using both accounting and market data (e.g. Shumway, 2001).  
While some of the models are argued to be superior due to their theoretical grounding 
(e.g. Vassalou and Xing, 2004), eventually, the empirical performance of the 
approaches is what really matters. Literature provides three methods of testing the 
empirical performance of bankruptcy prediction models. (i) The receiver operating 
characteristics (ROC) curve testing forecasting accuracy (Hanley and McNeil, 1982; 
Sobehart and Stein, 2000), (ii) information content tests testing whether measures 
contain bankruptcy related information (Hillegeist et al., 2004), and (iii) the illustrative 
credit loan market testing for economic value when misclassification costs differ (Stein, 
2005; Blöchlinger and Leippold, 2006).  
However, the existing literature does not provide clean evidence on the usefulness of 
competing approaches. First, existing literature is incomplete in the use of bankruptcy 
prediction models. Current tests contain single bankruptcy prediction models (e.g. 
Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Bharath and Shumway, 2008) or two of the three available 
approaches (e.g. Hillegeist et al. (2004) use accounting- and market-based models, 
Chava and Jarrow (2004) use hybrid and accounting-based models, Campbell et al. 
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(2008) use hybrid and market-based models). Second, existing literature is incomplete 
in the use of the performance tests. The majority of studies apply (in sample) 
information content tests (e.g. Hillegeist et al., 2004) or ROC curve analysis (e.g. Chava 
and Jarrow, 2004). In fact, the only study that tests for differential misclassification 
costs, in addition to information content and ROC curve, is Agarwal and Taffler 
(2008a). However, they only compare accounting- and market-based models but do not 
include hybrid models. This chapter extends the framework of existing studies and that 
of Agarwal and Taffler (2008a) while comparing all three available bankruptcy 
prediction approaches using all three available performance tests.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: in sub-chapter 2 I present the 
research question and research propositions. In sub-chapter 3 I briefly describe the data 
and method used. Sub-chapter 4 describes the hybrid models by presenting the variables 
and summary statistics from the logit regressions using different specifications. Sub-
chapter 5 provides comprehensive tests including hybrid, accounting-based and market-
based models. Sub-chapter 6 concludes. 
5.2 Research Question 
In this chapter I will examine the following research question and the corresponding 
research propositions to test for the difference in performance of the three bankruptcy 
prediction approaches.  
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Which of the alternative approaches to predict bankruptcies is the best? 
P1: The three different bankruptcy prediction measures have different predictive ability. 
P2: All three measures carry bankruptcy related information incremental to each other. 
P3: There is a difference in performance once misclassification costs are taken into 
account. 
5.3 Data and Methodology 
My sample consists of UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the 
London Stock Exchange between October 1979 and September 2010.  
I apply the specifications of hybrid models presented in Shumway (2001) (Shum), 
Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) (CHS) and Christidis and Gregory (2010) (CG) 
using rolling logit regressions. In addition, I apply the accounting-based z-score of 
Taffler (1983) and the market-based model of Bharath and Shumway (2008) (BS). The 
different test methodologies are receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves, 
information content tests, and economic value with differential misclassification costs.  
In order to derive the coefficients for the hybrid models I use the total sample period 
from October 1979 to September 2010 (i.e. portfolio years 1979 to 2009) consisting of 
28,804 observations (2,748 unique firms of which 274 failed). To avoid look-ahead 
bias, I use an annually expanding regression window with a fixed start date in October 
1979. To assess the bankruptcy risk each year, I use the coefficients estimated at the end 
of September in that year.  
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5.4 Hybrid Models 
5.4.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of accounting and market variables used in the 
hybrid models of Shumway (2001), Campbell et al. (2008) and Christidis and Gregory 
(2010).  
Panel A in Table 3 documents the summary statistics for all sample firms. NITA and 
NIMTA show that the sample firms are in general profitable (mean 3.83% for NITA 
and 2.28% for NIMTA). The operating cash flow ratio CFMTA demonstrates that firms 
are also profitable on a cash flow basis (mean 4.26%). CASHMTA shows that 6.33% 
(mean) of the market value of total assets consists of cash and cash equivalents. The net 
cash ratio NCASHMTA, however, shows that these cash holdings just cover the short-
term commitments of the sample firms as it is close to zero (mean 0.56%). Book 
leverage TLTA reveals that approximately half of the balance sheet consists of 
liabilities (mean 55.22%) while market leverage TLMTA is 42.19% and slightly lower 
due to the use of market equity. The reason why TLMTA (NIMTA) is lower than TLTA 
(NITA) is explained by BM. BM is smaller than one (mean 0.75), i.e. book value of 
equity is smaller than the market value of equity, leading to smaller ratios based on 
MTA than on TA. RSIZE puts the market value of equity into context with the FTSE 
All Share Index (natural log mean -9.23). PRICE is heavily skewed with a low mean of 
£ 2.27 and median of £ 1.67. A similar observation can be made for the market value of 
equity (not reported). EXRET is the log one-year excess return over the FTSE All Share 
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Index and shows a negative average return of -5.98% (mean).
25
 SIGMA, i.e. the 
annualised standard deviation of daily returns over the three months prior to portfolio 
formation, displays a volatility measure for the total sample of 0.46 (mean).  
Panel B in Table 3 gives the summary statistics for the non-failed sub-sample. As they 
contain the majority of observations (22,015 out of 22,217) I find no significant 
deviation from the total sample group: NITA and NIMTA are still positive with a mean 
of 3.92% and 2.35% respectively. The operating cash flow ratio CFMTA remains at a 
mean of 4.25%, CASHMTA is slightly higher with a mean of 6.34%. The net cash ratio 
NCASHMTA is still close to zero (mean 0.65%). TLTA and TLMTA are 55.08% and 
41.98% respectively (both mean) while BM remains at 0.74 (mean). The natural log of 
RSIZE increases little to -9.21 (mean) while PRICE hardly changed (mean £ 2.29). 
EXRET is higher for non-failed firms (mean -5.54%) while SIGMA is still at 0.46 
(mean).  
The focus of Table 3 is on Panel C as it illustrates the summary statistics of failed firms. 
It also reports the mean differences to the non-failed group, thus providing first 
indication if the variables are related to future bankruptcy. Failed firms are loss makers 
on average as the profitability ratios NITA and NIMTA are both negative (mean -5.51% 
and -4.67% respectively). As expected, the difference to non-failed firms is highly 
significant (t = 13.91 and 12.58 respectively). Interestingly, CFMTA measuring the 
operating cash flows of failed firms has a mean of 4.29% that is similar to the mean of 
non-failed firms (t = 0.03). Marginally significant (t = 1.93) is the difference in the 
                                                 
25
 The negative average excess return over the FTSE All Share Index is only observed for continuously 
compounded returns (log excess returns).  
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CASHMTA ratio between failed and non-failed firms (mean of failed firms 5.39%). 
However, highly significant is the difference in NCASHMTA (mean -9.00 and t = 9.70) 
leading to the conclusion that failed firms have significantly higher short-term 
borrowings. Moreover, this effect is also observed for total liabilities as the mean of 
TLTA and TLMTA (71.49% and 66.03% respectively) are significantly higher when 
compared to non-failed firms (t = 13.07 and 16.05 respectively). BM demonstrates the 
very low market values of failed firms as the BM ratio for failed firms is with 1.18 
(mean) above one (t = 5.87). Also, RSIZE shows that the relative size of failed firms 
decreased significantly (t = 18.30) to a mean of -10.96. Similarly, PRICE of failed firms 
is £ 0.52 and less than a quarter of the PRICE of the non-failed group (t = 30.08). 
EXRET shows that failed firms are prior-year losers as the natural log (mean) 
is -46.11% (t = 14.66). SIGMA is two times higher for failed firms than for non-failed 
firms (mean 0.89 and t = 17.09).  
To summarise, Table 3 shows that failed firms are less profitable than non-failed firms 
in terms of net income but the operating cash flows do not differ significantly. 
However, failed firms have lower cash balances and both higher short-term debt and 
total debt. Also, their BM ratios are higher than for non-failed firms. The size measures 
show that failed firms are significantly smaller than non-failed firms. Failed firms 
underperform non-failed firms in the portfolio year prior to failure and their stock 
returns are more volatile.  
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Table 3 Hybrid Models: Summary Statistics Independent Variables 
The table reports summary statistics of potential bankruptcy prediction variables of UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock 
Exchange. Variables are taken at the end of September each year from 1985 to 2009 (portfolio formation). Latest accounting data is taken with a minimum lag of five 
months between financial year-end and portfolio formation, market data is taken at portfolio formation. NITA is net income available to common shareholders (NI) 
over book value of total assets (TA). NIMTA is NI over the book value of total liabilities plus market value of common equity (MTA). CFMTA is operating cash flow 
over MTA. CASHMTA is cash and cash equivalents over MTA. NCASHMTA is CASH less short-term debt over MTA. TLTA (TLMTA) is book value of total assets 
excluding total common shareholders’ equity over book value of total assets (MTA). BM is book value of shareholders’ equity less preference shares and minorities 
over market value of common equity (MV). RSIZE is log of MV over the market value of the FTSE All Share Index. PRICE is share price. EXRET is log excess return 
over the FTSE All Share Index over the 12 months prior to portfolio formation. SIGMA is the annualised standard deviation of daily returns for the three months prior 
to portfolio formation. Mean, Median, Min, and Max are time-series averages. All variables are winsorised at the 5.0% level. Panel A contains all sample firms with 
22,217 firm years and 2,428 firms. Panel B contains non-failed firms (22,015 observations). Panel C reports the statistics of failed firms (202 observations) and the 
differences to the non-failed group (Δ Mean  F-F). 
  NITA NIMTA CFMTA CASHMTA NCASHMTA TLTA TLMTA BM RSIZE PRICE EXRET SIGMA 
Panel A. All Firms 
Mean 3.83 2.28 4.26 6.33 0.56 55.22 42.19 0.75 -9.23 2.27 -5.98 0.46 
Median 4.96 3.47 4.76 4.04 0.84 55.60 41.17 0.58 -9.32 1.67 -2.38 0.38 
Min -16.37 -13.21 -22.21 0.03 -25.46 22.49 11.01 0.08 -12.31 0.13 -85.13 0.13 
Max 15.17 10.43 27.51 23.25 20.73 88.17 82.58 2.82 -5.79 6.87 56.54 1.25 
Std Dev 7.67 5.46 11.84 6.57 10.57 18.09 20.21 0.64 1.84 1.96 36.67 0.30 
Obs 22,217 22,217 22,217 22,217 22,217 22,217 22,217 22,217 22,217 22,217 22,217 22,217 
Panel B. Non-Failed Firms 
Mean 3.92 2.35 4.25 6.34 0.65 55.08 41.98 0.74 -9.21 2.29 -5.54 0.46 
Median 5.00 3.49 4.76 4.06 0.88 55.46 40.99 0.58 -9.30 1.69 -2.04 0.38 
Obs 22,015 22,015 22,015 22,015 22,015 22,015 22,015 22,015 22,015 22,015 22,015 22,015 
Panel C. Failed Firms 
Mean -5.51 -4.67 4.29 5.39 -9.00 71.49 66.03 1.18 -10.96 0.52 -46.11 0.89 
Median -6.44 -5.96 3.92 3.57 -9.61 73.40 71.02 1.11 -11.24 0.38 -56.18 0.96 
Obs 202 202 202 202 202 202 202 202 202 2.02 202 202 
Δ Mean 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.16 0.24 0.43 1.73 1.75 0.40 0.42 
NF-F (13.91) (12.58) (0.03) (1.93) (9.70) (13.07) (16.05) (5.87) (18.30) (30.08) (14.66) (17.09) 
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5.4.2 Hybrid Model Specifications 
The variables introduced above are included in different hybrid model specifications. 
Table 4 presents key statistics for the models in Shumway (2001), Campbell et al. 
(2008), Christidis and Gregory (2010).  
Columns one and two in Table 4 present the analysis with the model in Shumway 
(2001). The model includes profitability (NITA), leverage (TLTA), prior-returns in 
excess of the market (EXRET), total volatility of stock returns (SIGMA) and the 
relative firm size measure (RSIZE). As expected, NITA, EXRET, and RSIZE are 
negatively associated with bankruptcy risk (the coefficients are -4.65, -1.52 and -0.37 
respectively). Also, TLTA and SIGMA have a positive association with bankruptcy risk 
(the coefficients are 2.66 and 1.13 respectively). Importantly, all the coefficients are 
statistically significant (lowest t-statistic is 5.38). The evidence shows that firms with 
higher profitability, higher prior-year stock return, larger size, lower leverage and lower 
volatility of stock returns are less likely to fail.  
Columns three and four in Table 4 present the analysis with the model in Campbell et 
al. (2008). Similar to Shumway (2001), the model includes profitability (NIMTA), 
leverage (TLMTA), prior-returns in excess of the market (EXRET), total volatility of 
stock returns (SIGMA) and the relative firm size measure (RSIZE). In addition to that, 
it includes a cash ratio (CASHMTA), book equity over market equity (BM) and share 
price (PRICE). NIMTA, EXRET, RSIZE, CASHMTA, and PRICE are negatively 
associated with bankruptcy risk (the coefficients are -5.77, -1.20, -0.22, -2.30 and -0.36 
respectively). TLMTA and SIGMA have a positive association with bankruptcy risk 
(the coefficients are 2.60, 1.11 respectively). Except for BM (t = 0.05), all coefficients 
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are statistically significant (lowest t-statistics is 2.17). As such, the evidence shows that 
firms with higher leverage and higher total volatility are more likely to fail while the 
opposite is true for firms with high profitability, higher past returns, bigger size, higher 
cash holdings and higher share price.  
Columns five and six in Table 4 document the analysis with the accounting, market and 
economic model (2) in Christidis and Gregory (2010). As with the other two 
specifications, the model includes profitability (NIMTA), leverage (TLMTA), prior-
returns in excess of the market (EXRET), total volatility of stock returns (SIGMA) and 
the relative firms size measure (RSIZE). In addition to that, Christidis and Gregory 
(2010) include PRICE and the cash flow (CFMTA). They also include macroeconomic 
variables: the Treasury Bill rate (DEFLTBR), the term structure premium (LONGSHT), 
and the change in the UK industrial production index (INDPROD). NIMTA, EXRET, 
RSIZE, PRICE, LONGSHT, and INDPROD are negatively associated with bankruptcy 
risk (the coefficients are -6.94, -0.94, -0.21, -0.38, -0.20, and -3.58 respectively). 
TLMTA, SIGMA, and CFMTA have a positive association with bankruptcy risk (the 
coefficients are 2.96, 1.10, and 0.83 respectively). Except for DEFLTBR (t = 0.81), all 
the coefficients are statistically significant (lowest t-statistics is 2.09).  
The model statistics presented on the bottom of Table 4 are very similar for the models. 
The pseudo R²s for the three models are tightly ranged from 24.8% for the Shumway 
(2001) model to 26.6% for the Christidis and Gregory (2010) model. Similarly, the χ2 is 
bound between 768.4 and 823.5. Although, the models are very similar, the summary 
statistics of the model in Christidis and Gregory (2010) show a slightly better model fit.  
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Table 4 Hybrid Models: Coefficients and Summary Statistics 
The table reports results from binary logit regressions using UK non-financial firms listed in the Main 
market segment of the London Stock Exchange. The predictor variables are taken at the end of each 
September from 1979 to 2009 (portfolio formation). Dependent variable: failure indicator and 1 (0) if the 
firm failed (not failed) in the twelve months following portfolio formation. Predictors: NITA is net 
income available to common shareholders (NI) over book value of total assets (TA). NIMTA is NI over 
the book value of total liabilities plus market value of common equity (MTA). TLTA (TLMTA) is book 
value of total assets excluding total common shareholders’ equity over book value of total assets (MTA). 
EXRET is log excess return over the FTSE All Share Index over the 12 months prior to portfolio 
formation. SIGMA is the annualised standard deviation of daily returns for the three months prior to 
portfolio formation. RSIZE is log of market value of common equity (MV) over the market value of the 
FTSE All Share Index. CASHMTA is cash and cash equivalents over MTA. BM is book value of 
shareholders’ equity less preference shares and minorities over MV. PRICE is share price. CFMTA is 
operating cash flow over MTA. DEFLTBR is the deflated Treasury Bill rate. LONGSHT is the term 
structure premium. INDPROD is the change in the UK industrial production index. Latest accounting 
data is taken with a minimum lag of five months between financial year-end and portfolio formation, 
market data is taken at portfolio formation. Variables (not macroeconomic) are winsorised at the 5.0% 
level. I present the models in Shumway (2001), Campbell et al. (2008), Christidis and Gregory (2010). I 
report coefficients, t-statistics in parentheses as well as summary regression statistics.  
Shumway   Campbell et al.   Christidis and 
(2001) 
 
(2008) 
 
Gregory (2010) 
NITA -4.65 
 
NIMTA -5.77 
 
NIMTA -6.94 
 
(6.12) 
  
(6.31) 
  
(7.33) 
TLTA 2.66 
 
TLMTA 2.60 
 
TLMTA 2.96 
 
(7.35) 
  
(5.73) 
  
(7.19) 
EXRET -1.52 
 
EXRET -1.20 
 
EXRET -0.94 
 
(8.44) 
  
(6.40) 
  
(4.97) 
SIGMA 1.13 
 
SIGMA 1.11 
 
SIGMA 1.10 
 
(5.38) 
  
(5.27) 
  
(5.05) 
RSIZE -0.37 
 
RSIZE -0.22 
 
RSIZE -0.21 
 
(6.56) 
  
(3.58) 
  
(3.52) 
   
CASHMTA -2.30 
 
PRICE -0.38 
 
 
  
(2.17) 
  
(2.84) 
   
BM 0.00 
 
CFMTA 0.83 
 
 
  
(0.05) 
  
(2.09) 
   
PRICE -0.36 
 
DEFLTBR -30.48 
 
 
  
(2.74) 
  
(0.81) 
      
LONGSHT -0.20 
 
 
  
 
  
(4.28) 
      
INDPROD -3.58 
 
 
  
 
  
(2.39) 
Constant -11.28 
 
Constant -9.05 
 
Constant -8.78 
 
(18.04) 
  
(12.33) 
  
(11.69) 
Obs 28,804 
 
Obs 28,804 
 
Obs 28,804 
Firms 2,748 
 
Firms 2,748 
 
Firms 2,748 
Failures 274 
 
Failures 274 
 
Failures 274 
χ² 768.4 
 
χ² 796.6 
 
χ² 823.5 
Pseudo R² 24.8   Pseudo R² 25.7   Pseudo R² 26.6 
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5.5 Evaluating Distress Risk Models 
The previous sub-chapter introduces the summary statistics of the hybrid models. In this 
sub-chapter, I continue to use the three hybrid models and add the accounting-based 
z-score model (Taffler, 1983) and the market-based model of Bharath and Shumway 
(2008) as well. 
In the previous sub-chapter I use the full sample period covering the months from 
October 1979 to September 2010. That is, the coefficients presented in Table 4 are 
obtained using the total observation period (i.e., in-sample). In the remaining analysis 
(including the subsequent chapters) I use a sample period from October 1985 to 
September 2010. This is necessary because using the coefficients from the total sample 
period to predict bankruptcy risk in (say) 1985 would involve a look-ahead bias as these 
coefficients are not known before October 2010. In order to avoid this, I use annually 
extending regression windows with a fixed start date in 1979. However, since the logit 
regressions of the hybrid models require a certain amount of observations, especially 
failures, I leave a calibration period of six years and start with the first bankruptcy risk 
assessment at the end of September 1985. Specifically, I assess the bankruptcy risk 
assessment at the end of September of 1985 (at the end of September 1986) with 
coefficients obtained from a regression using data from October 1979 to September 
1985 (October 1979 to September 1986) and so on. As such, all tests are out-of-sample. 
5.5.1 Default Probabilities 
Table 5 presents the default probabilities from the hybrid models in Shumway (2001) 
(Shum), Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) (CHS) and Christidis and Gregory 
(2010) (CG) and as well for the accounting-based z-score (Taffler, 1983) and the 
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market-based model in Bharath and Shumway (2008) (BS). Figures in column All 
represent the default probabilities of the total sample while non-failed and failed firms 
contain the respective firms only.  
The hybrid models return an average default probability of around 1.00% (ranging from 
0.90% to 1.10%) while the average default probabilities of z-score and BS are clearly 
higher (26.30% and 10.88% respectively). Recalling from Table 1 in Chapter 4 that the 
actual failure rate for the final sample is 0.91%, the hybrid models seem to be able to 
replicate this average default probability. In this context, z-score and BS are mis-
calibrated since they overstate the actual failure probability. 
However, for bankruptcy prediction it is more important to focus on the relative 
performance of each model than on absolute failure probability. As such, it is of greater 
importance that the expected failure probability is greater for failed firms than for non-
failed firms. Figures in column Non-Failed report the failure probability of non-failed 
firms. They are very similar to the failure probability of the total sample for Shum, 
CHS, CG, z-score and BS (the default probabilities are 1.03%, 0.83%, 0.91%, 25.86%, 
and 10.46% respectively). In contrast, the column Failed containing only failed firms 
shows increased default probabilities (7.81%, 6.87%, 7.02%, 73.83%, and 51.12% 
respectively). The difference between the non-failures and failures is highly significant 
for all the models (t = statistics are 10.20, 10.71, 10.02, 17.78, and 16.44 respectively).  
Table 5 therefore clearly shows that all models are able to differentiate significantly 
between non-failures and failures by allocating lower (higher) default probabilities to 
non-failed (failed) firms. 
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Table 5 Distress Risk Models: Default Probabilities 
The table reports time-series averages of default probabilities using all UK non-financial firms listed in 
the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. Default probabilities are calculated at the end 
of each September from 1985 to 2009 for the model in Shumway (2001), Campbell et al. (2008), 
Christidis and Gregory (2010), z-score (Taffler, 1983) and the market-based model in Bharath and 
Shumway (2008). I transform the z-score into probability: p = e
z-score 
/ (1+ e
z-score
). In order to avoid look-
ahead bias, I take the coefficients from failure indicators and predictor variables that are known at the end 
of each September. I display failure rates (in per cent) for all firms, for the non-failed firms and for failed 
firms. The t-statistic indicates the significance of the difference between the non-failed and failed group 
(ΔF-NF).  
  All Non-Failed Failed ΔF-NF t-stat 
Shumway (2001) 1.10 1.03 7.81 6.78 10.20 
Campbell et al. (2008) 0.90 0.83 6.87 6.04 10.71 
Christidis and Gregory (2010) 0.98 0.91 7.02 6.11 10.02 
Z-score (Taffler, 1983) 26.30 25.86 73.83 47.97 17.78 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) 10.88 10.46 51.12 40.65 16.44 
 
5.5.2 Test of Predictive Ability (ROC) 
Having illustrated that all models are able to differentiate between non-failures and 
failures I now test the predictive ability of the models using receiver operating 
characteristics (ROC) curves. 
Table 6 presents the area under ROC curve (AUC) for all bankruptcy prediction models. 
In addition, I test for the predictive ability of common risk factors used in the Carhart 
(1997) model. The table shows that the hybrid models have similar AUCs with all being 
close to 0.90. The accounting-based z-score model has lower prediction accuracy with 
an AUC of 0.81. The predictive ability of the market-based BS model is between that of 
the hybrid and that of the accounting-based model (AUC = 0.87). The AUC of the 
common risk factors BETA, SIZE, BM, and PYR vary strongly and are 0.59, 0.80, 0.61, 
and 0.78 respectively.  
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The third column indicates the standard error (SE) of the AUC while the fourth column 
presents the significance of the AUC (i.e. difference in model performance relative to 
that of a random model). The AUC of each bankruptcy prediction model is significantly 
higher than that of a random model. The hybrid models have a z-statistic slightly above 
26.00 while z-score (z = 16.95) and the BS model (z = 22.49) have lower z-statistics. 
Also, the common risk factors BETA, SIZE, BM, and PYR forecast bankruptcies better 
than a random model (z = 4.15, 16.19, 5.19, and 14.32 respectively). 
Table 6 provides evidence that all bankruptcy prediction models as well as the common 
risk factors have better forecasting accuracy than a random model. However, the hybrid 
models (more specifically, the model in Shumway (2001)) have the best forecasting 
accuracy. 
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Table 6 Distress Risk Models: Area under ROC Curve  
The table reports receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve analysis using all UK non-financial firms 
listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. At the end of each September from 
1985 to 2009 (portfolio formation), I calculate the default probabilities from the model in Shumway 
(2001), Campbell et al. (2008), Christidis and Gregory (2010), z-score (Taffler, 1983) and the market-
based model in Bharath and Shumway (2008). I transform the z-score into probability:  
p = e
z-score 
/ (1+ e
z-score
). In order to avoid look-ahead bias, I take the coefficients from failure indicators 
and predictor variables that are known at portfolio formation. BETA is the beta factor calculated for each 
firm according to Dimson (1979) over the previous 24 months (± 1 month lag). SIZE is the market value 
of common equity (MV). BM is book value of shareholders’ equity less preference shares and minorities 
over MV. PYR is the prior 11-months return excluding September. Latest accounting data is taken with a 
minimum lag of five months between financial year-end and portfolio formation, market data is taken at 
portfolio formation. All variables are winsorised at the 5.0% level, default probabilities at 0.00000001 
and 0.99999999. AUC is the area under the ROC curve estimated as the Wilcoxon statistic. SE is the 
standard error of the estimated area and z is the Hanley and McNeil (1983) test-statistic for the null-
hypothesis that the area under the ROC curve is equal to 0.5.  
Model AUC SE z 
Shumway (2001) 0.896 0.0148 26.83 
Campbell et al. (2008) 0.894 0.0149 26.57 
Christidis and Gregory (2010) 0.892 0.0150 26.25 
Z-score (Taffler, 1983) 0.812 0.0184 16.95 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) 0.866 0.0163 22.49 
BETA 0.587 0.0211 4.15 
SIZE 0.802 0.0187 16.19 
BM 0.610 0.0212 5.19 
PYR 0.777 0.0194 14.32 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the results of Table 6 graphically. However, as the hybrid models 
have very similar forecasting accuracy, Figure 4 only contains the model in Shumway 
(2001) in addition to the z-score and market-based BS. The graph clearly shows the 
superior performance of Shum (i.e. hybrid models) over the z-score and market-based 
BS model. It also shows that the outperformance of the hybrid models over the BS 
approach becomes apparent from integer λ = 15 onwards. For reasons of completeness, 
I report the graph including all three hybrid models in Figure 5A in the appendix to this 
chapter. 
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Figure 4 Distress Risk Models: Area under ROC Curve  
The figure illustrates the receiver operating characteristics curves using all UK non-financial 
firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. λ is an integer between 
0 and 100 and describes the λ% of the highest bankruptcy risk firms.  ( ) is a function of λ that 
divides the number of failures in the highest λ% of default risk by the total number of failures. 
Bankruptcy risk is determined at the end of September each year from 1985 to 2009 using the 
model in Shumway (2001), z-score (Taffler, 1983) and the market-based model in Bharath and 
Shumway (2008). I transform the z-score into probability: p = e
z-score 
/ (1+ e
z-score
). Random 
Model represents the results of random bankruptcy prediction model. All variables are 
winsorised at the 5.0% level, default probabilities at 0.00000001 and 0.99999999. 
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Table 7 reports the z-statistics for difference between the AUCs to test the relative 
performance of the bankruptcy prediction models and the common risk factors. The 
table confirms evidence in Table 6 that the hybrid models have very similar forecasting 
accuracy. The difference between their AUCs is insignificant (maximum z = 0.42). On 
the other hand, hybrid models significantly outperform both the z-score (minimum 
z = 5.96) and market-based BS (minimum z = 3.10) as well as the common risk factors 
(minimum z = 7.66). 
The BS model has a significantly better forecasting accuracy than the z-score (z = 3.83). 
While BS is better than any of the common risk factors (minimum z = 5.40), z-score has 
a better forecasting accuracy than BETA, BM, and PYR (minimum z = 2.36) but not 
better than SIZE (z = 0.70).  
The results in Table 7 are in contrast to those in Agarwal and Taffler (2008a) as they 
find z-score to have similar forecasting accuracy as the market-based bankruptcy 
prediction models using as well UK Main-listed firms. However, my sample period is 
longer and covers more recent years than the sample period in Agarwal and Taffler 
(2008a). To have a better understanding of the difference, Table 8 reports the 
differences in AUCs for the sub-period of portfolio years 1985 to 2000. The sub-period 
moderates the results from the entire sample period since the outperformance of the BS 
over z-score is now insignificant (z = 1.79). While the other results remain unchanged, 
z-score is, in contrast to the previous results, outperforming all common risk factors 
(minimum z = 2.43). This confirms the proposition in Agarwal and Taffler (2007) that 
the performance of the accounting-based z-score model has deteriorated since the late 
1990s. The results with respect to the hybrid models remain unchanged.  
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Table 7 Distress Risk Models: Difference Area under ROC Curve 
The table reports the significance of difference in area under receiver operating characteristics curves 
using all UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. At 
the end of each September from 1985 to 2009 (portfolio formation), I calculate the default probabilities 
from the model in Shumway (2001) (Shum), Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) (CHS), Christidis 
and Gregory (2010) (CG), z-score (Taffler, 1983) and the market-based model in Bharath and Shumway 
(2008) (BS). I transform the z-score into probability: p = e
z-score 
/ (1+ e
z-score
). In order to avoid look-ahead 
bias, I take the coefficients from failure indicators and predictor variables that are known at portfolio 
formation. BETA is the beta factor calculated for each firm according to Dimson (1979) over the previous 
24 months (± 1 month lag). SIZE is the market value of common equity (MV). BM is book value of 
shareholders’ equity less preference shares and minorities over MV. PYR is the prior 11-months return 
excluding September. Latest accounting data is taken with a minimum lag of five months between 
financial year-end and portfolio formation, market data is taken at portfolio formation. All variables are 
winsorised at the 5.0% level, default probabilities at 0.00000001 and 0.99999999. The figures in the table 
present test-statistics of Hanley and McNeil (1983) to compare the area under the curve (AUC) for two 
different variables/models. AUC is estimated as the Wilcoxon statistic.  
  Shum CHS CG Z-score BS BETA SIZE BM 
CHS 0.19 
       
CG 0.42 0.23 
      
Z-score 5.96 6.74 6.58 
     
BS 3.51 3.33 3.10 3.83 
    
BETA 19.39 19.29 19.16 14.69 17.37 
   
SIZE 7.66 7.84 7.68 0.70 5.40 13.16 
  
BM 19.44 18.80 18.68 12.79 18.31 1.43 12.99 
 
PYR 9.41 9.65 9.50 2.36 7.03 11.14 2.42 10.78 
 
 113 
 
Table 8 Distress Risk Models: Difference Area under ROC Curve 1985 to 2000 
The table reports the significance of difference in area under receiver operating characteristics curves 
using all UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. At 
the end of each September from 1985 to 2000 (portfolio formation), I calculate the default probabilities 
from the model in Shumway (2001) (Shum), Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) (CHS), Christidis 
and Gregory (2010) (CG), z-score (Taffler, 1983) and the market-based model in Bharath and Shumway 
(2008) (BS). I transform the z-score into probability. p = e
z-score 
/ (1+ e
z-score
). In order to avoid look-ahead 
bias, I take the coefficients from failure indicators and predictor variables that are known at portfolio 
formation. BETA is the beta factor calculated for each firm according to Dimson (1979) over the previous 
24 months (± 1 month lag). SIZE is the market value of common equity (MV). BM is book value of 
shareholders’ equity less preference shares and minorities over MV. PYR is the prior 11-months return 
excluding September. Latest accounting data is taken with a minimum lag of five months between 
financial year-end and portfolio formation, market data is taken at portfolio formation. All variables are 
winsorised at the 5.0% level, default probabilities at 0.00000001 and 0.99999999. The figures in the table 
present test-statistics of Hanley and McNeil (1983) to compare the area under the curve (AUC) for two 
different variables/models. AUC is estimated as the Wilcoxon statistic.  
  Shum CHS CG Z-score BS BETA SIZE BM 
CHS 0.12 
       
CG 0.41 0.29 
      
Z-score 3.15 3.34 3.16 
     
BS 2.52 2.40 2.20 1.79 
    
BETA 14.54 14.76 14.61 12.43 13.85 
   
SIZE 5.97 6.09 5.90 2.43 4.73 10.00 
  
BM 15.59 15.52 15.36 12.72 14.79 0.59 11.11 
 
PYR 7.63 7.31 7.25 3.96 5.88 8.27 1.86 9.00 
 
The previous tables report the differences between the models and the common risk 
factors. As a further robustness test, I test whether the bankruptcy prediction models 
have greater forecasting accuracy than their individual variables. Table 9 presents the z-
statistics for differences in AUC between the bankruptcy prediction model and its 
respective variables (please see Table 2A on page 91 for a definition of the key 
variables). 
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Shumway (2001) including NITA, TLTA, EXRET, SIGMA, and RSIZE clearly 
outperforms its individual components (minimum z = 5.95). The same is true for 
Campbell et al. (2008) which includes NIMTA, TLMTA, EXRET, SIGMA, RSIZE, 
CASHMTA, BM, and PRICE (minimum z = 4.48). Also, the composite measure of 
Christidis and Gregory (2010) outperforms its individual variables (minimum 
z = 4.48).
26
 The forecasting ability of z-score against its individual variables is better for 
CATL, CLTA, and NCI (minimum z = 6.57). However, the difference between the 
AUC of z-score and PBTCL is insignificant (z = 0.98) showing that PBTCL has similar 
bankruptcy forecasting power as z-score. As such, profitability has the same forecasting 
accuracy as the composite z-score measure. Agarwal and Taffler (2007) discuss the 
importance of profits although their tests show that z-score significantly outperforms 
profit before tax. The BS market-based model clearly outperforms its individual 
components (minimum z = 3.00).
27
 
The results in this sub-chapter provide clear evidence in support of research proposition 
P1, that the bankruptcy prediction measures have different predictive ability. While the 
hybrid models outperform both the z-score and the BS model, the forecasting accuracy 
of z-score is mixed and depends on the time period used.  
In the next sub-chapter I test for bankruptcy related information carried by the distress 
risk measures. 
 
                                                 
26
 In this test, the macroeconomic variables are excluded because they are the same for all firms and thus, 
lead to a random sort.  
27
 Similar results are obtained using the sub-period for portfolio years 1985 to 2000. 
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Table 9 Variables Distress Risk Models: Difference Area under ROC Curve 
The table reports the significance of difference in area under receiver operating characteristics curves using all UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market 
segment of the London Stock Exchange. At the end of each September from 1985 to 2009 (portfolio formation), I calculate the default probabilities from the model in 
Shumway (2001), Campbell et al. (2008), Christidis and Gregory (2010), z-score (Taffler, 1983) and the market-based model in Bharath and Shumway (2008). I 
transform the z-score into probability: p = e
z-score 
/ (1+ e
z-score
). In order to avoid look-ahead bias, I take the coefficients from failure indicators and predictor variables 
that are known at portfolio formation. NITA is net income available to common shareholders (NI) over book value of total assets (TA). NIMTA is NI over the book 
value of total liabilities plus market value of common equity (MTA). TLTA (TLMTA) is book value of total assets excluding total common shareholders’ equity over 
book value of total assets (MTA). EXRET is log excess return over the FTSE All Share Index over the 12 months prior to portfolio formation. SIGMA is the 
annualised standard deviation of daily returns for the three months prior to portfolio formation. RSIZE is log of market value of common equity (MV) over the market 
value of the FTSE All Share Index. CASHMTA is cash and cash equivalents over MTA. BM is book value of shareholders’ equity less preference shares and 
minorities over MV. PRICE is share price. CFMTA is operating cash flow over MTA. PBTCL is profit before tax over current liabilities. CATL is current assets over 
total liabilities. CLTA is current liabilities over total assets. NCI is the no-credit interval calculated as (quick assets – current liabilities) / ((sales – profit before tax – 
depreciation) / 365). ER1y is the prior-year return. Latest accounting data is taken with a minimum lag of five months between financial year-end and portfolio 
formation, market data is taken at portfolio formation. All variables are winsorised at the 5.0% level, default probabilities at 0.00000001 and 0.99999999. The figures 
in the table present test-statistics of Hanley and McNeil (1983) to compare the area under the curve (AUC) for two different variables/models. AUC is estimated as the 
Wilcoxon statistic. I present the t-statistic for difference in AUC between Shumway (2001), Campbell et al. (2008), Christidis and Gregory (2010), z-score (Taffler, 
1983) and the market-based model in Bharath and Shumway (2008) and its respective individual variables. The macro-economic variables of Christidis and Gregory 
(2010) are not contained as they are the same for all sample firms. 
Shumway 
(2001) 
  
Campbell 
et al. (2008) 
  
Christidis and 
Gregory (2010) 
  
Z-score  
(Taffler, 1983) 
  
Bharath and 
Shumway (2008) 
NITA 8.36 
 
NIMTA 9.51 
 
NIMTA 9.51 
 
PBTCL 0.98 
 
ER1y 7.25 
TLTA 11.19 
 
TLMTA 8.19 
 
TLMTA 8.19 
 
CATL 8.04 
 
TLMTA 6.15 
EXRET 8.67 
 
EXRET 8.36 
 
EXRET 8.36 
 
CLTA 6.57 
 
SIGMA 3.00 
SIGMA 5.95 
 
SIGMA 5.92 
 
SIGMA 5.92 
 
NCI 7.36 
   RSIZE 7.46 
 
RSIZE 7.59 
 
RSIZE 7.59 
      
   
CASHMTA 15.28 
 
CFMTA 21.57 
      
   
BM 19.22 
 
PRICE 4.48 
            PRICE 4.48                   
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5.5.3 Test of Information Content 
The information content tests are based on Hillegeist et al. (2004) and estimated by 
logistic regressions with the test-statistic adjusted for multiple observations per firm. I 
use different specifications to test for information content. These include the hybrid 
models, the accounting-based z-score model and the market-based BS model. I also 
include the common risk factors BETA, SIZE, BM and PYR and the base rate of default 
risk measured by the trailing sample failure rate following Hillegeist et al. (2004).  
With the information content tests I examine to what extent the bankruptcy prediction 
models carry bankruptcy related information incremental to each other. Before running 
the logistic regressions, I test for multicollinearity using correlations. Table 10 presents 
a matrix of the Spearman/Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in the 
information content tests. With respect to the hybrid models, Table 10 provides further 
evidence for their similarity (correlation coefficients are ≥ 0.90). Also, hybrid models 
seem to have more in common with the market-based BS model (correlation 
coefficients range between 0.77 and 0.81) than with z-score (correlation coefficients 
range between 0.46 and 0.52).
28
 Due to their different informational background, 
z-score and BS are moderately correlated (correlation coefficients: Spearman 0.37, 
Pearson 0.33). Looking at the correlation coefficients with the common risk factors, it 
can be observed that the hybrid models (all including RSIZE) and SIZE have elevated 
correlation coefficients (Pearson correlation coefficients range between -0.68 and -0.73) 
                                                 
28
 As mentioned earlier and following Hillegeist et al. (2004), I change the sign of z-score to conform to 
the hybrid and market-based models. As such, distress risk is higher for higher scores from Shum, 
z-score, and BS. The same applies to logit regressions and cross-sectional tests in other parts of the study. 
Clearly, the sign-change has no impact on the significance of the coefficients. 
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and thus, regressions using the scores of the hybrid models and SIZE suffer from 
multicollinearity. However, for testing the different models, it follows that information 
content tests (i) including two or more hybrid models suffer from multicollinearity, (ii) 
including hybrid models and BS have to be interpreted with care, and (iii) combining 
hybrid models or BS with z-score has no problem of multicollinearity. 
Table 10 Distress Risk Models: Correlation Common Risk Factors 
This table presents time-series averages of correlation coefficients for variables of UK non-financial firms 
listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. The lower-left side of the matrix 
presents Spearman rank correlation coefficients. The upper-right side of the matrix presents Pearson 
correlation coefficients. Correlation coefficients are calculated at the end of each September from 1985 to 
2009 (portfolio formation). Variables are: Shum is the score from the model in Shumway (2001), CHS 
from Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008), CG from Christidis and Gregory (2010), z-score (Taffler, 
1983) and BS from Bharath and Shumway (2008). In order to avoid look-ahead bias, I take the 
coefficients from failure indicators and predictor variables that are known at the end of each September. 
BETA is the beta factor calculated for each firm according to Dimson (1979) over the previous 24 months 
(± 1 month lag). SIZE is the market value of common equity (MV). BM is book value of shareholders’ 
equity less preference shares and minorities over MV. PYR is the prior 11-months return excluding 
September. Latest accounting data is taken with a minimum lag of five months between financial year-
end and portfolio formation, market data is taken at portfolio formation. All variables are winsorised at 
the 5.0% level, scores are winsorised at ±18.4207.  
  Shum CHS CG Z-score BS BETA SIZE BM PYR 
Shum 1 0.91 0.90 0.51 0.77 0.05 -0.73 0.24 -0.50 
CHS 0.90 1 0.99 0.48 0.81 0.07 -0.68 0.41 -0.48 
CG 0.90 0.99 1 0.47 0.80 0.07 -0.70 0.43 -0.44 
Z-score 0.52 0.47 0.46 1 0.33 0.06 -0.17 -0.04 -0.12 
BS 0.80 0.78 0.77 0.37 1 0.08 -0.51 0.38 -0.59 
BETA 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 1 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 
SIZE -0.49 -0.47 -0.49 -0.08 -0.30 0.08 1 -0.21 0.10 
BM 0.28 0.43 0.45 0.00 0.39 -0.06 -0.36 1 -0.29 
PYR -0.50 -0.48 -0.44 -0.11 -0.56 -0.01 0.22 -0.28 1 
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Table 11 summarises the key results from the information content tests while Table 13A 
in the appendix to this chapter contains all relevant specifications.  
Models 1 to 3 of Table 11 show that all the hybrid models carry significant information 
about failure in the next twelve months. The coefficients (1.02 for Shum, 0.95 for CHS, 
and 0.96 for CG) show that the scores of the hybrid models are positively related with 
actual failures. Importantly, the t-statistics range from 5.21 (CHS) to 5.39 (Shum). None 
of the risk factors (maximum t-statistic 1.70) or Rate (maximum t-statistic 0.63) is 
significant. Model 4 shows a positive and highly significant (t = 3.83) coefficient for 
z-score, i.e. higher default risk measured by z-score is positively associated with actual 
failures. However, PYR is also significant (t = 2.44) showing that it carries bankruptcy 
related information incremental to z-score. Model 5 demonstrates that the market-based 
BS model also carries significant bankruptcy related information (t = 2.88) while the 
common risk factors and RATE are insignificant. 
Model 6 combines the z-score and the BS in one equation. It shows that both carry 
significant bankruptcy related information incremental to each other (t = 2.95 and 2.26 
respectively). This is consistent with the evidence in Hillegeist et al. (2004) and 
Agarwal and Taffler (2008a) who argue that the two models capture distinct aspects of 
bankruptcy risk.  
Models 7, 8, and 9 combine Shum with z-score, BS or both. They demonstrate that the 
coefficients on both z-score and market-based model estimates become statistically 
insignificant (t-statistic are between 0.67 and 0.90) while Shum continues to be 
significant (minimum t = 3.16) although Shum and BS are moderately correlated. 
Overall, this shows (i) that Shum carries significant bankruptcy related information 
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incremental to z-score (see Charalambakis et al. (2009) for similar results) and BS and 
(ii) that once the bankruptcy related information of Shum is included, the information 
carried by z-score and BS is irrelevant.  
The results in this sub-chapter demonstrate clear support for research proposition P2 as 
the distress risk measures carry bankruptcy related information incremental to each 
other. While z-score and BS have distinct bankruptcy related information, the hybrid 
models subsume the information of both z-score and BS. 
Overall, the results show a clear outperformance of the hybrid models using ROC curve 
analysis and information content tests. While the outperformance of hybrids as a group 
is distinct, both tests are unable to distinguish between them. In the next sub-chapter, I 
therefore analyse the three hybrid models testing the economic impact of differential 
misclassification costs using the three hybrid models only.  
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Table 11 Distress Risk Models: Information Content Tests 
The table reports different specifications of logit regressions to test for information content. At the end of 
each September from 1985 to 2009 (portfolio formation), I take the independent variables of UK non-
financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. Dependent binary 
variable: failure (1) or non-failed (0). Independent variables: Shum is the score from the model in 
Shumway (2001), CHS from Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008), CG from Christidis and Gregory 
(2010), z-score (Taffler, 1983) and BS from Bharath and Shumway (2008). In order to avoid look-ahead 
bias, I take the coefficients from failure indicators and predictor variables that are known at portfolio 
formation. BETA is the beta factor calculated for each firm according to Dimson (1979) over the previous 
24 months (± 1 month lag). SIZE is the market value of common equity (MV). BM is book value of 
shareholders’ equity less preference shares and minorities over MV. PYR is the prior 11-months return 
excluding September. RATE is the sample failure rate over the previous twelve months. Latest 
accounting data is taken with a minimum lag of five months between financial year-end and portfolio 
formation, market data is taken at portfolio formation. All variables (except RATE) are winsorised at the 
5.0% level, scores are winsorised at ±18.4207. 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
          Shum 1.02 
     
0.91 0.94 0.82 
 (5.39) (4.00) (4.17) (3.16) 
CHS 0.95 
         (5.21) 
CG 0.96 
         (5.34) 
Z-score 
   
0.09 
 
0.08 0.03 
 
0.03 
 (3.83) (2.95) (0.88) (0.90) 
BS 
  
0.30 0.22 
 
0.06 0.06 
       (2.88) (2.26)  (0.67) (0.69) 
BETA 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.14 
 (0.83) (0.89) (0.71) (0.98) (1.03) (0.94) (0.81) (0.83) (0.81) 
SIZE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.02) (1.20) (0.97) (0.85) (0.01) (0.14) (0.04) 
BM 0.41 0.05 -0.08 0.41 0.09 0.25 0.45 0.36 0.40 
 (1.70) (0.22) (0.31) (1.61) (0.35) (1.00) (1.84) (1.46) (1.59) 
PYR 0.21 -0.01 -0.05 -1.77 0.00 -0.16 0.10 0.46 0.36 
 (0.29) (0.01) (0.07) (2.44) (0.00) (0.19) (0.14) (0.58) (0.45) 
RATE -0.16 -0.24 -0.08 -0.04 -0.09 -0.13 -0.15 -0.16 -0.16 
 (0.41) (0.63) (0.22) (0.10) (0.23) (0.34) (0.40) (0.43) (0.43) 
Constant -0.62 -0.17 -0.20 -5.08 -3.61 -4.05 -1.15 -0.70 -1.25 
 (0.73) (0.19) (0.22) (9.52) (5.90) (6.55) (1.10) (0.83) (1.20) 
          Obs 22,217 22,217 22,217 22,217 22,217 22,217 22,217 22,217 22,217 
χ² 614.3 613.7 631.9 461.2 452.8 530.2 621.2 618.8 626.0 
Pseudo R² 26.7 26.7 27.5 20.0 19.7 23.0 27.0 26.9 27.2 
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5.5.4 Test of Economic Value 
The results in the two previous sub-sections present strong evidence for superiority of 
the hybrid models over the z-score and market-based BS model. Hence, in this sub-
chapter I restrict the analysis to the three hybrid models that my previous performance 
tests are unable to distinguish between.  
Agarwal and Taffler (2008a) note that the credit spread as defined in Eq. (21) is a 
function of the probability of non-failure and failure, and is therefore influenced by both 
the power as well as the calibration of the model. In order to have clean measures of the 
economic impact of model power uncontaminated by possible differences in calibration 
(see Table 5), I use bankruptcy probability percentiles as in Agarwal and Taffler 
(2008a). Further, I smooth the ROC curve using the method of Burgt (2007). Similar to 
Agarwal and Taffler (2008a), I assume that the three banks follow the Basel III 
Foundation Internal Ratings-Based approach, all loans are unsecured senior debt (i.e., 
LGD is 45.0%), and the risk premium for the highest quality customer to be 0.30% (k). 
Table 12 presents the revenue, profitability, and other statistics for the three banks under 
the mixed-regime competitive loan market. The first row presents the loans granted to 
the sample firms. Please note that the credits, market share and defaults does not sum up 
to the total observations (22,217) or 100.0% because banks reject all firms with default 
probabilities that fall in the bottom 5.0% based on their respective model (this affects 
843 firms of which 92 failed). The market share figures show that Bank 1 (Shumway, 
2001) has the largest market share of 54.7% as compared to 19.9% and 21.7% 
respectively for the other two banks that use Campbell et al. (2008) and Christidis and 
Gregory (2010). The quality of loans granted by Bank 1 is also better as only 0.40% of 
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its customers default compared to 0.61% and 0.73% for the other two banks. The better 
credit quality of Bank 1 loans is also reflected in the lower average spread it earns 
(50 bps against 52 bps for Bank 2 and 63 bps for Bank 3). However, the higher market 
share and the better credit quality of Bank 1 translate into much higher profits (£177.7m 
vs. £49.2m for Bank 2 and £65.6m for Bank 3). While the ROA of the three banks is 
tightly ranging between 0.25% (Bank 2) and 0.33% (Bank 1), the RORWA, which 
measures profitability as a function of risk, of Bank 1 (1.21%) clearly outperforms the 
other two banks (0.81% Bank 2 and 0.80% Bank 3). On this basis, considering the 
differential misclassification costs, the Shumway (2001) model clearly outclasses the 
other two hybrid models in economic terms.
29
 
The clear outperformance of Shum might appear surprising since the estimates of the 
three hybrid models are highly correlated (minimum Spearman/Pearson correlation 
coefficient 0.90). However, as the results in Agarwal and Taffler (2008a) demonstrate, 
small differences in the predictive ability can lead to sharp differences in the economic 
value of the models once the differential misclassification costs are considered. A 
detailed inspection of the pricing characteristics of the models shows that the market 
share of Shum is almost linearly increasing with credit quality. For instance, for the 
highest risk firms Shum has a market share of 43 % while it goes up to 78 % for the 
safest firms. At the same time, for the high risk portfolios the fails per loans granted is 
lower than for CHS and about the same as for CG. Therefore, the outperformance of 
Shum is due to its high volume, especially in the high quality loan portfolios, while its 
                                                 
29
 The finding (based on LGD 45.00% and k 0.30%) is robust to alternative model assumptions. For 
instance, changing LGD to 50.00% and k to 0.40% leads to a RORWA of 1.44% for Shum, 1.01% for 
CHS, and 0.96% for CG.  
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default rate in the low quality loan portfolios is better or about the same as for the other 
hybrid models.  
Taken together the results in Table 12, the differential misclassification costs matter 
even for the hybrid models that have very close performance when tested using ROC 
curve analysis and information content tests. The most parsimonious hybrid model 
Shum performs best in an illustrative loan market. Hence the results provide strong 
support for research proposition P3, that there is a difference in performance once 
differential misclassification costs are taken into account.  
Table 12 Hybrid Models: Test of Economic Value 
The table is an illustrative example of a competitive credit market. I hypothesise three banks using default 
probabilities from the models in Shumway (2001) (Shum), Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) 
(CHS), Christidis and Gregory (2010) (CG) using UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market 
segment of the London Stock Exchange. At the end of each September from 1985 to 2009 (portfolio 
formation), I calculate default probabilities. In order to avoid look-ahead bias, I take the coefficients from 
failure indicators and predictor variables that are known at portfolio formation. The banks reject all firms 
with probabilities that fall in the bottom 5.0% based on their respective models while offering credit to all 
others at a credit spread derived using the centred default probability of Burgt (2007) and as defined in 
Eq. (21). The bank with the lowest credit spread is assumed to grant the loan. Market share is the total 
number of loans granted as a percentage of total number of firm years, defaults is the number of firms to 
whom a loan is granted that went bankrupt. Revenue = market size*market share*average credit spread. 
Loss = market size*prior probability of failure*share of defaulters*loss given default. Profit = Revenue - 
Loss. Return on assets is profit divided by market size * market share. The market size is £ 100.0 billion, 
loans are of equal size, loss given default is 45.0%, and credit spread for the highest quality customers is 
0.30%. The prior probability of failure is taken to be the same as the ex-post failure rate of 0.91% during 
the sample period. 
  Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 
Model Shum CHS CG 
Credits 12,144 4,418 4,812 
Market Share (%) 54.7 19.9 21.7 
Defaults 48 27 35 
Defaults/Credits (%) 0.40 0.61 0.73 
Avg. Credit Spread (%) 0.50 0.52 0.63 
Revenue (£m) 275.0 103.9 136.6 
Loss (£m) 97.3 54.7 71.0 
Profit (£m) 177.7 49.2 65.6 
Return on asset (%) 0.33 0.25 0.30 
Return on RWA (%) 1.21 0.81 0.80 
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5.6 Conclusion and Discussion of Findings 
This chapter provides the first comprehensive test of hybrid, accounting-based and 
market-based bankruptcy prediction models. For hybrid models, I apply the seminal 
model of Shumway (2001), the model of Campbell et al. (2008) as well as the model of 
Christidis and Gregory (2010). Further, I include Taffler’s ( 9  ) accounting-based 
z-score model as well as the market-based model of Bharath and Shumway (2008). To 
test the models’ performance, I use receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves, 
information content tests, and the economic impact of differential misclassification 
costs to test the models.  
The tests using ROC curve analysis demonstrate that (i) all bankruptcy prediction 
models have a greater forecasting accuracy than a random model and that the composite 
models perform better than their individual variables (except for z-score and PBTCL). 
(ii) Hybrid models have a significantly higher forecasting accuracy than both z-score 
and BS. (iii) There is no difference in forecasting accuracy between the hybrid models. 
(iv) The outperformance of BS over z-score is not present in the earlier half of the 
sample period (see Hillegeist et al., 2004; Agarwal and Taffler, 2008a). 
Information content tests provide evidence that (i) all models carry significant 
bankruptcy related information when tested individually. (ii) Z-score and BS carry 
distinct and bankruptcy related information complementary to each other (Agarwal and 
Taffler, 2008a). (iii) Hybrid models subsume the bankruptcy related information carried 
by z-score and BS.  
The first two tests show a sharp outperformance of the hybrid models over z-score and 
BS but they are unable to distinguish between the three hybrid models. Therefore, the 
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last test examines the economic value with differential misclassification costs for credit 
pricings using the models in Shumway (2001), Campbell et al. (2008) and Christidis 
and Gregory (2010). In this illustrative loan market, the model in Shumway (2001) 
leads to greater market share, higher credit quality and higher profits. 
The results in this chapter clearly show that the hybrid models outperform the two 
alternatives, the z-score and BS model using ROC curve analysis and information 
content tests. There are several potential explanations for this outperformance. First, the 
z-score model was derived using a sample of firms failing between 1968 and 1976 
(Taffler, 1983). As argued in Agarwal and Taffler (2007), the component ratios need to 
reflect the current key dimensions of firm financial profiles, and these are quite likely to 
have changed over the almost 35 years since the model was developed. Indeed, Agarwal 
and Taffler (2007) note that the firms at risk (and thus the Type II error rate) have 
dramatically increased from 1997 onwards. Also, my results show that an earlier sub-
sample period leads to improved results. The BS model, while being theoretically 
sound, requires the estimation of several unobservable variables and thus introduces 
potential measurement error although existing studies suggest that the different 
estimators (e.g. asset volatility or asset returns) might have little impact on performance 
(e.g. Bharath and Shumway, 2008; Agarwal and Taffler, 2008a). Most importantly, the 
BS and the z-score do not account for time-varying effects on firm bankruptcy risk. In 
contrast, hybrid models assess firm bankruptcy risk with an annual re-estimation of the 
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coefficients.
30
 Thus, hybrid models are by definition more contemporaneous as the 
alternative models tested here. Consistent with Hillegeist et al. (2004) and Agarwal and 
Taffler (2008a), the information content tests show that accounting-based and market-
based models carry bankruptcy related information incremental to each other. This also 
explains why hybrid models that draw upon both information sources are superior in 
assessing firm bankruptcy risk. 
For the following analysis, I use the three approaches to predict bankruptcy, i.e. hybrid, 
accounting-based and market-based, but, due to its outperformance when considering 
differential misclassification costs, I continue with the model in Shumway (2001) to 
represent the hybrid models.  
In the following chapter, I review the evidence on distress risk pricing using the 
alternative three approaches to proxy for distress risk. 
  
                                                 
30
 However, this is unlikely to be the main reason for their outperformance as Begley et al. (1996) show 
that simply re-estimating the coefficients of existing z-score models does not improve the performance 
significantly.  
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5.7 Appendix 
 
Figure 5A Distress Risk Models: Area under ROC Curves (Hybrids) 
The figure illustrates the receiver operating characteristics curves using all UK non-financial 
firms listed in the Main market segment of the  ondon Stock Exchange. λ is an integer between 
0 and  00 and describes the λ% of the highest bankruptcy risk firms.  ( ) is a function of λ that 
divides the number of failures in the highest λ% of default risk by the total number of failures. 
Bankruptcy risk is determined at the end of September each year from 1985 to 2009 using the 
model in Shumway (2001), Campbell et al. (2008), Christidis and Gregory (2010), z-score 
(Taffler, 1983) and the market-based model in Bharath and Shumway (2008). I transform the z-
score into probability: p = e
z-score 
/ (1+ e
z-score
). Random Model represents the results of random 
bankruptcy prediction model. All variables are winsorised at the 5.0% level, default 
probabilities at 0.00000001 and 0.99999999. 
  
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 20 40 60 80 100
𝑓
(λ
) 
λ 
Random Model Shumway (2001)
Campbell et al. (2008) Christidis and Gregory (2010)
Z-score (Taffler, 1983) Bharath and Shumway (2008)
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Table 13A Distress Risk Models: Information Content Tests (Hybrids) 
The table reports different specifications of logit regressions to test for information content. At the end of 
each September from 1985 to 2009 (portfolio formation), I take the independent variables of UK non-
financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. Dependent binary 
variable: failure (1) or non-failed (0). Independent variables: Shum is the score from the model in 
Shumway (2001), CHS from Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008), CG from Christidis and Gregory 
(2010), z-score (Taffler, 1983) and BS from Bharath and Shumway (2008). In order to avoid look-ahead 
bias, I take the coefficients from failure indicators and predictor variables that are known at portfolio 
formation. BETA is the beta factor calculated for each firm according to Dimson (1979) over the previous 
24 months (± 1 month lag). SIZE is the market value of common equity (MV). BM is book value of 
shareholders’ equity less preference shares and minorities over MV. PYR is the prior 11-months return 
excluding September. RATE is the sample failure rate over the previous twelve months. Latest 
accounting data is taken with a minimum lag of five months between financial year-end and portfolio 
formation, market data is taken at portfolio formation. All variables (except RATE) are winsorised at the 
5.0% level, scores are winsorised at ±18.4207. 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
          Shum  0.91 0.94 0.82 
       (4.00) (4.17) (3.16) 
CHS 
 
0.83 0.91 0.79 
      (3.89) (4.06) (3.08) 
CG 
    
0.85 0.91 0.80 
   (4.13) (4.28) (3.40) 
Z-score 0.03 
 
0.03 0.03 
 
0.03 0.03 
 
0.03 
 (0.88) (0.90) (1.00) (1.02) (1.06) (1.06) 
BS 0.06 0.06 
 
0.03 0.03 
 
0.03 0.03 
   (0.67) (0.69)  (0.27) (0.32)  (0.36) (0.36) 
BETA 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.12 
 (0.81) (0.83) (0.81) (0.86) (0.89) (0.86) (0.70) (0.72) (0.71) 
SIZE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.14) (0.04) (0.15) (0.05) (0.13) (0.09) (0.01) (0.06) 
BM 0.45 0.36 0.40 0.14 0.05 0.13 0.02 -0.08 0.02 
 (1.84) (1.46) (1.59) (0.55) (0.20) (0.52) (0.09) (0.32) (0.08) 
PYR 0.10 0.46 0.36 -0.10 0.11 0.03 -0.12 0.11 0.04 
 (0.14) (0.58) (0.45) (0.14) (0.13) (0.04) (0.16) (0.14) (0.05) 
RATE -0.15 -0.16 -0.16 -0.23 -0.24 -0.23 -0.11 -0.10 -0.12 
 (0.40) (0.43) (0.43) (0.60) (0.63) (0.60) (0.28) (0.25) (0.31) 
Constant -1.15 -0.70 -1.25 -0.82 -0.24 -0.91 -0.80 -0.26 -0.86 
 (1.10) (0.83) (1.20) (0.73) (0.25) (0.79) (0.75) (0.29) (0.80) 
          Obs 22,217 22,217 22,217 22,217 22,217 22,217 22,217 22,217 22,217 
χ² 621.2 618.8 626.0 622.7 614.4 623.6 642.0 633.2 643.2 
Pseudo R² 27.0 26.9 27.2 27.1 26.7 27.1 27.9 27.5 28.0 
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CHAPTER 6:  NEGATIVE DISTRESS RISK PREMIUM 
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6.1 Introduction 
A key assertion of theoretical finance literature is that higher systematic risk is rewarded 
with higher returns. Chan and Chen (1991) and Fama and French (1992) hypothesise 
that high returns on small size and high BM firms are due to higher financial distress 
risk of such firms. If financial distress risk is systematic, then investors expect a positive 
premium for bearing this risk. Campbell et al. (2008) and Chava and Purnanandam 
(2010) note that the standard implementation of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
might fail to completely capture the distress risk premium if corporate failures are 
correlated with deteriorating investment opportunities (Merton, 1973) or unmeasured 
components of wealth such as human capital (Fama and French, 1996) and debt 
securities (Ferguson and Shockley, 2003). Following this argument, distress risk would 
result in the return patterns related to size and value as argued by Fama and French 
(1996). 
Chava and Purnanandam (2010) find expected returns to be higher for distressed firms. 
Vassalou and Xing (2004) observe a positive distress risk premium using realised 
returns. However, in the majority of the literature a negative relation between distress 
risk and realised stock returns is found (e.g. Dichev, 1998; Griffin and Lemmon, 2002; 
Agarwal and Taffler, 2008b). This is in sharp contrast with the risk-reward relation of 
theoretical finance, and moreover, it rejects the distress hypothesis proposed by Chan 
and Chen (1991) and Fama and French (1992). 
Although the majority of studies document a negative distress risk premium, the reasons 
for this anomalous finding are still not clear. Also, studies with the same bankruptcy 
prediction measure document conflicting results (e.g. Vassalou and Xing, 2004 and Da 
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and Gao, 2010). Moreover, the existing studies do not examine the pricing impact 
comprehensively by using all three available approaches to measure distress risk. This 
chapter fills this gap by providing evidence on the pricing of distress risk by first testing 
whether the documented negative distress risk premium in the literatures is sensitive to 
the distress risk proxy. Also, while Agarwal and Taffler (2008b) provide evidence of 
negative distress risk premium using z-score, there is no study that provides similar 
evidence using market-based or hybrid models in the UK. The analysis in this chapter 
fills this gap as well. 
Importantly, the evidence in Chapter 5 clearly demonstrates that the hybrid model of 
Shumway (2001) is a better predictor of bankruptcy than other models and that it 
subsumes the bankruptcy related information of both, the z-score and market-based 
model. If the observed lower returns on distressed firms are due to their higher risk of 
failure, I expect the Shumway (2001) model-based proxy for distress risk will subsume 
the information related to future stock returns contained in the other two measures. 
Therefore and in contrast to other studies, this chapter is essentially able to test whether 
there is a distress risk premium: the best bankruptcy prediction model is expected to be 
the most significant in distress risk pricing. This dimension has so far been disregarded 
in literature. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: in sub-chapter 2 I present the 
research question and research propositions. In sub-chapter 3 I briefly describe the data 
and method used. Sub-chapter 4 tests the distress risk premium using time-series 
regressions. Sub-chapter 5 tests the distress risk premium using cross-sectional 
regressions. Sub-chapter 6 concludes.  
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6.2 Research Question 
While the majority of previous studies focus on using one or two distress risk proxies 
and explore its impact on stock prices (e.g. Dichev, 1998; Griffin and Lemmon, 2002; 
Agarwal and Taffler, 2008b), I review the relation between distress risk and subsequent 
stock returns using the three available approaches to proxy for distress risk. The 
research question and propositions tested in this chapter are as follows: 
Is there a distress risk premium and does it depend on the distress risk measure? 
P4: There is a distress risk premium in stock returns. 
P5: The distress risk premium depends on the proxy for distress risk. 
6.3 Data and Methodology 
My sample consists of UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the 
London Stock Exchange anytime between October 1985 and September 2010. It 
includes 22,217 observations with 2,428 unique firms of which 202 failed.  
The test of economic value with differential misclassification costs in Chapter 5 shows 
that the hybrid model of Shumway (2001) (Shum) outperforms the two alternative 
hybrid models. Therefore, in all subsequent parts in this thesis, I use Shum to represent 
the hybrid models. In addition to Shum, I apply the accounting-based z-score (Taffler, 
1983) and the market-based model of Bharath and Shumway (2008) (BS) to proxy for 
distress risk. 
In this chapter, I use two testing procedures. First, I use time-series regressions on 
average portfolio excess returns using the Fama and French (1993) model (Fama and 
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French model) as well as the Carhart (1997) model (Carhart model) as defined in 
Eq. (25). Second, I use cross-sectional regressions following the method of Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) as defined in Eq. (24).  
6.4 Time-Series Regressions 
To test the time-series characteristics of distress risk, I use decile portfolios sorts on 
each distress risk measure. Specifically, at the end of September of each year from 1985 
to 2009, I sort all stocks on their failure probability and group them into ten portfolios 
with equal number of stocks. 
6.4.1 Portfolios on Shumway (2001) 
Table 14 summarises the portfolio characteristics of decile portfolios sorted on Shum. 
Using value-weighted average excess portfolio returns, the high distress risk portfolio 
clearly stands out with a negative return of -28 bps per month. Likewise, the low 
distress risk portfolio earns 61 bps per month (t = 2.21), the highest return of all 
portfolios. The H-L portfolio, that is a portfolio long on distressed and short on non-
distressed stocks, earns a significant negative premium of -89 bps per month (t = 2.23). 
Using equally-weighted returns, the highest distress risk portfolio underperforms all 
other portfolios (21 bps per month) while the low distress risk portfolio earns the second 
highest returns (63 bps). The return on the H-L portfolio is -42 bps per month though 
statistically not significant (t = 1.09). The returns between the two extreme portfolios do 
not follow any pattern. BETA increases (monotonically) with distress risk. The low 
distress risk portfolio has an average equity beta of 1.04 while the high distress risk 
portfolio has an average equity beta of 1.25. SIZE is negatively related with distress 
risk. The average market capitalisation of the low distress risk portfolio is £ 1,104m. In 
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sharp contrast to that, the high distress risk portfolio has the lowest average market 
capitalisation of only £ 23m. Also, BM increases monotonically in distress risk from 
0.49 for the low distress risk portfolio to 1.05 for the high distress risk portfolio. PYR 
provides another monotonic relation with Shum as the prior-year returns decrease from 
38 bps for the low risk portfolio to -23 bps to the high risk portfolio. However, 
interpreting the results one has to keep in mind that Shum contains a SIZE-related 
variable (RSIZE) as well as a PYR-related variable (EXRET). As such, it is not 
surprising that the two variables are related with Shum, though this does not change the 
fact that they are good proxies for distress risk. Def Prob presents the average default 
probabilities of the portfolios. Recalling from Chapter 5, the average sample default 
probability using Shum is 1.10%. As such, P1 to P8 have substantially lower than 
average failure probabilities while for the high risk portfolio the average failure 
probability is 7.43%. Demonstrating the ability of Shum to predict failures, Fail Rate 
shows that the failure rate of the high risk portfolio is 6.46% compared to an average 
failure rate of 0.91% (see Chapter 4). This equals to 144 out of 202 failures in the high 
default risk portfolio.  
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Table 14 Shumway (2001) Decile Portfolios: Summary Statistics 
The table presents summary statistics of decile portfolios based on UK non-financial firms listed in the 
Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. At the end of each September from 1985 to 2009 
(portfolio formation), I rank the sample firms on default probability obtained from the model in Shumway 
(2001) and sort into equally populated decile portfolios. In order to avoid look-ahead bias, I take the 
coefficients from failure indicators and predictor variables that are known at portfolio formation. ER vw 
(ER ew) reports the value-weighted (equally-weighted) average monthly portfolio excess return for the 12 
months following portfolio formation. Time-series portfolio averages are reported for: BETA is the beta 
factor calculated for each firm according to Dimson (1979) over the previous 24 months (± 1 month lag). 
SIZE is the market value of common equity (MV). BM is book value of shareholders’ equity less 
preference shares and minorities over MV. PYR is the prior 11-months return excluding September. Def 
Prob is the average default probability measured by Shumway (2001). Act Fails is the number of actuals 
failures within the respective portfolio. Fail Rate is Act Fails over the total number of firms in the 
portfolio. Latest accounting data is taken with a minimum lag of five months between financial year-end 
and portfolio formation, market data is taken at portfolio formation. The return of the month of failure is 
set to -100.0%. All variables are winsorised at the 5.0% level, default probabilities at 0.00000001 and 
0.99999999. 
  Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High H-L 
ER vw 0.61 0.47 0.45 0.48 0.24 0.37 0.23 0.47 0.44 -0.28 -0.89 
 
(2.21) (1.65) (1.52) (1.49) (0.67) (1.06) (0.59) (1.12) (0.83) (0.56) (2.23) 
ER ew 0.63 0.54 0.57 0.64 0.37 0.61 0.39 0.56 0.55 0.21 -0.42 
 
(2.24) (1.94) (1.98) (2.13) (1.19) (1.95) (1.16) (1.59) (1.29) (0.44) (1.09) 
BETA 1.04 1.02 1.05 1.09 1.07 1.06 1.12 1.14 1.15 1.25 0.20 
SIZE 1,104 718 539 389 292 207 139 82 56 23 -1,082 
BM 0.49 0.55 0.57 0.61 0.67 0.76 0.82 0.93 1.02 1.05 0.56 
PYR 0.38 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.05 -0.03 -0.23 -0.61 
Def Prob 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.22 0.30 0.46 0.77 1.54 7.34 7.30 
Act Fails 0 0 2 2 6 2 12 10 24 144 144 
Fail Rate 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.27 0.09 0.54 0.45 1.08 6.46 6.46 
 
Table 15 presents the risk-adjusted returns and adjusted R²s using the Fama and French 
model and Carhart model for decile portfolios sorted on Shum. Panel A in Table 15 
reports the results for value-weighted portfolio average excess returns. The results show 
a sharp underperformance of distressed stocks. The H-L portfolio earns a significant 
premium of -131 bps per month (t = 5.14) using the Fama and French model. The 
negative premium is driven by both the high distress risk portfolio (-96 bps, t = 4.10) 
and the low distress risk portfolio (35 bps, t = 3.59). Like the intercept, the adjusted R²s 
are generally lower for high distress risk portfolios (overall ranging from 88% to 67%). 
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The inclusion of the momentum factor (Carhart model) reduces the premium on the H-L 
portfolio to -104 bps but it is still statistically highly significant (t = 4.15). Again, the 
distress risk premium is driven by the two extreme portfolios (-81 bps, t = 3.44 and 
22 bps, t = 2.37 respectively). The adjusted R²s increase only little with the inclusion of 
the momentum factor (ranging from 71% to 89%). 
Panel B presents the portfolio statistics using equally-weighted returns. Again, there is a 
negative distress risk premium with a substantial underperformance of the H-L portfolio 
of -77 bps per month (t = 3.12) using the Fama and French model. The distress risk 
premium is driven by both distressed stocks (-44 bps, t = 1.97) and the non-distressed 
stocks (32 bps, t = 3.23). Interestingly, the adjusted R²s are higher using equal weights 
(ranging from 78% to 91%). Using the Carhart (1997) risk-adjustment, the negative H-L 
remains (-62 bps, t = 2.49). However, the risk-adjusted return of the highly distressed 
firms are insignificant (-40 bps, t = 1.73) and thus, the negative distress risk premium is 
mainly driven by outperforming non-distressed stocks contributing with 22 bps 
(t = 2.24). As with value-weighted returns, the adjusted R²s do not increase significantly 
with the inclusion of the momentum factor (ranging from 78% to 91%). 
The results in Table 15 clearly show that when distress risk is proxied by Shumway 
(2001) model, the distressed stocks significantly underperform non-distressed stocks on 
a risk-adjusted basis. Thus, I find evidence in favour of proposition P4, as there is a 
distress risk premium in stock returns, albeit negative.  
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Table 15 Shumway (2001) Decile Portfolios: Time-Series Regression 
The table presents summary statistics of time-series regressions on decile portfolios based on UK non-
financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. At the end of each 
September from 1985 to 2009 (portfolio formation), I rank the sample firms on default probability 
obtained from the model in Shumway (2001) and sort into equally populated decile portfolios. In order to 
avoid look-ahead bias, I take the coefficients from failure indicators and predictor variables that are 
known at portfolio formation. I report the intercepts β1, the corresponding t-statistics in brackets, and the 
adjusted R² for the asset pricing model of Fama and French (1993) (excl.      ) and Carhart (1997) as 
defined in Eq. (25): 
                                                                    , 
where        is the return on portfolio i during month m (integer 1 to 12) in portfolio year t,        the 
one-month UK Treasury Bill rate at the beginning of month t+m,         the return difference of the 
FTSE All Share Index and the one-month UK Treasury Bill rate during month t+m,        the return on 
the mimicking portfolio for the size factor during month t+m,        the return on the mimicking 
portfolio for the BM factor during month t+m and        the return on the mimicking portfolio for the 
return momentum factor during month t+m. The results in Panel A are based on value-weighted monthly 
portfolio average excess returns. The results in Panel B are based on equally-weighted monthly portfolio 
average excess returns. The return of the month of failure is set to -100.0%. 
  Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High H-L 
Panel A. Value-Weighted Returns 
Fama and French Model 
β1 0.35 0.10 0.01 0.05 -0.31 -0.16 -0.35 -0.19 -0.34 -0.96 -1.31 
 
(3.59) (0.98) (0.05) (0.37) (2.07) (1.00) (1.55) (0.80) (1.17) (4.10) (5.14) 
Adj. R² 0.88 0.88 0.85 0.82 0.83 0.80 0.67 0.69 0.71 0.77 0.60 
Carhart Model 
β1 0.22 0.12 0.09 0.20 -0.17 0.02 -0.21 0.03 -0.10 -0.81 -1.04 
 
(2.37) (1.21) (0.77) (1.43) (1.18) (0.11) (0.91) (0.12) (0.37) (3.44) (4.15) 
Adj. R² 0.89 0.88 0.86 0.83 0.84 0.81 0.68 0.71 0.73 0.78 0.63 
Panel B. Equally-Weighted Returns 
Fama and French Model 
β1 0.32 0.16 0.14 0.20 -0.12 0.12 -0.16 0.00 -0.14 -0.44 -0.77 
 
(3.23) (1.53) (1.34) (1.87) (1.20) (1.27) (1.45) (0.03) (0.91) (1.97) (3.12) 
Adj. R² 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.91 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.78 0.61 
Carhart Model 
β1 0.22 0.13 0.14 0.23 -0.11 0.18 -0.13 0.05 -0.06 -0.40 -0.62 
 
(2.24) (1.20) (1.30) (2.14) (1.02) (1.86) (1.19) (0.40) (0.41) (1.73) (2.49) 
Adj. R² 0.89 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.91 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.78 0.62 
 
6.4.2 Portfolios on z-score (Taffler, 1983) 
Table 16 summarises the portfolio characteristics of the ten portfolios sorted on z-score. 
Similar to the sort on Shum, excess returns using equal weights are generally lower for 
firms with higher distress risk. The highest distress risk portfolio earns a return of only 
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8 bps per month (t = 0.23). In contrast, the low distress portfolio has an average return 
of 54 bps. As such, the return of the H-L portfolio is -46 bps per month though 
insignificant (t = 1.68). Using equal weights, the negative distress risk-return relation is 
more apparent. The high distress risk portfolio again has the lowest returns (-2 bps, 
t = 0.05) while the low distress risk portfolio earns high positive returns (64 bps, 
t = 2.27). The negative premium of -66 bps per month on the H-L portfolio is highly 
significant (t = 2.62). BETA increases monotonically with distress risk from 0.99 for the 
low distress risk portfolio to 1.25 for the high distress risk portfolio. SIZE is not as 
pronounced as in the Shum sort and in fact, it shows a hump-shaped relation with 
z-score (£ 282m for the low distress risk portfolio, £ 460m for P5, and £ 167m for the 
high distress risk portfolio). The relation between BM and z-score shows a distinct 
U-shape with similar BM ratios for the low and high distress risk portfolios (0.84 for the 
low distress risk portfolio, 0.80 for the high distress risk portfolio, and a drop to 0.68 in 
P3). PYR is fairly constant (between 15 bps and 18 bps) for portfolios 1 to 8 and 
declines sharply for the two high distress risk portfolios (12 bps and 1 bps respectively). 
The average failure probability predicted by z-score increases to nearly 100% for the 
high distress risk portfolio showing again the mis-calibration of the model (see 
Chapter 5). However, in relative terms, z-score is able to predict failures as the failure 
rate and the distribution of failures show. The high default risk portfolio has an average 
failure rate of 4.71% (about four times higher than average) and contains more than half 
of all failures (105 out of 202).  
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Table 16 Z-score (Taffler, 1983) Decile Portfolios: Summary Statistics 
The table presents summary statistics of decile portfolios based on UK non-financial firms listed in the 
Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. At the end of each September from 1985 to 2009 
(portfolio formation), I rank the sample firms on default probability obtained from z-score (Taffler, 1983) 
and sort into equally populated decile portfolios. I transform the z-score into probability:  
p = e
z-score 
/ (1+ e
z-score
). In order to avoid look-ahead bias, I take the predictor variables that are known at 
portfolio formation. ER vw (ER ew) reports the value-weighted (equally-weighted) average monthly 
portfolio excess return for the 12 months following portfolio formation. Time-series portfolio averages 
are reported for: BETA is the beta factor calculated for each firm according to Dimson (1979) over the 
previous 24 months (± 1 month lag). SIZE is the market value of common equity (MV). BM is book 
value of shareholders’ equity less preference shares and minorities over MV. PYR is the prior 11-months 
return excluding September Def Prob is the average default probability measured by z-score (Taffler, 
1983). Act Fails is the number of actuals failures within the respective portfolio. Fail Rate is Act Fails 
over the total number of firms in the portfolio.  Latest accounting data is taken with a minimum lag of 
five months between financial year-end and portfolio formation, market data is taken at portfolio 
formation. The return of the month of failure is set to -100.0%. All variables are winsorised at the 5.0% 
level, default probabilities at 0.00000001 and 0.99999999. 
  Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High H-L 
ER vw 0.54 0.61 0.54 0.55 0.51 0.44 0.48 0.22 0.42 0.08 -0.46 
 
(1.60) (2.06) (1.78) (1.91) (1.73) (1.48) (1.62) (0.70) (1.25) (0.23) (1.68) 
ER ew 0.64 0.71 0.61 0.65 0.54 0.48 0.56 0.43 0.45 -0.02 -0.66 
 
(2.27) (2.46) (2.10) (2.08) (1.68) (1.59) (1.71) (1.29) (1.24) (0.05) (2.62) 
BETA 0.99 1.03 1.09 1.09 1.10 1.08 1.11 1.10 1.16 1.25 0.26 
SIZE 282 392 452 459 460 394 349 321 280 167 -115 
BM 0.84 0.72 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.80 0.80 -0.04 
PYR 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.01 -0.16 
Def Prob 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.33 1.60 6.41 20.94 50.04 84.31 98.98 98.98 
Act Fails 2 5 5 5 6 8 5 30 31 105 103 
Fail Rate 0.09 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.27 0.36 0.23 1.35 1.39 4.71 4.62 
 
Table 17 reports the summary results for time-series regressions on decile portfolios 
sorted on z-score. The pricing analysis using z-score is of great interest since, as 
opposed to the other two bankruptcy prediction models, the accounting-based z-score is 
completely independent of the risk factors. However, like the sort on Shum, Panel A in 
Table 17 reveals a highly significant distress risk premium of -57 bps (t = 2.12) using 
the Fama and French model. The distress risk premium is driven by both the low 
distressed firms (20 bps, t = 1.09) and the high distress portfolio (-37 bps, t = 1.91). The 
adjusted R²s show that the Fama and French model has problems in pricing these two 
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portfolios especially (72% and 71% respectively) while for the other portfolios it is 75% 
to 87%. The risk-adjusted returns of the Carhart model show a weaker but still 
significant negative distress risk premium. The H-L portfolio earns a negative distress 
risk premium of -57 bps per month (t = 2.07). While the mispricing of the high distress 
risk portfolio has increased with the inclusion of the momentum factor (-40 bps, 
t = 1.99), it slightly decreased for the low distress risk portfolio (17 bps, t = 0.94). There 
is no difference in adjusted R²s between the pricing models.  
Panel B presents equally-weighted risk-adjusted portfolios returns. Using the Fama and 
French model, there is a substantial distress risk premium of -89 bps per month 
(t = 4.50) that is mostly due to the high distress risk portfolio (-66 bps, t = 3.44) and 
partly driven by low distress risk portfolio (23 bps, t = 2.21). As with the sort on Shum, 
using equal weights increases the adjusted R²s to about 87% but there is still a low fit 
for the high distress risk portfolio (82%). The momentum factor (Carhart model) is 
again unable to capture the distress risk premium. The H-L portfolio still earns a 
premium of -93 bps per month (t = 4.59). The returns of the low and high distress risk 
portfolio remain significant as well (26 bps, t = 2.42 and -67 bps, t = 3.42 respectively). 
Adjusted R²s are still at around 88% except for the high distress risk portfolio (82%).  
Table 17 clearly shows that when z-scores are used to proxy for distress risk, on a risk-
adjusted basis, the distressed stocks underperform the non-distressed stocks on value-
weighted and equally-weighted basis. Thus, I again find supporting evidence of 
proposition P4, there is a negative distress risk premium in stock returns.  
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Table 17 Z-score (Taffler, 1983) Decile Portfolios: Time-Series Regression 
The table presents summary statistics of time-series regressions on decile portfolios based on UK non-
financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. At the end of each 
September from 1985 to 2009 (portfolio formation), I rank the sample firms on default probability 
obtained from the z-score (Taffler, 1983) and sort into equally populated decile portfolios. I transform the 
z-score into probability: p = e
z-score 
/ (1+ e
z-score
). In order to avoid look-ahead bias, I take the coefficients 
from failure indicators and predictor variables that are known at portfolio formation. I report the 
intercepts β1, the corresponding t-statistics in brackets, and the adjusted R² for the asset pricing model of 
Fama and French (1993) (excl.      ) and Carhart (1997) as defined in Eq. (25): 
                                                                    , 
where        is the return on portfolio i during month m (integer 1 to 12) in portfolio year t,        the 
one-month UK Treasury Bill rate at the beginning of month t+m,         the return difference of the 
FTSE All Share Index and the one-month UK Treasury Bill rate during month t+m,        the return on 
the mimicking portfolio for the size factor during month t+m,        the return on the mimicking 
portfolio for the BM factor during month t+m, and       the return on the mimicking portfolio for the 
return momentum factor during month t+m. The results in Panel A are based on value-weighted monthly 
portfolio average excess returns. The results in Panel B are based on equally-weighted monthly portfolio 
average excess returns. The return of the month of failure is set to -100.0%. 
  Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High H-L 
Panel A. Value-Weighted Returns 
Fama and French Model 
β1 0.20 0.21 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.02 0.05 -0.22 0.02 -0.37 -0.57 
 
(1.09) (1.76) (1.36) (1.37) (1.06) (0.19) (0.38) (1.53) (0.12) (1.91) (2.12) 
Adj. R² 0.72 0.84 0.87 0.84 0.87 0.84 0.84 0.79 0.75 0.71 0.04 
Carhart Model 
β1 0.17 0.25 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.07 0.07 -0.11 0.03 -0.40 -0.57 
 
(0.94) (2.03) (1.45) (1.53) (1.29) (0.56) (0.55) (0.76) (0.18) (1.99) (2.07) 
Adj. R² 0.72 0.84 0.87 0.84 0.87 0.85 0.84 0.80 0.75 0.71 0.04 
Panel B. Equally-Weighted Returns 
Fama and French Model 
β1 0.23 0.26 0.16 0.15 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.66 -0.89 
 
(2.21) (2.52) (1.60) (1.38) (0.28) (0.12) (0.35) (0.65) (0.52) (3.44) (4.50) 
Adj. R² 0.87 0.87 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.82 0.40 
Carhart Model 
β1 0.26 0.29 0.16 0.20 0.10 0.03 0.05 -0.08 -0.09 -0.67 -0.93 
 
(2.42) (2.74) (1.63) (1.74) (0.83) (0.24) (0.44) (0.68) (0.67) (3.42) (4.59) 
Adj. R² 0.87 0.87 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.82 0.40 
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6.4.3 Portfolios on Bharath and Shumway (2008) 
Table 18 presents the summary characteristics for the sort on the market-based Bharath 
and Shumway (2008) model. The value-weighted average excess returns show a 
negative premium on the H-L portfolios of -31 bps (t = 0.76). However, the distress 
risk-return relation is less clear than for the previous two sorts. The high distress risk 
portfolio earns a fairly low return (23 bps, t = 0.45) while the lowest return is earned by 
P8 (2 bps, t = 0.05). However, the returns for low distress risk firms are higher and more 
stable, ranging from 53 bps to 64 bps for portfolios 1 to 3 (minimum t = 1.92). Using 
equal weights gives a less clear picture. Although there is a negative distress risk 
premium (-40 bps, t = 1.12), P9 earns the highest returns (70 bps, t = 1.73). The low 
distress risk portfolio has an average return of 53 bps (t = 2.01). BETA generally 
increases with distress risk from 0.94 to 1.22 with a small drop in P8. SIZE decreases 
with distress risk to £ 51m for the high distress risk portfolio (peaking in P3 with 
£ 598m). BM increases monotonically in distress risk from 0.39 to 1.30. Not 
surprisingly, PYR, which is similar to the BS component ER1y, decreases 
monotonically with distress risk from 42 bps to -30 bps. Similar to z-score, the BS is 
mis-calibrated as the average default probabilities are too high for the high risk 
portfolios (up to 60%). But again, the ability of BS in predicting bankruptcy is shown 
by the high failure rates (5.87%) and concentration of failures in the high distress risk 
portfolio (131 out of 202 failures).  
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Table 18 Bharath and Shumway (2008) Decile Portfolios: Summary Statistics 
The table presents summary statistics of decile portfolios based on UK non-financial firms listed in the 
Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. At the end of each September from 1985 to 2009 
(portfolio formation), I rank the sample firms on default probability obtained from the model in Bharath 
and Shumway (2001) and sort into equally populated decile portfolios. In order to avoid look-ahead bias, 
I take the predictor variables that are known at portfolio formation. ER vw (ER ew) reports the value-
weighted (equally-weighted) average monthly portfolio excess return for the 12 months following 
portfolio formation. Time-series portfolio averages are reported for: BETA is the beta factor calculated 
for each firm according to Dimson (1979) over the previous 24 months (± 1 month lag). SIZE is the 
market value of common equity (MV). BM is book value of shareholders’ equity less preference shares 
and minorities over MV. PYR is the prior 11-months return excluding September. Def Prob is the average 
default probability measured by Bharath and Shumway (2008). Act Fails is the number of actuals failures 
within the respective portfolio. Fail Rate is Act Fails over the total number of firms in the portfolio. Latest 
accounting data is taken with a minimum lag of five months between financial year-end and portfolio 
formation, market data is taken at portfolio formation. The return of the month of failure is set 
to -100.0%. All variables are winsorised at the 5.0% level, default probabilities at 0.00000001 and 
0.99999999. 
  Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High H-L 
ER vw 0.53 0.64 0.59 0.43 0.34 0.44 0.18 0.02 0.41 0.23 -0.31 
 
(1.92) (2.27) (2.09) (1.45) (1.06) (1.29) (0.49) (0.05) (0.88) (0.45) (0.76) 
ER ew 0.53 0.53 0.70 0.52 0.46 0.51 0.49 0.54 0.70 0.13 -0.40 
 
(2.01) (1.94) (2.45) (1.76) (1.45) (1.64) (1.49) (1.53) (1.73) (0.27) (1.12) 
BETA 0.94 0.99 1.06 1.07 1.10 1.13 1.14 1.10 1.25 1.22 0.28 
SIZE 451 568 598 557 452 340 256 169 115 51 -400 
BM 0.39 0.48 0.53 0.61 0.66 0.73 0.81 0.93 1.04 1.30 0.91 
PYR 0.42 0.36 0.30 0.27 0.20 0.17 0.09 0.03 -0.09 -0.30 -0.71 
Def Prob 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.20 0.92 2.75 6.56 13.03 25.50 59.62 59.62 
Act Fails 0 3 2 4 4 11 7 17 23 131 131 
Fail Rate 0.00 0.13 0.09 0.18 0.18 0.50 0.32 0.77 1.03 5.87 5.87 
 
Table 19 presents summary statistics for time-series regressions on decile portfolios 
sorted on BS. Panel A reports value-weighted returns and again shows a substantial 
distress risk premium of -92 bps (t = 3.08) using the Fama and French model. The low 
distress risk portfolio contributes about a third (30 bps, t = 2.70) while the high distress 
risk portfolio contributes two thirds (-61 bps, t = 2.26) to the premium. The highest and 
lowest risk-adjusted returns are earned by P2 (43 bps, t = 3.91) and P8 (-68 bps, 
t = 3.06) respectively. The adjusted R²s are low for the high distressed portfolios, for P9 
especially (68%). The inclusion of the momentum factor (Carhart model) returns a weak 
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distress risk premium of -54 bps (t =1.88) while the two extreme portfolios do not earn 
abnormal returns (low distress risk 18 bps, t = 1.67 and high distress risk -35 bps, 
t = 1.31). As such, the Carhart model is able to account for the low and high distress risk 
portfolio especially while P2 and P8 still earn abnormal returns (t = 2.91 and 1.93). The 
increased model fit is also illustrated by higher adjusted R²s ranging from 72% to 89%. 
Panel B shows the results using equal-weights. Here, the outperformance is more 
apparent since the H-L premium using the Fama and French model is -89 bps and 
highly significant (t = 3.78). The high risk portfolio contributes about two thirds to the 
premium (-66 bps, t = 3.21) while the low distress risk portfolio still earns an abnormal 
return (23 bps, t = 2.16). Again, the adjusted R²s are higher for equally-weighted returns 
as they range between 83% and 90%. The momentum (Carhart model) is unable to 
capture the distress risk premium. It is still -74 bps per month (t = 3.14) and driven 
mostly by the high distress risk portfolio (-58 bps, t = 2.76). The adjusted R²s hardly 
change with the inclusion of the momentum factor.  
Similar to Tables 15 and 17, the results in Table 19 support proposition P4 as they show 
a negative distress risk premium. 
The evidence in this chapter demonstrates that the underperformance of distressed firms 
relative to non-distressed firms is robust to different proxies for distress risk. While the 
portfolio excess returns generally show lower returns for high distress risk firms, the 
underperformance worsens with risk-adjustment, i.e. the stock underperform although 
they load high on the common risk factors. As this is independent of the distress risk 
proxy applied, I find strong evidence not just in support of proposition P4, that there is a 
negative distress risk premium, but I also do not find evidence for proposition P5, the 
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negative distress risk premium exists regardless of which proxy is used. These findings 
are robust as 11 out of 12 H-L portfolios (using three distress risk measures, two risk-
adjustments, and two weighting-schemes) document significant negative risk premia.  
In the next sub-chapter, I test the same propositions using cross-sectional regressions.  
Table 19 Bharath and Shumway (2008) Decile Portfolios: Time-Series Regression 
The table presents summary statistics of time-series regressions on decile portfolios based on UK non-
financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. At the end of each 
September from 1985 to 2009 (portfolio formation), I rank the sample firms on default probability 
obtained from the model in Bharath and Shumway (2008) and sort into equally populated decile 
portfolios. In order to avoid look-ahead bias, I take the coefficients from failure indicators and predictor 
variables that are known at portfolio formation. I report the intercepts β1, the corresponding t-statistics in 
brackets, and the adjusted R² for the asset pricing model of Fama and French (1993) (excl.      ) and 
Carhart (1997) as defined in Eq. (25): 
                                                                    , 
where        is the return on portfolio i during month m (integer 1 to 12) in portfolio year t,        the 
one-month UK Treasury Bill rate at the beginning of month t+m,         the return difference of the 
FTSE All Share Index and the one-month UK Treasury Bill rate during month t+m,        the return on 
the mimicking portfolio for the size factor during month t+m,        the return on the mimicking 
portfolio for the BM factor during month t+m, and       the return on the mimicking portfolio for the 
return momentum factor during month t+m. The results in Panel A are based on value-weighted monthly 
portfolio average excess returns. The results in Panel B are based on equally-weighted monthly portfolio 
average excess returns. The return of the month of failure is set to -100.0%. 
  Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High H-L 
Panel A. Value-Weighted Returns 
Fama and French Model 
β1 0.30 0.43 0.30 0.00 -0.12 -0.09 -0.45 -0.68 -0.33 -0.61 -0.92 
 
(2.70) (3.91) (2.92) (0.01) (0.91) (0.59) (2.63) (3.06) (1.25) (2.26) (3.08) 
Adj. R
2
 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.89 0.84 0.79 0.77 0.72 0.68 0.71 0.48 
Carhart Model 
β1 0.18 0.32 0.24 0.04 -0.04 0.10 -0.20 -0.41 0.00 -0.35 -0.54 
 
(1.67) (2.91) (2.32) (0.37) (0.30) (0.63) (1.23) (1.93) (0.00) (1.31) (1.88) 
Adj. R
2
 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.89 0.85 0.81 0.81 0.75 0.72 0.73 0.54 
Panel B. Equally-Weighted Returns 
Fama and French Model 
β1 0.23 0.20 0.32 0.09 -0.04 0.01 -0.07 -0.02 0.05 -0.66 -0.89 
 
(2.16) (1.98) (3.13) (0.98) (0.34) (0.07) (0.64) (0.18) (0.31) (3.21) (3.78) 
Adj. R
2
 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.90 0.86 0.83 0.57 
Carhart Model 
β1 0.16 0.12 0.28 0.07 0.01 0.06 -0.05 0.04 0.16 -0.58 -0.74 
 
(1.55) (1.18) (2.73) (0.78) (0.06) (0.56) (0.42) (0.31) (1.05) (2.76) (3.14) 
Adj. R
2
 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.90 0.87 0.83 0.58 
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6.5 Cross-Sectional Regressions 
In addition to the previously reported time-series regressions I test as well for the 
distress risk-return relation using cross-sectional regressions. Before introducing the 
results, I test for multicollinearity. 
The cross-sectional tests apply the common risk factors as well as the three distress risk 
measures Shum, z-score and BS. Table 20 reports the matrix of Spearman rank and 
Pearson correlation coefficients. Three relations are of importance to the cross-sectional 
tests: correlation within the risk factors, correlation within the default measures and 
correlation between risk factors and default measures. As Table 20 shows, there is only 
a moderate correlation between the risk factors BETA, SIZE, BM and PYR (maximum 
coefficient is 0.36). Within the distress risk measures, there are fairly high correlation 
coefficients between Shum and BS (Spearman 0.80 and Pearson 0.77). The correlations 
between z-score and the other two bankruptcy prediction models BS and Shum are 
relatively low (maximum coefficients: Spearman 0.52, Pearson 0.51). There is moderate 
correlation between PYR and BS (Spearman coefficient -0.59 and Pearson 
coefficient -0.56) since BS includes ER1y. This logic applies to Shum with SIZE 
(RSIZE is variable) and PYR (EXRET is variable) as well.  
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Table 20 Distress Risk Models: Correlation Common Risk Factors 
This table presents time-series averages of correlation coefficients for variables of UK non-financial firms 
listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. The lower-left side of the matrix 
presents Spearman rank correlation coefficients. The upper-right side of the matrix presents Pearson 
correlation coefficients. Correlation coefficients are calculated at the end of each September from 1985 to 
2009 (portfolio formation). Variables are: BETA is the beta factor calculated for each firm according to 
Dimson (1979) over the previous 24 months (± 1 month lag). SIZE is the market value of common equity 
(MV). BM is book value of shareholders’ equity less preference shares and minorities over MV. PYR is 
the prior 11-months return excluding September. Latest accounting data is taken with a minimum lag of 
five months between financial year-end and portfolio formation, market data is taken at portfolio 
formation. I use as well Shum, the score from the model in Shumway (2001), z-score (Taffler, 1983) and 
BS, the score from the market-based model in Bharath and Shumway (2008). In order to avoid look-
ahead bias, I take the coefficients from failure indicators and predictor variables that are known at 
portfolio formation. All variables are winsorised at the 5.0% level, scores are winsorised at ±18.4207.  
  BETA SIZE BM PYR Shum Z-score BS 
BETA 1 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.07 
SIZE 0.08 1 -0.21 0.10 -0.49 -0.08 -0.30 
BM -0.06 -0.36 1 -0.29 0.28 0.00 0.39 
PYR -0.01 0.22 -0.28 1 -0.50 -0.11 -0.56 
Shum 0.05 -0.73 0.24 -0.50 1 0.51 0.77 
Z-score 0.06 -0.17 -0.04 -0.12 0.52 1 0.33 
BS 0.08 -0.51 0.38 -0.59 0.80 0.37 1 
 
Table 21 presents the results from the cross-sectional regressions. Following the risk 
argument of Fama and French (1993), Models 1 to 4 include the risk factors BETA, 
SIZE, and BM combined with the individual distress risk measures Shum, z-score and 
BS. Following the risk argument of Carhart (1997), Models 5 to 8 repeat the regressions 
including PYR. Model 9 to 11 add combinations of the distress risk measures.  
Model 1 in Table 21 shows that contrary to its risk prediction neither BETA (t = 1.35) 
nor SIZE (t = 0.15) is associated with stock returns. BM is significant (t = 2.31) and 
carries a positive premium. Model 2 adds the score from Shum and shows a negative 
and significant distress risk premium (t = 2.62): the higher (lower) the bankruptcy risk, 
the lower (higher) the subsequent stock returns. BETA is still insignificant (t = 1.32) 
while SIZE becomes significant (t = 2.06) with the inclusion of Shum (Pearson 
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correlation coefficient -0.49). BM is insignificant (t = 1.72) when Shum is included. 
Model 3 adds the accounting-based z-score (t = 3.17) to the basic model and confirms 
the negative distress risk premium observed in Model 2. BETA and SIZE (t = 1.23 and 
0.48 respectively) are similar to the basic Model 1 whereas BM has now a t-statistic of 
1.95, i.e. the BM effect is lowered by the inclusion of z-score (Fama and French, 1992). 
Model 4 adds the BS score to the basic model and shows, against the results of Vassalou 
and Xing (2004), a negative distress risk premium (t = 2.47). Overall, the results 
provide no evidence for the distress hypothesis of Chan and Chen (1991) and Fama and 
French (1992) because (i) the risk factors, especially SIZE, are found to be insignificant, 
(ii) SIZE and BM are not related to distress risk, and (iii) coefficients on distress risk 
proxies are negative and highly significant demonstrating a negative relation between 
distress risk and subsequent stock returns.  
Model 5 reports the coefficients and t-statistics for BETA, SIZE, BM, and PYR. BETA 
and SIZE are still found to be insignificant (t = 1.69 and 0.54 respectively) whereas BM 
(t = 2.76) and PYR (t = 2.38) have a positive and significant relation with returns. 
Model 6 shows a negative and significant distress risk premium for Shum (t = 2.07). 
The PYR coefficient is now insignificant (t = 1.28) but this is not surprising as Shum 
already includes EXRET. Model 7 presents a negative and significant distress risk 
premium for z-score (t = 3.08). BM and PYR are independent from z-score and 
significant (t = 2.33 and 2.07 respectively). Model 8 shows a negative but insignificant 
distress risk premium for BS (t = 1.91). PYR (t = 1.74) and BM (t = 3.03) are positive 
and highly significant. The results further confirm (i) BM and SIZE are independent of 
distress risk, (ii) PYR is partially lowered with the inclusion of distress risk (Agarwal 
and Taffler, 2008b), and (iii) there is a significant and negative distress risk premium 
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for all distress risk proxies, albeit hardly significant when distress is proxied by BS and 
controlled for the common risk factors. 
Model 9 includes scores from both Shum and z-score. It follows that Shum (t = 1.25) is 
insignificant once z-score (t = 2.25) is included. Also, z-score is the most significant 
risk factor followed by BM (t = 1.90) and PYR (t = 1.68). Model 10 includes the z-score 
and BS score. The significance of BS (t = 1.23) is heavily reduced once z-score 
(t = 2.91) is included. BM is also the only significant variable (t = 2.58) of the common 
risk factors. Having showed that z-score absorbs the distress related information carried 
by Shum and BS, Model 11 includes all three scores and confirms the superior role of z-
score (t = 2.43) in explaining the cross-section of subsequent stock returns. 
Chapter 5 shows that Shum is the best bankruptcy prediction model and is therefore 
expected to be most relevant in pricing of distress risk. However, results in Table 21 
clearly show that once z-score is included in the regressions (Model 9 to 11), the Shum 
and BS measures do not carry any incremental information about stock returns. In other 
words, the best bankruptcy prediction model is not the most relevant in explaining 
subsequent stock returns. This is a remarkable new finding as it suggests that while the 
distress risk measures are priced, distress risk may not be driving the observed ‘negative 
distress risk premium’. This raises the possibility that it may not be the composite 
distress risk measure but one or more elements of the distress risk measures that drive 
the observed relation between distress risk and stock returns. In Chapter 8 of this study I 
deconstruct each distress risk measure to explore the pricing impact of the individual 
components of each of the three distress risk proxies.  
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Apart from the pricing impact of each individual bankruptcy measure in Table 21, the 
evidence in this sub-chapter is consistent with that in the existing literature as well as 
that of my time-series regressions: firms with higher distress risk earn lower subsequent 
stock returns and the conclusions are robust to different proxies for bankruptcy risk. The 
evidence provides strong support for proposition P4 and once again, I do not find any 
evidence to support proposition P5.  
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Table 21 Distress Risk Models: Cross-Sectional Regression 
This table presents results from cross-sectional regressions on individual stock returns of UK non-
financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. I employ the method of 
Fama and MacBeth (1973) as defined in Eq. (24) and add default scores to the basic model: 
                                         (    )          (  )            ,  
where subscript t denotes the portfolio year starting at the beginning of October each year from 1985 to 
2009 and t+m for integer m = 1 to 12 denotes the month-ends of the portfolio year. BETA is the beta 
factor calculated for each firm according to Dimson (1979) over the previous 24 months (± 1 month lag). 
SIZE is the natural log of the market value of common equity (MV). BM is the natural log of book value 
of shareholders’ equity less preference shares and minorities over MV. PYR is the prior 11-months return 
excluding September. Latest accounting data is taken with a minimum lag of five months between 
financial year-end and portfolio formation, market data is taken at portfolio formation. I add to the 
regression the failure indicators Shum, the score from the model in Shumway (2001), z-score (Taffler, 
1983) and BS, the score from the market-based model in Bharath and Shumway (2008). In order to avoid 
look-ahead bias, I take the coefficients from failure indicators and predictor variables that are known at 
the end of each September (portfolio formation). All variables are winsorised at the 5.0% level, scores are 
winsorised at ±18.4207. The return of the month of failure is set to -100.0%. 
  γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 γ5 γ6 γ7 
Model BETA SIZE BM PYR Shum Z-score BS 
1 -0.10 -0.01 0.20 
     (1.35) (0.15) (2.31) 
2 -0.09 -0.13 0.15 
 
-0.22 
   (1.32) (2.06) (1.67) (2.62) 
3 -0.09 -0.03 0.17 
  
-0.02 
  (1.23) (0.48) (1.95) (3.17) 
4 -0.10 -0.07 0.25 
   
-0.03 
  (1.43) (1.32) (2.89)    (2.47) 
5 -0.12 -0.03 0.22 0.40 
    (1.69) (0.54) (2.76) (2.38) 
6 -0.09 -0.12 0.15 0.17 -0.18 
   (1.32) (1.84) (1.87) (1.28) (2.07) 
7 -0.11 -0.04 0.19 0.33 
 
-0.02 
  (1.58) (0.78) (2.33) (2.07) (3.08) 
8 -0.10 -0.06 0.24 0.26 
  
-0.02 
  (1.52) (1.16) (3.03) (1.74)   (1.91) 
9 -0.09 -0.09 0.16 0.23 -0.12 -0.01 
  (1.49) (1.37) (1.90) (1.68) (1.25) (2.25) 
10 -0.10 -0.06 0.21 0.25 
 
-0.02 -0.01 
 (1.53) (1.12) (2.58) (1.70) (2.91) (1.23) 
11 -0.09 -0.07 0.17 0.23 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 
  (1.48) (1.07) (2.04) (1.67) (0.62) (2.43) (0.79) 
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6.6 Conclusion 
The analysis presented in this chapter tests for the relation between distress risk and 
subsequent stock returns using three bankruptcy prediction models: the hybrid model of 
Shumway (2001), the accounting-based z-score (Taffler, 1983) and the market-based 
model of Bharath and Shumway (2008).  
The characteristics on decile distress risk portfolios confirm prior findings that 
distressed stocks generally score high on the conventional risk measures BETA, SIZE, 
BM, and PYR while the risk-adjustments actually worsen the underperformance. This 
finding is robust and generally independent of the distress risk measure applied. 
Time-series regressions show that although the conventional risk measures are 
associated with higher returns, consistent with existing literature (e.g. Dichev, 1998; 
Griffin and Lemmon, 2002; Agarwal and Taffler, 2008b), I find that distressed stocks 
underperform. The negative distress risk premium is robust to (i) the distress risk proxy 
I use (i.e. Shum, z-score, and BS), (ii) value-weighted and equally-weighted average 
portfolio returns, and (iii) risk-adjustments using the Fama and French model (1996) 
and the Carhart (1997) model.  
The cross-sectional results corroborate these findings. Consistent with the majority of 
prior studies, I find no evidence for the distress hypothesis of Chan and Chen (1991) 
and Fama and French (1992) that SIZE and BM are proxies for distress risk. Although 
BS is insignificant using the Carhart (1997) risk-adjustment, it is still far away from 
being positive and significant as claimed by Vassalou and Xing (2004).  
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Overall, the evidence provides strong support for proposition P4 that there is a negative 
premium on the distress risk measure. I do not find any evidence to support research 
proposition P5, as the distress risk premium is independent of the distress risk proxy.  
However, the more interesting finding is the role of z-score. Fama and French (1992) 
argue that ratios scaling market prices extract the information in prices about risk and 
expected returns. Following their argument, the premia earned on z-score - as an 
accounting data-only model without any market price information - can be interpreted 
as being particularly robust. Importantly, the cross-sectional regressions show that 
z-score is able to subsume the information about future returns carried by Shum and BS. 
Since z-score is a weaker bankruptcy predictor than Shum and BS, this finding suggests 
that it might not be distress risk per se but an element of the distress risk measures that 
drives the premia.  
In the next Chapter 7, I test whether the proposed explanations for the negative distress 
risk premium are able to explain it. In Chapter 8, I further explore whether it is distress 
risk that drives the premia earned by the distress risk measures. 
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CHAPTER 7:  EXPLAINING THE NEGATIVE DISTRESS RISK 
PREMIUM 
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7.1 Introduction 
Theory suggests that distressed firms should earn higher returns than non-distressed 
firms. However, Chapter 5 of this study provides evidence for a puzzling 
underperformance of distressed firms and, in addition, shows that it is robust to 
alternative distress risk proxies. Moreover, existing literature is almost unanimous in 
finding an underperformance of distressed firms (e.g. Dichev, 1998; Griffin and 
Lemmon, 2002; Agarwal and Taffler, 2008b).
31
 The focus of current literature is on 
solving this puzzle (Campbell et al., 2008). 
There are several potential explanations for the underperformance of distressed firms. 
Garlappi and Yan (2011) provide a risk-based explanation arguing that due to the ability 
of shareholders to strategically default at the cost of debt holders, equity risk decreases 
with high levels of distress risk. Thus, the stocks of highly distressed firms are expected 
to earn low returns. Alternatively, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that limits of 
arbitrage hinder institutional investors’ ability to trade on mispriced stocks. The 
characteristics that are associated with limits of arbitrage are also shared by distressed 
firms (Taffler et al., 2004; Campbell et al., 2008). Related to that, Han and Kumar 
(2011) argue that the priority of retail investor is not on profit maximisation but on 
gambling. Since distressed stocks have lottery-type characteristics, they attract retail 
investors that could drive the overpricing in the first place (Coelho et al., 2010). 
The shareholder advantage effect has been empirically tested by Zhang (2012) who 
finds that the strategic default effect is limited to firms with private debt. However, he 
                                                 
31
 The only exceptions are the findings in Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Chava and Purnanandam (2010). 
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focuses primarily on shareholders’ bargaining power, not on testing the hump-shaped 
characteristics in distress risk. Moreover, the pricing impact of the shareholder 
advantage effect has yet not been tested in the UK market. The more creditor friendly 
insolvency regime in the UK (Franks and Nyborg, 1996) does not necessarily imply 
there is no shareholder advantage. Indeed, Garlappi and Yan (2011) argue that 
shareholder recovery is not restricted to ‘violations of absolute priority rule’. They 
rather describe it as the resolution of financial distress which, undeniably, is generally 
independent of the bankruptcy regime. To what extent is the shareholder advantage 
theory applicable to the significantly different insolvency regime of the UK is 
ultimately an empirical question.  
The limits of arbitrage is explored on several anomalies (e.g. Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 
2002; Mendenhall, 2004), while Taffler et al. (2004) and Kausar et al. (2009) provide a 
link to distress as they find limits of arbitrage to hinder trading on the going-concern 
anomaly. Similarly, Avramov et al. (2010) use credit ratings to establish a link between 
distress risk and short-selling constraints. The potential of gambling to explain the 
overpricing of distress risk is underpinned by Coelho et al. (2010) who show that 
Chapter 11 firms are primarily traded by retail investors while being unattractive to 
arbitrageurs.  
Besides this first evidence, none of the studies explores the potential of the three 
explanations in detail using different bankruptcy prediction models. In this chapter, I 
introduce various tests to provide evidence on the potential explanatory power of 
shareholder advantage, limits of arbitrage and lottery stocks using the bankruptcy 
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prediction models of Shumway (2001) (Shum), z-score (Taffler, 1983) and the model of 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) (BS). 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: in sub-chapter 2 I present the 
research question and research propositions. In sub-chapter 3 I briefly describe the data 
and method. Sub-chapter 4 empirically evaluates the explanatory power of the potential 
explanation proposed by Garlappi and Yan (2011). Sub-chapter 5 presents the results on 
characteristics that are associated with both limits of arbitrage and gambling stocks. 
Sub-chapter 6 concludes and discusses the results.  
7.2 Research Question 
The majority of the literature on distress risk pricing finds a negative distress risk 
premium. There are several potential explanations for this underperformance. In this 
chapter, I test the potential of shareholder advantage, limits of arbitrage, and gambling 
retail investors to explain the pricing of distress risk. The prevailing research question 
therefore is: 
Can shareholder advantage, gambling retail investors or limits of arbitrage explain 
the negative distress risk premium? 
The main predictions of the Garlappi and Yan (2011) shareholder advantage theory are 
that beta (and thus returns) and book-to-equity ratio (BM) are hump-shaped in distress 
risk. I therefore test the following proposition. 
P6: There is a hump-shaped relation between BETA and distress risk as well as between 
the value premium and distress risk. 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that for mispricings to persist in the presence of 
sophisticated investors there must be some limits of arbitrage. Distressed firms have 
characteristics that are usually associated with limits of arbitrage (Taffler et al., 2004; 
Kausar et al., 2009). Thus, my research proposition is: 
P7: Limits of arbitrage hinder sophisticated investors’ ability to correct the overpricing 
of distressed firms. 
Kumar (2009) argues that the priority of retail investors is on gambling, not on profit 
maximisation. As such, the demand for lottery-type stocks could lead to an overpricing 
of those stocks. Since, Coelho et al. (2010) find that Chapter 11 firms have lottery-type 
characteristics, I test the following proposition: 
P8: Gambling retail investors drive the overpricing of distressed firms. 
7.3 Data and Method 
My sample consists of UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the 
London Stock Exchange anytime between October 1985 and September 2010. It 
includes 22,217 observations with 2,428 unique firms of which 202 failed.  
Following Han and Kumar (2011) I form a lottery-index that consists of PRICE, 
idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) and idiosyncratic skewness (ISKEW). At the end of each 
September from 1985 to 2009, I rank the sample firms on each variable and sort into 
virgintile portfolios. For each firm, I calculate an index by taking the sum of the stock’s 
virgintile portfolio assignment divided by 60.  
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In this chapter I apply two testing procedures: first, I use time-series regressions on 
average portfolio excess returns using the Fama and French (1993) model as well as the 
Carhart (1997) model as defined in Eq. (25). Second, I use cross-sectional regressions 
following the method of Fama and MacBeth (1973) as defined in Eq. (24).  
7.4 Shareholder Advantage 
In this sub-chapter I test for the predictions of Garlappi and Yan (2011) that equity beta 
and thus, stock returns, as well as the value premium have a hump-shaped relation with 
distress risk.  
Panel A in Table 22 presents the decile portfolio beta for sorts on Shum, z-score and 
BS.
32
 BETA on the Shum sort increases monotonically with distress risk (except for a 
small drop in P2 to 1.02). The low distress risk portfolio has an average equity beta of 
1.04 while the high distress risk portfolio has an average equity beta of 1.25. In contrast 
to the predictions of Garlappi and Yan (2011), the relation between equity risk and 
distress risk measured by Shum is strictly linear rather than hump-shaped. The sort on 
z-score shows that, besides a small drop in P6, BETA increases monotonically with 
z-score from 0.99 for the low distress risk portfolio to 1.25 for the high distress risk 
portfolio. It follows, that BETA is also not hump-shaped in distress risk using z-score. 
The last row summarises the BETA of decile portfolios sorted on BS. Similar to the sort 
on Shum, BETA increases monotonically with distress risk from 0.94 to 1.22 with a 
small drop in P8. It again rejects the propositions of Garlappi and Yan (2011) as BETA 
                                                 
32
 The analysis repeats parts of the analysis presented in Chapter 6. However, while the focus of 
Chapter 6 is to explore the impact of distress risk on stock returns, the focus of this chapter is to test the 
predictions of Garlappi et al. (2008) and Garlappi and Yan (2011). 
 160 
 
is linearly related with distress risk measured by BS (the only exception is BS where the 
highest risk portfolio has slightly lower BETA than the second highest risk portfolios 
but is still considerably higher than all other portfolios). 
Panel B and Panel C in Table 22 report the equally-weighted and value-weighted 
portfolio average excess returns for the decile sorts on Shum, z-score and BS. As 
described in detail in Chapter 6, there is a general negative return association with 
distress risk independent of the distress risk measure or the weighting-scheme applied. 
Although returns decrease for the high distress risk portfolios, they are not increasing 
with distress risk at lower levels and thus, in sharp contrast to the predictions of 
Garlappi and Yan (2011), there is no hump-shaped relation between excess returns and 
distress risk. In addition to that, the risk-adjusted returns of CAPM as well as the risk-
adjusted returns of the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) model would imply 
a negative distress risk-return relation that is not hump-shaped independent of the 
distress risk proxy (not tabulated). 
Thus, the evidence in Table 22 clearly shows that proposition P6 of a hump-shaped 
relation between BETA or returns and distress risk does not hold. Regardless of the 
proxy used for distress risk, the relation between beta and distress risk increases linear-
like, especially in higher risk portfolios rather than being hump-shaped.  
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Table 22 Shareholder Advantage: BETA and Returns 
The table presents decile portfolio betas based on UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market 
segment of the London Stock Exchange. At the end of each September from 1985 to 2009 (portfolio 
formation), I rank the sample firms on default probability obtained from Shum, the model in Shumway 
(2001), z-score (Taffler, 1983), and on BS, the model in Bharath and Shumway (2008) and sort into 
equally populated decile portfolios. In order to avoid look-ahead bias, I take the coefficients from failure 
indicators and predictor variables that are known at portfolio formation. BETA is the beta factor 
calculated for each firm according to Dimson (1979) over the previous 24 months (± 1 month lag). I 
report time-series averages. BETA is winsorised at the 5.0% level. ER vw (ER ew) reports the value-
weighted (equally-weighted) average monthly portfolio excess return for the 12 months following 
portfolio formation. 
  Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High H-L 
Panel A. BETA 
Shum 1.04 1.02 1.05 1.09 1.07 1.06 1.12 1.14 1.15 1.25 0.20 
Z-score 0.99 1.03 1.09 1.09 1.10 1.08 1.11 1.10 1.16 1.25 0.26 
BS 0.94 0.99 1.06 1.07 1.10 1.13 1.14 1.10 1.25 1.22 0.28 
Panel B. Equally-Weighted Return 
Shum 0.61 0.47 0.45 0.48 0.24 0.37 0.23 0.47 0.44 -0.28 -0.89 
Z-score 0.54 0.61 0.54 0.55 0.51 0.44 0.48 0.22 0.42 0.08 -0.46 
BS 0.53 0.64 0.59 0.43 0.34 0.44 0.18 0.02 0.41 0.23 -0.31 
Panel C. Value-Weighted Return 
Shum 0.63 0.54 0.57 0.64 0.37 0.61 0.39 0.56 0.55 0.21 -0.42 
Z-score 0.64 0.71 0.61 0.65 0.54 0.48 0.56 0.43 0.45 -0.02 -0.66 
BS 0.53 0.53 0.70 0.52 0.46 0.51 0.49 0.54 0.70 0.13 -0.40 
 
In the following, I present evidence on the relation of distress risk and the value 
premium using independent sorts on distress risk portfolios and BM. For each year, I 
sort into decile distress risk portfolios using Shum, z-score and BS. Independently, I 
split the sample into low and high BM using median. I form 20 portfolios at the 
intersections of the two sorts. I calculate the value premium, i.e. the return on a portfolio 
that is long on the high BM stocks and short on low BM stocks, for each distress 
portfolio after risk-adjustment using the Carhart (1997) model. Garlappi and Yan (2011) 
predict the value premium to be hump-shaped in distress risk. 
Figure 6 shows the value premium for the 10x2 sort on distress risk and BM using 
value-weighted returns (the equivalent information of Figures 6 and 7 is presented in 
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Table 28A in the appendix to this chapter). The sort on Shum shows that the value 
premium is close to zero at both ends i.e. the low and the high distress risk portfolio. 
However, between these two portfolios the relation is far from being hump-shaped. In 
fact, the value premium peaks in P5 and P8 with a sharp drop in P7. The value premium 
using the 10x2 z-score sort shows a similar chart. The value premium oscillates between 
the low distress risk and high distress risk portfolios with peaks in P5 and P9. The chart 
using the BS sort is slightly different. There is a hump-shaped relation of the value 
premium with BS. However, it is limited to P4 to P9 and, more importantly, the value 
premium increases sharply for the high distress risk portfolio. 
Figure 7 illustrates the value premium for the 10x2 sort on distress risk and BM using 
equally-weighted returns. The value premium on Shum is very volatile as it is 
oscillating increasingly with higher distress risk with a sharp peak in P8. The value 
premium using z-score again alternates between the low and the high distress risk 
portfolio with peaks in P5 and 9 while the lowest value premium is earned in P3 and P8. 
While all charts so far provide clear evidence that the relation between value premium 
and distress risk is not hump-shaped, the chart on BS using equally-weighted returns is 
most similar to being hump-shaped but, again, this is limited for the portfolios P4 to 
P10.  
Overall, the results from Figure 6 and 7 provide clear evidence that the relation between 
the value premium and distress risk is not hump-shaped, except for the limited hump-
shape using BS and equal-weighted returns. Thus, similar to the results on BETA and 
distress risk, I again find no support for my proposition P6, that there is a hump-shaped 
relation of the value premium in distress risk. 
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Figure 6 Shareholder Advantage: Value Premium (value-weighted) 
The figure plots the risk-adjusted value premium of decile distress risk portfolios based on UK 
non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. At the 
end of each September from 1985 to 2009 (portfolio formation), I rank the sample firms on 
default probability and sort into equally populated decile portfolios (low to high distress risk). 
Independently, I rank the sample firms on BM (book value of shareholders’ equity less 
preference shares and minorities over market value of common equity) and form two equally 
populated portfolios (high and low BM). I form 20 portfolios at the intersections of the two sorts 
as well as the value premium portfolio with the value-weighted return that is long on high BM 
and short on low BM stocks. Per value premium portfolio, I run the time-series regressions 
using the model in Carhart (1997). I repeat this for each default probability obtained from the 
model in Shumway (2001), z-score (Taffler, 1983), and the model in Bharath and Shumway 
(2008). The returns of the month of failure are set to -100.0%. The figure plots the intercepts 
from the regressions on the value-premium. 
-0.80
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High
Shumway (2001) Z-score (Taffler, 1983)
Bharath and Shumway (2008)
 164 
 
 
Figure 7 Shareholder Advantage: Value Premium (equally-weighted) 
The figure plots the risk-adjusted value premium of decile distress risk portfolios based on UK 
non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. At the 
end of each September from 1985 to 2009 (portfolio formation), I rank the sample firms on 
default probability and sort into equally populated decile portfolios (low to high distress risk). 
Independently, I rank the sample firms on BM (book value of shareholders’ equity less 
preference shares and minorities over market value of common equity) and form two equally 
populated portfolios (high and low BM). I form 20 portfolios at the intersections of the two sorts 
as well as the value premium portfolio with the equally-weighted return that is long on high BM 
and short on low BM stocks. Per value premium portfolio, I run the time-series regressions 
using the model in Carhart (1997). I repeat this for each default probability obtained from the 
model in Shumway (2001), z-score (Taffler, 1983), and the model in Bharath and Shumway 
(2008). The returns of the month of failure are set to -100.0%. The figure plots the intercepts 
from the regressions on the value-premium. 
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7.5 Limits of Arbitrage and Gambling 
In this sub-chapter I present the tests of whether the distress risk premium is caused by 
limits of arbitrage and/or stock gambling.  
Han and Kumar (2011) form a lottery-index that consists of PRICE, idiosyncratic 
volatility (IVOL) and idiosyncratic skewness (ISKEW). I construct a lottery index 
(LOTT) following their methodology and as defined in Eq. (26). 
The literature on limits of arbitrage associates generally high arbitrage costs with firms 
that have high transaction costs, low level of investor sophistication and small firm size 
(Ali et al., 2003). Common proxies are PRICE, idiosyncratic volatility, idiosyncratic 
skewness, bid-ask spread, institutional ownership, and low analyst coverage (e.g. 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002; Mashruwala et al., 2006). 
As such, the proxies for limits of arbitrage are very similar to the ones of lottery-type 
stocks. Han and Kumar (2011) provide direct evidence for the connection between the 
two as they note that lottery stocks are not only dominated by retail investors, they also 
face high limits of arbitrage as they tend to have very low market cap, low price, high 
idiosyncratic volatility, low institutional ownership and low analyst coverage. Similarly, 
Coelho et al. (2010) conclude that the post-Chapter 11 filing drift is caused by both 
gambling retail investors and limits of arbitrage. As such, the symptoms are the same 
while the cause is different. Following the literature, I argue that the lottery index is able 
to capture both the limits of arbitrage and the impact of gambling retail investors on 
distressed stocks. And thus, I test for the impact of the lottery index on stock returns 
whether it is proxying for limits of arbitrage or gambling retail investors.  
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Table 23 presents the summary statistics of the lottery index (LOTT). The mean of 
LOTT for the total sample is at 0.52 (non-failed firms 0.52). Failed firms have an 
average LOTT of 0.74 that is significantly different from the non-failed firms 
(t = 18.68). Since the median is close to the mean (0.52 vs. 0.52 for all firms, 0.52 vs. 
0.51 for non-failed firms, 0.74 vs. 0.75 for failed-firms), the spread of LOTT within 
each of the sub-samples is low. While the minimum LOTT for the total sample is 0.07, 
the minimum for the failed firms is 0.53. Although the average in means is significantly 
different, the failed firms sub-sample does not contain the stocks with the highest LOTT 
(maximum failed firms 0.91 vs. maximum of all firms 0.99) showing that the LOTT of 
failed firms is more homogeneous. Moreover, the ROC curve analysis also 
demonstrates the forecasting ability of LOTT. The AUC of LOTT is 0.80 which is 
significantly better than that of a random model (z = 15.93). Recalling from Chapter 5, 
the AUC of Shum, z-score and BS are 0.90, 0.81, and 0.87 respectively. As such, there 
is evidence that LOTT is not only able to differentiate between non-failed and failed 
firms but can also forecast bankruptcies. This underlines its potential for explaining the 
distress risk premium. 
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Table 23 Lottery Stocks: Non-Failed and Failed Firms 
The table presents summary statistics of lottery characteristics of UK non-financial firms listed in the 
Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. At the end of each September from 1985 to 2009 
(portfolio formation), I construct a lottery index (LOTT) following Han and Kumar (2011) and as defined 
in Eq. (26). That is, I rank the sample firms on share price (PRICE) and form virgintile portfolios. I repeat 
that for IVOL and ISKEW. LOTT is the sum of the virgintile assignments for the sort on PRICE, IVOL 
and ISKEW divided by 60. At portfolio formation, I run the regression using the Carhart (1997) model 
over the previous 24 months and collect the residual terms per firm. IVOL is the variance and ISKEW the 
skewness of the residual terms. The figures on Mean, Median, Min and Max are based on time-series 
averages. AUC is the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve for LOTT and 
estimated as the Wilcoxon statistic. Z-statistic is the Hanley and McNeil (1983) test-statistic for the null 
hypothesis that the area under the ROC curve is equal to 0.5 (random model). Column All presents the 
statistics for all sample firms which split into Non-Failed firms (Column 3) and Failed Firms (Column 4). 
Δ  F-F is the difference between the two sub-samples. 
  All Non-Failed Failed Δ NF-F 
Mean 0.52 0.52 0.74 0.22 
    
(18.68) 
Median 0.52 0.51 0.75 0.24 
Min 0.07 0.07 0.53 0.46 
Max 0.99 0.99 0.91 -0.09 
Std Dev 0.21 0.21 0.16 -0.04 
Obs 22,217 22,015 202 
 Receiver Operating Characteristics 
  AUC 0.800 
   z-statistic 15.93       
 
In Table 24 I present characteristics of decile portfolios sorted on LOTT. The market 
share of each decile shows that the stocks in the highest LOTT portfolio only make up 
1.2% of the total market while the stocks in the lowest LOTT portfolio make up more 
than a quarter of the total market value (27.7%). BETA increases monotonically with 
LOTT. The lowest decile has an average equity beta of 0.87 rising to 1.35 in the highest 
decile portfolio. SIZE declines sharply with LOTT. The average market capitalisation 
for the low LOTT firms is £ 922m while high LOTT stocks have an average market 
capitalisation of only £ 46m. The average BM increases from 0.56 for non-lottery stocks 
to 0.86 in P7 and remains at this level for portfolios 8 to 10. There seems to be no 
pattern in PYR as it is fairly stable across the LOTT deciles ranging from 10% (P10) to 
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18% (P2) but generally lower at high levels of LOTT. The default probability of Shum 
increases monotonically with LOTT from 0.2% for the low LOTT stocks to 3.5% for 
the high LOTT stocks. This is not surprising as there are similar components in both 
LOTT and Shum (i.e. IVOL and SIGMA, PRICE and RSIZE). However, the results are 
further confirmed by z-score showing that the default probability is nearly linearly 
increasing with LOTT from 15.0% (low LOTT) to 52.7% (high LOTT). Also, the 
default probability using BS is monotonically related with LOTT (1.6% low LOTT to 
24.4% high LOTT). The overview of the failures provides further evidence of the 
relation between LOTT and distress risk. 79 out of 202 failures are in the high LOTT 
portfolio while in the lowest 50% of LOTT stocks only 21 firms failed. The value-
weighted excess returns do not show any pattern: while the high LOTT stocks earn the 
lowest returns (29 bps, t = 0.57) the neighbouring P9 and P7 have the highest excess 
returns (63 bps, t = 1.31 and 68 bps, t = 1.75 respectively). The H-L premium is 
negative (-22 bps) and insignificant (t = 0.56). Similar results are obtained using equal-
weights. The high LOTT portfolio earns the lowest returns (34 bps, t = 0.74), and the 
H-L premium is insignificant (-26 bps, t = 0.80). 
The table presents preliminary evidence that while stocks with high LOTT score are 
riskier (higher BETA, smaller SIZE, higher BM, and higher default probability), they 
earn the lowest excess returns of the ten portfolios though the H-L return premium is 
statistically insignificant.  
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Table 24 Lottery Stocks Decile Portfolios: Summary Statistics 
The table presents summary statistics of decile portfolios based on UK non-financial firms listed in the 
Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. At the end of each September from 1985 to 2009 
(portfolio formation), I construct a lottery index (LOTT) following Han and Kumar (2011) and defined in 
Eq. (26). That is, I rank the sample firms on share price (PRICE) and form virgintile portfolios. I repeat 
that for IVOL and ISKEW. LOTT is the sum of the virgintile assignments for the sort on PRICE, IVOL 
and ISKEW divided by 60. At portfolio formation, I run the regression using the Carhart (1997) model 
over the previous 24 months and collect the residual terms per firm. IVOL is the variance and ISKEW the 
skewness of the residual terms. I then rank all sample firms on LOTT and form decile portfolios. The 
table reports time-series averages. Frac Mkt is the total portfolio market value over the total market value. 
BETA is the beta factor calculated for each firm according to Dimson (1979) over the previous 24 months 
(± 1 month lag). SIZE is the market value of common equity (MV). BM is book value of shareholders’ 
equity less preference shares and minorities over MV. PYR is the prior 11-months return excluding 
September. Latest accounting data is taken with a minimum lag of five months between financial year-
end and portfolio formation, market data is taken at portfolio formation. Default probabilities are 
estimated using the model in Shumway (2001) (Shum), z-score (Taffler, 1983) and the market-based 
model in Bharath and Shumway (2008) (BS). In order to avoid look-ahead bias, I take the coefficients 
from failure indicators and predictor variables that are known at portfolio formation. All variables are 
winsorised at the 5.0% level. ER vw reports the value-weighted average monthly portfolio excess return. 
ER ew reports the equally-weighted average monthly portfolio excess return. The return of the month of 
failure is set to -100.0%. T-statistics are reported in brackets below.  
  Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High H-L 
Frac Mkt 27.66 19.96 15.84 10.83 8.34 6.07 4.53 3.28 2.31 1.19 -26.46 
BETA 0.87 0.97 0.97 1.03 1.09 1.13 1.15 1.21 1.23 1.35 0.48 
SIZE 922 701 563 398 309 228 174 123 88 46 -875 
BM 0.56 0.60 0.64 0.67 0.73 0.75 0.86 0.88 0.90 0.88 0.32 
PYR 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.10 -0.07 
Shum 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 1.3 2.0 2.1 3.5 3.4 
Z-score 15.0 14.4 17.0 17.4 21.6 20.6 28.4 36.1 39.7 52.7 37.7 
BS 1.6 2.5 4.6 5.5 8.0 9.7 15.1 18.4 19.1 24.4 22.9 
Fails 1 4 3 8 5 9 25 32 45 79 78 
ER vw 0.51 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.59 0.35 0.68 0.39 0.63 0.29 -0.22 
 
(1.90) (1.82) (1.34) (1.25) (1.80) (0.99) (1.75) (0.96) (1.31) (0.57) (0.56) 
ER ew 0.59 0.51 0.51 0.41 0.65 0.52 0.49 0.46 0.61 0.34 -0.26 
  (2.33) (1.89) (1.75) (1.41) (2.10) (1.58) (1.41) (1.26) (1.55) (0.74) (0.80) 
 
The results in Table 24 show that LOTT shares common characteristics with distress 
risk although the return premium on LOTT is insignificant. In order to further explore 
the potential of LOTT to explain the distress risk premium, I conduct time-series 
analysis using the decile portfolios. Table 25 reports the risk-adjusted returns using the 
Fama and French (1993) and the Carhart (1997) model risk-adjustment.  
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Panel A reports the portfolio intercepts using value-weighted portfolio average returns. 
Similar to the excess returns, there is no return pattern in LOTT. None of the decile 
portfolios earns abnormal returns using either the Fama and French (1993) or Carhart 
(1997) risk-adjustment. While the return of the portfolio long on high LOTT stocks and 
short on low LOTT stocks is negative (-53 bps and -45 bps respectively), it is 
insignificant (t = 1.68 and 1.41 respectively) independent of the risk-adjustment.  
Panel B repeats the analysis using equally-weighted returns. The results show higher 
significance since the low LOTT portfolio earns an abnormal return of 21 bps (t = 2.27) 
using the Fama and French risk-adjustment and 20 bps (t = 2.14) using the Carhart risk-
adjustment. Although returns do not show a specific pattern in distress risk, the high 
lottery stocks underperform all other portfolios (-27 bps, t = 1.40 and -29 bps, t = 1.48 
respectively). As such, the H-L premium using equal-weights is negative and significant 
(-48 bps, t = 2.26 and -49 bps, t = 2.28 respectively).  
The results in Panel B (equally-weighted return) show a significant return premium for 
LOTT stocks while the results in Panel A (value-weighted returns) do not find a return 
association with LOTT. This suggests that the premium observed in Panel B is driven 
by stocks with low market capitalisation. This is consistent with the evidence in 
Angelidis and Tessaromatis (2005; 2008) who show that idiosyncratic risk (as part of 
LOTT) is only related to the returns of stocks with small market capitalisation. Fama 
and French (2008) argue that both weighting schemes might lead to unrepresentative 
results: value-weighted returns might overvalue large market capitalisation stocks and 
equally-weighted returns might overvalue small market capitalisation stocks. Only 
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when a return pattern is independent of the weighting scheme (as e.g. throughout sub-
chapter 6.4), can the results be considered to be robust.  
Table 25 Lottery Stocks Decile Portfolios: Time-Series Regression 
The table presents summary statistics of time-series regressions on decile portfolios based on UK non-
financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. At the end of each 
September from 1985 to 2009 (portfolio formation), I construct a lottery-index (LOTT) following Han 
and Kumar (2011) and as defined in Eq. (26). That is, I rank the sample firms on share price (PRICE) and 
form virgintile portfolios. I repeat that for IVOL and ISKEW. LOTT is the sum of the virgintile 
assignments for the sort on PRICE, IVOL and ISKEW divided by 60. At portfolio formation, I rank 
stocks on LOTT and form decile portfolios. I run regressions using the Carhart (1997) model in Eq. (25) 
over the previous 24 months and collect the residual terms per firm. IVOL is the variance and ISKEW the 
skewness of the residual terms. I then rank all sample firms on LOTT and form decile portfolios. I report 
the intercepts β1 and the corresponding t-statistics in brackets for the asset pricing model of FF, the Fama 
and French (1993) model (excl.      ) and Car, the Carhart (1997) model as defined in Eq. (25):  
                                                                    , 
where        is the return on portfolio i during month m (integer 1 to 12) in portfolio year t,        the 
one-month UK Treasury Bill rate at the beginning of month t+m,         the return difference of the 
FTSE All Share Index and the one-month UK Treasury Bill rate during month t+m,        the return on 
the mimicking portfolio for the size factor during month t+m,        the return on the mimicking 
portfolio for the BM factor during month t+m and        the return on the mimicking portfolio for the 
return momentum factor during month t+m. The results in Panel A are based on value-weighted monthly 
portfolio average excess returns. The results in Panel B are based on equally-weighted monthly portfolio 
average excess returns. The return of the month of failure is set to -100.0%. 
LOTT Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High H-L 
Panel A. Value-Weighted Returns 
FF 0.16 0.14 -0.01 -0.04 0.15 -0.16 0.22 -0.01 0.09 -0.37 -0.53 
 (1.86) (1.42) (0.08) (0.32) (1.02) (0.97) (1.18) (0.05) (0.31) (1.23) (1.68) 
Car 0.15 0.14 0.01 -0.01 0.18 -0.09 0.31 0.09 0.24 -0.30 -0.45 
 (1.70) (1.42) (0.12) (0.05) (1.22) (0.54) (1.69) (0.39) (0.84) (0.99) (1.41) 
Panel B. Equally-Weighted Returns 
FF 0.21 0.10 0.07 -0.04 0.16 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 0.04 -0.27 -0.48 
 (2.27) (0.96) (0.63) (0.41) (1.54) (0.02) (0.20) (0.41) (0.27) (1.40) (2.26) 
Car 0.20 0.08 0.07 -0.02 0.17 0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.04 -0.29 -0.49 
  (2.14) (0.75) (0.62) (0.18) (1.63) (0.17) (0.04) (0.26) (0.29) (1.48) (2.28) 
 
Given the positive premium for LOTT reported in Han and Kumar (2011), the results 
from the time-series regressions on decile LOTT portfolios in Table 25 might appear 
surprising. However, LOTT is an equally-weighted index consisting of price, 
idiosyncratic skewness and idiosyncratic volatility and their individual return impact 
has to be considered: Price is related to firm size and its effect is thus likely to be 
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captured by SMB factor of the four factor model in time-series regression and SIZE 
factor in cross-sectional regression. Also, the evidence on pricing of the idiosyncratic 
risk components in the literature is mixed. For instance, Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) 
find a positive relation between idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns while Wei and 
Zhang (2005) show that the positive relation is sample specific and Bali, Cakici, Yan 
and Zhang (2008) find no confirmation for the return pattern after controlling for small 
stock and liquidity premium. Similarly, Bali and Cakici (2005) argue that the premium 
is sensitive to the method applied. In contrast, Ang et al. (2006, 2009) report a negative 
return premium for high idiosyncratic risk firms. As such, to further understand the 
stock return association of LOTT I decompose LOTT into its component parts and test 
their pricing impact using cross-sectional regressions.  
Before conducting the cross-sectional regressions, I report the Spearman and Pearson 
correlation coefficients of LOTT and its individual components as well as the common 
risk factors and the distress risk proxies Table 26. It shows that LOTT is moderately 
correlated with SIZE (Spearman: -0.58, Pearson: -0.45) and Shum (Spearman: 0.59, 
Pearson: 0.58). Due to SIGMA (component of Shum and similar to IVOL), there is 
moderate correlation between IVOL and Shum (Spearman: 0.53, Pearson: 0.49). 
ISKEW is only marginally correlated with the risk factors and distress risk measures. 
As expected, PRICE is correlated with SIZE (Spearman: 0.64, Pearson: 0.50) and, due 
to RSIZE, with Shum (Spearman: -0.69, Pearson: -0.59). Since the correlation 
coefficients are not particularly high between the variables, no adjustment is required 
for the following cross-sectional regressions.  
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Table 26 Lottery Stocks: Correlation 
This table presents time-series averages of correlation coefficients for variables of UK non-financial firms 
listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. Spear is the Spearman and Pear the 
Pearson correlation coefficient. Correlation coefficients are calculated at the end of each September from 
1985 to 2009 (portfolio formation). Variables are: BETA is the beta factor calculated for each firm 
according to Dimson (1979) over the previous 24 months (± 1 month lag). SIZE is the market value of 
common equity (MV). BM is book value of shareholders’ equity less preference shares and minorities 
over MV. PYR is the prior 11-months return excluding September. Latest accounting data is taken with a 
minimum lag of five months between financial year-end and portfolio formation, market data is taken at 
portfolio formation. I use Shum, the score from the model in Shumway (2001), z-score (Taffler, 1983) 
and BS, the score from the market-based model in Bharath and Shumway (2008). I transform the z-score 
into probability: p = e
z-score 
/ (1+ e
z-score
). In order to avoid look-ahead bias, I take the coefficients from 
failure indicators and predictor variables that are known at portfolio formation. LOTT is the lottery-index 
following Han and Kumar (2011) and as defined in Eq. (26). That is, I rank the sample firms on share 
price (PRICE) and form virgintile portfolios. I repeat that for IVOL and ISKEW. LOTT is the sum of the 
virgintile assignments for the sort on PRICE, IVOL and ISKEW divided by 60. At portfolio formation, I 
rank stocks on LOTT and form decile portfolios. I run regressions using the Carhart (1997) model over 
the previous 24 months and collect the residual terms per firm. IVOL is the variance and ISKEW the 
skewness of the residual terms. I then rank all sample firms on LOTT and form decile portfolios. All 
variables (except LOTT) are winsorised at the 5.0% level, default probabilities at 0.00000001 and 
0.99999999.  
    LOTT     IVOL     ISKEW     PRICE 
 Variable Spear Pear   Spear Pear   Spear Pear   Spear Pear 
BETA 0.13 0.14 
 
0.20 0.18 
 
-0.01 0.00 
 
-0.09 -0.10 
SIZE -0.58 -0.45 
 
-0.44 -0.27 
 
-0.16 -0.11 
 
0.64 0.50 
BM 0.15 0.18 
 
0.02 0.04 
 
-0.01 -0.02 
 
-0.28 -0.27 
PYR -0.13 -0.09 
 
-0.10 -0.02 
 
0.16 0.17 
 
0.32 0.27 
Shum 0.59 0.58 
 
0.53 0.49 
 
0.05 0.03 
 
-0.69 -0.59 
Z-score 0.28 0.27 
 
0.28 0.30 
 
0.01 0.02 
 
-0.31 -0.25 
BS 0.48 0.47 
 
0.45 0.35 
 
-0.02 -0.02 
 
-0.61 -0.52 
 
Using cross-sectional analysis in Table 27, I formally test whether (i) there is a premium 
on LOTT, and (ii) if LOTT is able to account for the premium earned by Shum, z-score 
and BS. Model 1 repeats the basic regression using the Carhart (1997) risk factors 
BETA, SIZE, BM, and PYR (t = 1.69, 0.54, 2.76 and 2.38 respectively). Model 2 
includes IVOL as additional explanatory variable. IVOL (t = 0.67) is not able to add any 
pricing relevant information in addition to the risk factors. The significance of the risk 
factors remains unchanged. Model 2 includes ISKEW (t = 0.61) and provides similar 
results. Model 3 adds PRICE which is again insignificant (t = 0.94) and does not change 
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the significant levels of the risk factors. As such, none of the individual variables of 
LOTT carries significant pricing information in addition to the risk factors. It is 
therefore not surprising that the composite of the variables, LOTT, is also insignificant 
(t = 0.61). As such, LOTT has no significance in explaining the cross-section of 
subsequent stock returns. I report the results of Model 6 to 8 that include the default 
scores from Shum, z-score and BS which are all negative and significant (t = 2.32, 3.28, 
and 2.16 respectively) while LOTT remains insignificant (maximum t = 0.26).  
Due to its ability to forecast bankruptcies (AUC of 0.80), LOTT might have been 
expected to earn a ‘distress risk measure’ premium. Though, while two of the 
components of LOTT have some similarity with Shum and BS, there is no commonality 
with z-score, the distress risk proxy with the strongest association with future stock 
returns.
 33
 Thus, the results in Table 27 do not only confirm the time-series regressions 
on decile portfolio sorts on LOTT (Table 25) but they further corroborate the first 
indication in Table 21 that it might not be distress risk that is priced. 
The results in Table 27 show clear evidence against research propositions P7 and P8. 
Neither the composite LOTT measure nor any of the individual components is 
significant in the cross-sectional analysis. LOTT has no impact on the negative distress 
risk premium. Thus, I conclude that limits of arbitrage or gambling retail investors do 
not account for the overpricing of distressed firms.  
                                                 
33
 Most similar to PRICE is RSIZE in Shum. Most similar to IVOL (volatility of error terms from Carhart 
(1997) model) is SIGMA (the volatility of stock returns) in Shum and BS. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient between LOTT and Shum, BS, and z-score is 0.59, 0.48, and 0.28 respectively.  
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Table 27 Lottery Stocks: Cross-Sectional Regression 
This table presents results from cross-sectional regressions on individual stock returns of UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London 
Stock Exchange. I employ the method of Fama and MacBeth (1973) as defined in Eq. (24) and add various variables to the basic model: 
                                         (    )          (  )            ,  
where subscript t denotes the portfolio year starting at the beginning of October each year from 1985 to 2009 and t+m for integer m = 1 to 12 denotes the month-ends 
of the portfolio year. BETA is the beta factor calculated for each firm according to Dimson (1979) over the previous 24 months (± 1 month lag). SIZE is the natural log 
of the market value of common equity (MV). BM is the natural log of book value of shareholders’ equity less preference shares and minorities over MV. PYR is the 
prior 11-months return excluding September. I add IVOL, ISKEW, PRICE, LOTT, the failure indicators Shum, the score from the model in Shumway (2001), z-score 
(Taffler, 1983) and BS, the score from the market-based model in Bharath and Shumway (2008). I take the coefficients from failure indicators and predictor variables 
known at the end of each September from 1985 to 2009 (portfolio formation). LOTT is the lottery-index following Han and Kumar (2011): I run regressions using the 
Carhart (1997) model over the previous 24 months and collect the residual terms. IVOL is the variance and ISKEW the skewness of the residual terms. I rank the 
sample firms on share price (PRICE) and form virgintile portfolios. I repeat that for IVOL and ISKEW. LOTT (Eq. (26)) is the sum of the virgintile portfolio 
assignments divided by 60. Latest accounting data is taken with a minimum lag of five months between financial year-end and portfolio formation, market data is taken 
at portfolio formation. All variables (not LOTT) are winsorised at the 5.0% level, scores are winsorised at ±18.4207. The return of the failure month is set to -100.0%.  
 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 γ5 γ6 γ7 γ8 γ9 γ10 γ11 
Model BETA SIZE BM PYR IVOL ISKEW PRICE LOTT Shum Z-score BS 
1 -0.12 -0.03 0.22 0.40 
       
 
(1.69) (0.54) (2.76) (2.38)       
2 -0.10 -0.04 0.21 0.44 -1.08 
      
 
(1.45) (0.80) (2.78) (2.64) (0.67)       
3 -0.12 -0.03 0.22 0.41 
 
0.03 
     
 
(1.72) (0.49) (2.76) (2.37)  (0.61)      
4 -0.10 -0.06 0.22 0.42 
  
0.00 
    
 
(1.52) (0.93) (2.77) (2.68)   (0.94)     
5 -0.10 -0.05 0.21 0.42 
   
-0.21 
   
 
(1.51) (0.80) (2.70) (2.51)    (0.61)    
6 -0.07 -0.12 0.15 0.16 
   
-0.01 -0.19 
  
 
(1.19) (1.83) (1.84) (1.21)    (0.05) (2.32)   
7 -0.10 -0.05 0.18 0.35 
   
-0.09 
 
-0.02 
 
 
(1.46) (0.88) (2.29) (2.19)    (0.26)  (3.28)  
8 -0.09 -0.06 0.24 0.27 
   
-0.06 
  
-0.02 
  (1.42) (1.13) (3.02) (1.72)       (0.18)     (2.16) 
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7.6 Conclusion and Discussion of Findings 
The results in this chapter provide no evidence for the predictions of Garlappi and Yan 
(2011). In contrast to their predictions but in line with other studies, I find that equity 
beta as well as BM increases with distress risk (e.g. Dichev, 1998; Avramov, Chordia, 
Jostova and Philipov, 2009). More importantly, while Garlappi and Yan (2011) apply 
only a market-based measure, I reject their proposition using a hybrid, accounting-based 
and market-based measure to proxy for distress risk.  
Garlappi and Yan (2011) argue that their valuation model originally introduced to the 
US market is broader than a simple violation of the absolute priority rule. However, its 
applicability to the UK market is an empirical question because Franks and Nyborg 
(1996) highlight significant differences between the US and the UK bankruptcy regime, 
in particular, the UK bankruptcy regime is more creditor-friendly. Kaiser (1996) finds 
that UK stockholders are passed over in terminal payments and similarly, Agarwal and 
Taffler (2008b) find that over their sample period of 24 years in only one instance did 
the shareholders of a failed firm receive any pay-out. I find no evidence in support of 
the shareholder advantage theory of Garlappi and Yan (2011). Hence, the negative 
distress risk premium in the UK is unlikely to be driven by the shareholder advantage 
effect.  
However, my findings could also be different to the results of Garlappi and Yan (2011) 
because of sample and method. Dichev (1998) finds a hump-shaped distress risk-return 
relation only to be true for NASDAQ stocks using z-score. As such, the findings of 
Garlappi and Yan (2011) could be driven by a class of small stocks listed at NASDAQ. 
The fact that I exclude AIM, i.e. the equivalent to NASDAQ, might explain why my 
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results do not support the findings in Garlappi and Yan (2011). Alternatively, the 
shareholder advantage might be a myopic view of reality. Zhang (2012) argues that the 
model of Garlappi and Yan (2011) assumes that there are no renegotiation frictions. 
However, Zhang (2012) shows that such frictions exist and have a negative effect on the 
shareholder advantage.  
The second part of this chapter demonstrates that firms with lottery-type characteristics 
or limits of arbitrage share similar characteristics with distressed firms. However, the 
pricing impact of these characteristics is marginal. Decile sorts on LOTT show no 
return association with value-weighted portfolio returns though the association with 
equally-weighted portfolio returns suggests that the return premium is due to stocks 
with low market capitalisation. The results from cross-sectional regressions are even 
weaker as they demonstrate that the characteristics are not relevant in subsequent stock 
returns and that the distress risk premium is not affected. This might appear surprising 
because (i) LOTT was found significant in previous studies (e.g. Han and Kumar, 
2011), and (ii)  OTT is associated with distress risk and thus might earn a ‘distress risk 
measure’ premium. However, the impact of the individual components of LOTT is 
likely to be controlled for by the risk-adjustment applied. The size factor covers the 
share price component of LOTT and the remaining idiosyncratic risk components 
(Angelidis and Tessaromatis, 2005; 2008). Moreover, the fact that LOTT is not priced 
although being a fairly good failure predictor (AUC of 0.80) further corroborates the 
first indication from Chapter 6 that it might not be distress risk that is priced but an 
element of the distress measures not shared by LOTT.  
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Overall, the results in this chapter present no evidence to support the research 
propositions P6 to P8. I therefore conclude that there is no shareholder advantage effect 
in the UK as described by Garlappi and Yan (2011) and the negative distress risk 
measure premium is not driven by gambling retail investors or limits of arbitrage.  
In the next chapter, I explore the drivers of the distress risk measures as I break each of 
them down into its individual variables and test for their price impact in subsequent 
stock returns.  
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7.7 Appendix 
Table 28A Shareholder Advantage: Value Premium 
The table presents value premia from time-series regressions on decile portfolios based on UK non-
financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. At the end of each 
September from 1985 to 2009 (portfolio formation), I rank the sample firms on default probability and 
sort into equally populated decile portfolios (low to high distress risk). Independently, I rank the sample 
firms on BM (book value of shareholders’ equity less preference shares and minorities over market value 
of common equity) and form two equally populated portfolios (high and low BM). I form 20 portfolios at 
the intersections of the two sorts. Per decile distress risk portfolio, I calculate the risk-adjusted value 
premium using the Carhart (1997) model as defined in Eq. (25), i.e. the risk-adjusted return on a portfolio 
that is long on high BM and short on low BM stocks. The portfolio returns are value-weighted (vw) or 
equally-weighted (ew). I repeat this for each default probability obtained from the model in Shumway 
(2001), z-score (Taffler, 1983), and the model in Bharath and Shumway (2008). 
  Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High H-L 
Panel A. Shumway (2001) 
vw 0.09 0.07 0.16 0.03 0.44 -0.05 -0.58 0.76 -0.01 0.00 -0.09 
 (0.56) (0.37) (0.86) (0.13) (1.96) (0.17) (1.66) (2.16) (0.01) (0.00) (0.19) 
ew 0.23 0.10 0.24 0.17 0.44 0.05 0.57 0.72 0.09 0.16 -0.07 
 (1.46) (0.66) (1.53) (1.12) (2.77) (0.30) (3.01) (3.21) (0.34) (0.43) (0.17) 
Panel B. Z-score (Taffler, 1983) 
vw 0.05 -0.01 0.06 -0.19 0.72 -0.19 0.10 0.32 0.62 -0.17 -0.21 
 (0.14) (0.04) (0.27) (1.08) (3.69) (0.83) (0.46) (1.12) (1.90) (0.47) (0.48) 
ew 0.31 0.31 -0.02 0.24 0.54 0.10 0.13 -0.04 0.30 0.28 -0.04 
 (1.46) (1.61) (0.10) (1.31) (3.31) (0.58) (0.70) (0.21) (1.30) (0.81) (0.10) 
Panel C. Bharath and Shumway (2008) 
vw -0.13 0.05 0.17 -0.09 0.39 0.43 0.31 0.19 -0.11 0.96 1.09 
 (0.58) (0.27) (0.93) (0.48) (1.85) (1.79) (1.12) (0.53) (0.27) (1.55) (1.66) 
ew 0.21 0.34 0.33 0.09 0.36 0.34 0.84 0.53 0.46 0.24 0.03 
  (1.16) (2.02) (2.15) (0.56) (2.16) (1.91) (4.29) (2.49) (1.53) (0.48) (0.05) 
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CHAPTER 8:  UNRAVELLING THE NEGATIVE DISTRESS RISK 
PREMIUM 
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8.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 presents clear evidence that distressed stocks underperform while scoring 
high on conventional risk measures. Since this is hard to reconcile with the traditional 
risk-return paradigm, literature proposes alternative explanations for the anomalous 
distress risk return pattern. However, the tests in Chapter 7 do not find any evidence in 
support of the shareholder advantage theory of Garlappi and Yan (2011) in the UK. The 
results in Chapter 7 also show that distressed firms have characteristics that are 
associated with high limits of arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and that attract 
gambling retail investors (Han and Kumar, 2011) but, there is no evidence that these 
characteristics drive the overpricing of distressed firms. 
Literature hitherto assumes that the lower returns on distressed stocks provide evidence 
that distress risk is priced, albeit counterintuitively (e.g. Campbell et al., 2008). The 
results in the previous chapters raise fundamental doubts on this assumption. First, if it 
is distress risk that is priced, the best distress risk measure is expected to be the most 
strongly related to future stock returns. In sharp contrast to this, I find that z-score, the 
weakest bankruptcy prediction model (Chapter 5), subsumes the pricing information of 
the stronger bankruptcy predictors (Chapter 6). A second doubt is raised by the results 
on LOTT (Chapter 7). I find that while LOTT is a fairly good bankruptcy predictor 
(AUC = 0.80), it has no association with subsequent stock returns. These empirical 
findings suggest that it is not distress risk but one or more elements of the distress risk 
measures that drive the observed premium. As z-score is the dominant distress risk 
measure in the returns analysis, it suggests that the pricing element is most pronounced 
within z-score. 
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These conflicting findings make it a requisite to explore the underlying drivers of the 
distress risk premium. The existing literature only works with the composite measures 
and this chapter fills this gap in the literature by testing whether it is distress risk (i.e. 
the composite) or some individual components that drive the observed negative distress 
risk premium.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: in sub-chapter 2 I present the 
research question and research proposition. In sub-chapter 3 I briefly describe the data 
and method used. Sub-chapter 4 uses cross-sectional regressions to tests for the pricing 
relevance of the individual variables of each distress risk measure. Sub-chapter 5 
provides robustness tests using time-series regressions. Sub-chapter 6 concludes and 
discusses the results.  
8.2 Research Question and Propositions 
In this chapter I explore the relation between distress risk and returns more thoroughly 
than current studies by testing the drivers of the distress risk proxies using their 
individual components. As such, I examine the following research question: 
Does one of the components of the distress risk measures drive the returns or is it 
the composite? 
The corresponding research proposition is therefore: 
P9: One or more of the components of the distress risk measures drive the observed 
distress risk premium. 
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8.3 Data and Method 
My sample consists of UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the 
London Stock Exchange anytime between October 1985 and September 2010. It 
includes 22,217 observations with 2,428 unique firms of which 202 failed.  
In this chapter I apply two testing procedures: First, I use cross-sectional regressions 
following the method of Fama and MacBeth (1973) as defined in Eq. (24) to test for 
pricing significance of each distress risk measures’ individual variables (I use Shum, 
z-score and BS). Second, based on the results of the cross-sectional regressions, I use 
sorts on distress risk and profitability. I test for abnormal returns using time-series 
regressions with the Fama and French (1993) model as well as the Carhart (1997) model 
as defined in Eq. (25). Following Novy-Marx (2010), I add a risk factor to represent 
profitability as defined in Eq. (28). 
8.4 Cross-Sectional Regressions 
8.4.1 Distress Risk Measures: Individual Variables 
In this sub-chapter I conduct cross-sectional tests to identify the drivers of the distress 
risk premium. In doing so, I analyse the cross-sectional impact of the individual 
variables of each distress risk measure on subsequent stock returns controlling for the 
common risk factors. 
Before conducting the cross-sectional analysis, I test for the correlation between the 
distress risk measure components and the common risk factors. Since the distress risk 
measures of Shumway (2001) and Bharath and Shumway (2008) contain variables 
similar to the risk factors, I expect high correlations. Table 29 presents the Spearman 
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and Pearson correlation coefficients for the common risk factors BETA, SIZE, BM and 
PYR with the distress risk measures Shum, z-score and BS. I break down each distress 
risk measure into the individual component parts i.e. Shum into NITA, TLTA, EXRET, 
SIGMA and RSIZE; z-score into PBTCL, CATL, CLTA and NCI; and BS into ER1y, 
TLMTA, and SIGMA (please see Table 2A on page 91 for a definition of the key 
variables). 
First, I examine the correlations of Shum’s components and the risk factors. BETA 
shows no relation with the individual components (maximum: Spearman 0.13, Pearson 
0.12). SIZE shows a high correlation with Shum (Spearman -0.73, Pearson -0.49) while, 
as expected, it is highly correlated with RSIZE (Spearman 1.00, Pearson 0.79). BM has 
a low correlation with all the Shum variables (maximum Spearman -0.37, 
Pearson -0.38). Unsurprisingly, PYR is highly correlated with EXRET (Spearman 0.95, 
Pearson 0.93). Within the Shum variables there are no high correlations (see Appendix). 
As such, when I run the cross-sectional regressions with the individual variables, I 
either exclude SIZE or RSIZE and PYR or EXRET. 
Next, I look at the correlation coefficients of the z-score components and the risk 
factors. Z-score is a purely accounting-based distress risk measure. Since the risk factors 
are all market-based variables, the correlation between the individual z-score variables 
and the risk factors is low. The maximum Spearman rank correlation coefficient is 0.35 
and between PBTCL and SIZE, while the maximum Pearson correlation coefficient 
is -0.28 and between CLTA and BM. Within the individual variables of z-score there is 
no significant correlation (see Appendix). It follows that no adjustment is required for 
running cross-sectional tests using the z-score components and risk factors. 
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Third, I examine the correlation coefficients of the individual BS components and the 
risk factors. BETA has no correlation with the BS components (maximum Spearman 
0.13, Pearson 0.12). SIZE has as well moderate correlation with the individual BS 
variables (maximum Spearman -0.54, Pearson -0.31). BM has a moderate correlation 
with TLMTA (Spearman 0.46, Pearson 0.48). Unsurprisingly, PYR is a substitute for 
ER1y (Spearman 0.95, Pearson 0.96). The three individual components of BS are not 
highly correlated (see Appendix). As such, I use either PYR or ER1y in the cross-
sectional tests.  
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Table 29 Variables Distress Risk Models: Correlation Common Risk Factors 
This table presents time-series averages of correlation coefficients for variables of UK non-financial firms 
listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. Spear is the Spearman and Pear the 
Pearson correlation coefficient. Correlation coefficients are calculated at the end of each September from 
1985 to 2009 (portfolio formation). Variables are: Shum, the score from the model in Shumway (2001), 
z-score (Taffler, 1983) and BS, the score from the market-based model in Bharath and Shumway (2008). 
NITA is net income available to common shareholders over book value of total assets. TLTA (TLMTA) 
is book value of total assets excluding total common shareholders’ equity over book value of total assets 
(over book value of total liabilities plus market value of common equity). EXRET is log excess return 
over the FTSE All Share Index over the 12 months prior to portfolio formation. SIGMA is the annualised 
standard deviation of daily returns for the three months prior to portfolio formation. RSIZE is log of 
market value of common equity (MV) over the market value of the FTSE All Share Index. PBTCL is 
profit before tax over current liabilities. CATL is current assets over total liabilities. CLTA is current 
liabilities over total assets. NCI is the no-credit interval calculated as (quick assets – current liabilities) / 
((sales – profit before tax – depreciation) / 365). ER1y is the prior-year return. Latest accounting data is 
taken with a minimum lag of five months between financial year-end and portfolio formation, market data 
is taken at portfolio formation. All variables are winsorised at the 5.0% level, scores are winsorised at 
±18.4207.  
    BETA     SIZE     BM     PYR 
 Variable Spear Pear   Spear Pear   Spear Pear   Spear Pear 
Shum 0.05 0.07 
 
-0.73 -0.49 
 
0.24 0.28 
 
-0.50 -0.50 
NITA -0.05 -0.08 
 
0.32 0.19 
 
-0.33 -0.23 
 
0.18 0.18 
TLTA 0.07 0.08 
 
0.09 0.10 
 
-0.36 -0.29 
 
-0.03 -0.03 
EXRET -0.03 -0.05 
 
0.21 0.14 
 
-0.29 -0.31 
 
0.95 0.93 
SIGMA 0.13 0.12 
 
-0.54 -0.31 
 
0.17 0.24 
 
-0.26 -0.25 
RSIZE 0.08 0.06   1.00 0.79   -0.37 -0.38   0.22 0.19 
Z-score 0.06 0.07 
 
-0.17 -0.08 
 
-0.04 0.00 
 
-0.12 -0.11 
PBTCL -0.08 -0.09 
 
0.35 0.20 
 
-0.15 -0.16 
 
0.17 0.15 
CATL 0.01 0.00 
 
-0.25 -0.23 
 
0.05 0.06 
 
0.02 0.03 
CLTA 0.05 0.06 
 
-0.13 -0.12 
 
-0.34 -0.28 
 
-0.02 -0.01 
NCI 0.01 0.01   -0.04 -0.06   -0.01 0.00   0.05 0.04 
BS 0.08 0.07 
 
-0.51 -0.30 
 
0.38 0.39 
 
-0.59 -0.56 
ER1y -0.03 -0.03 
 
0.22 0.10 
 
-0.29 -0.30 
 
0.95 0.96 
TLMTA 0.02 0.02 
 
-0.27 -0.12 
 
0.46 0.48 
 
-0.28 -0.30 
SIGMA 0.13 0.12   -0.54 -0.31   0.17 0.24   -0.26 -0.25 
 
Table 30 reports the cross-sectional regressions using the individual distress risk 
measure variables. Model 1 is the basic regression using the common risk factors and 
the starting point of the analysis. As such, I test for significance of the individual 
variables after controlling for BETA, SIZE, BM and PYR. 
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Model 2 contains the variables of Shum. As discussed above, I exclude either SIZE and 
PYR or RSIZE and EXRET. Being a substitute of PYR, EXRET shows high 
significance (t = 2.27) in explaining the cross-section of subsequent stock returns. 
Similar to SIZE, RSIZE is insignificant (t = 1.60). Looking at the other two risk factors, 
BETA remains insignificant (t = 1.62) while the coefficient of BM is lowered to an 
insignificant level (t = 1.82). This might be due to the fact that BM has a moderate 
correlation with the Shum components and thus, the BM effect might be covered 
collectively by them. Apart from that, Model 2 highlights the relevance of profitability. 
NITA is positively related with subsequent stock returns (t = 2.27). TLTA and SIGMA 
are both insignificant (t = 0.80 and 1.36).
34
 Model 3 is similar to Model 2 but it uses 
SIZE instead of RSIZE and PYR instead of EXRET. BETA, SIZE, and BM are again 
insignificant (t = 1.17, 1.64, and 1.87 respectively). Similar to EXRET in Model 2, PYR 
is significant in explaining the cross-section of subsequent stock returns (t = 2.43). 
Further confirming the results of Model 2, NITA (t = 2.24) is again the only Shum 
component that is significant in addition to the risk factors. As such, TLTA (t = 0.83) 
and SIGMA (t = 1.37) are insignificant. The results clearly show that the premium on 
Shum is mainly driven by NITA. 
Model 4 examines the effects of the individual components of z-score. Similar to the 
basic Model 1, BETA and SIZE are insignificant (t = 1.55 and 0.61) while BM and PYR 
are significant (t = 2.72 and 1.95). The z-score components show that, again, 
profitability measured by PBTCL, is highly significant (t = 2.69). Besides that, the firm-
                                                 
34
 This confirms results in Chapter 7 where IVOL (idiosyncratic volatility), that is similar to SIGMA 
(total volatility), is also found to be insignificant. 
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liquidity ratio NCI is also significant (t = 2.52) in explaining subsequent stock returns. 
The remaining two z-score variables CATL and CLTA are insignificant (t = 0.19 and 
1.48 respectively). As such, confirming the results on Shum, the z-score effect is driven 
by profitability and NCI. 
Model 5 presents the results on the components of BS. Similar to Model 1, BETA and 
SIZE have no impact on subsequent stock returns (t = 1.46 and 1.53 respectively) while 
BM is highly significant (t = 2.81). As a substitute of PYR, ER1y is highly significant 
(t = 2.75) too. Similar to Model 2 and 3, SIGMA has no statistical relevance (t = 1.62) 
and the coefficient on TLMTA is also statistically insignificant (t = 0.59). Model 6 
repeats the results using PYR instead of ER1y and the results remain unchanged. 
BETA, SIZE, SIGMA, and TLMTA are insignificant (t = 1.22, 1.43, 1.68, and 0.75 
respectively) while BM and PYR are the only significant variables in explaining the 
cross-section of subsequent stock returns (t = 2.80 and 2.56 respectively). As such, none 
of the BS variables is significant in addition to the common risk factors. However, this 
is not surprising because, recalling from Model 8 in Table 21, BS itself is only 
marginally significant (t = 1.91). 
The results in Table 30 can be summarised as follows: (i) the coefficients of the 
common risk factors generally do not differ when the individual variables of the distress 
risk measures are included instead of the composite measure itself. As such, Table 30 
confirms the results from Table 21 in Chapter 6 in terms of the risk factors, and (ii) I 
find profitability and firm-liquidity to be relevant in explaining cross-sectional variation 
of stock returns in addition to the common risk factors. For Shum, NITA is positive and 
significant and for z-score, PBTCL is positive and significant. In addition, for z-score, 
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NCI is also positive and significant. The other variables of Shum and z-score are 
insignificant.  
As such, I find supporting evidence for research proposition P9, that profitability and 
firm-liquidity drives the distress scores of Shum and z-score. In the following, I further 
explore this finding employing orthogonalised distress risk proxies in cross-sectional 
regressions. 
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Table 30 Variables Distress Risk Models: Cross-Sectional Regression 
This table presents results from cross-sectional regressions on individual stock returns of UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London 
Stock Exchange. I employ the method of Fama and MacBeth (1973) as defined in Eq. (24) and add various variables to the basic model: 
                                         (    )          (  )            , 
where subscript t denotes the portfolio year starting at the beginning of October each year from 1985 to 2009 and t+m for integer m = 1 to 12 denotes the month-ends 
of the portfolio year. BETA is the beta factor calculated for each firm according to Dimson (1979) over the previous 24 months (± 1 month lag). SIZE is the natural log 
of the market value of common equity (MV). BM is the natural log of book value of shareholders’ equity less preference shares and minorities over MV. PYR is the 
prior 11-months return excluding September. NITA is net income available to common shareholders over book value of total assets. TLTA (TLMTA) is book value of 
total assets excluding total common shareholders’ equity over book value of total assets (over book value of total liabilities plus market value of common equity). 
EXRET is log excess return over the FTSE All Share Index over the 12 months prior to portfolio formation. SIGMA is the annualised standard deviation of daily 
returns for the three months prior to portfolio formation. RSIZE is log of market value of common equity (MV) over the market value of the FTSE All Share Index. 
PBTCL is profit before tax over current liabilities. CATL is current assets over total liabilities. CLTA is current liabilities over total assets. NCI is the no-credit interval 
calculated as (quick assets – current liabilities) / ((sales – profit before tax – depreciation) / 365). ER1y is the prior-year return. Latest accounting data is taken with a 
minimum lag of five months between financial year-end and portfolio formation (end of September from 1985 to 2009), market data is taken at portfolio formation. All 
variables are winsorised at the 5.0% level, scores are winsorised at ±18.4207. The return of the month of failure is set to -100.0%. 
 
γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 γ5 γ6 γ7 γ8 γ9 γ10 γ11 γ12 γ13 γ14 γ15 
Model  BETA SIZE BM PYR NITA TLTA EXRET SIGMA RSIZE PBTCL CATL CLTA NCI ER1y TLMTA 
1 -0.12 -0.03 0.22 0.40 
             (1.69) (0.54) (2.76) (2.38)                       
2 -0.10 
 
0.17 
 
1.60 -0.25 0.48 -0.35 -0.08 
      
 
(1.62)  (1.82)  (2.13) (0.80) (2.27) (1.36) (1.60)       
3 -0.07 -0.09 0.17 0.34 1.69 -0.26 
 
-0.39 
         (1.17) (1.64) (1.87) (2.43) (2.24) (0.83)   (1.37)               
4 -0.11 -0.03 0.24 0.31 
     
0.57 -0.02 0.44 0.00 
    (1.55) (0.61) (2.72) (1.95)           (2.69) (0.19) (1.48) (2.52)     
5 -0.09 -0.08 0.22 
    
-0.48 
     
0.50 -0.18 
 
(1.46) (1.53) (2.81)     (1.62)      (2.75) (0.59) 
6 -0.08 -0.08 0.21 0.36 
   
-0.50 
      
-0.23 
  (1.22) (1.43) (2.80) (2.56)       (1.68)             (0.75) 
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8.4.2 Distress Risk and Profitability  
Chapter 6 demonstrates that there is a negative distress risk premium in stock returns. 
The results in Table 30 show that profitability and firm-liquidity are the drivers of the 
negative distress risk premium. To further test these findings, I separate the information 
carried by profitability and firm-liquidity from the distress risk measure and test for 
significance of the remaining information of the distress risk measure. As such, I 
orthogonalise Shum by NITA and, likewise, I orthogonalise z-score by PBTCL and NCI 
using Eq. (27).  
Table 31 presents the results for the orthogonalised Shum measure. Model 1 repeats the 
basic regression with the Shum score (not orthogonalised) showing the negative distress 
risk premium (t = 2.07). Model 2 includes the Shum measure orthogonalised by NITA 
i.e. the distress information unrelated to profitability and shows that the remaining 
distress related information is not significant (t = 0.91) in explaining the cross-section of 
subsequent stock returns. At the same time, BETA, BM and PYR become significant 
(t = 1.98, 2.21, and 2.66 respectively) while SIZE remains insignificant (t = 0.88) when 
the profitability related information in the distress risk measure is excluded. This 
suggests that collectively BETA, BM, and PYR account for the information carried by 
NITA (the maximum correlation coefficient between NITA and the other variables 
I -0.33). Model 3 includes NITA and shows that profitability is significant (t = 2.08) 
while Shum remains insignificant (t = 1.54). Also, the risk factors BETA, SIZE, BM, 
and PYR have significance levels similar to Model 1 (t = 1.54, 1.68, 1.87, and 1.66 
respectively). 
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Table 31 Profitability and Shumway (2001) 
This table presents results from cross-sectional regressions on individual stock returns of UK non-
financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. I employ the method of 
Fama and MacBeth (1973) as defined in Eq. (24) and add various variables to the basic model: 
                                         (    )          (  )            , 
where subscript t denotes the portfolio year starting at the beginning of October each year from 1985 to 
2009 and t+m for integer m = 1 to 12 denotes the month-ends of the portfolio year. BETA is the beta 
factor calculated for each firm according to Dimson (1979) over the previous 24 months (± 1 month lag). 
SIZE is the natural log of the market value of common equity (MV). BM is the natural log of book value 
of shareholders’ equity less preference shares and minorities over MV. PYR is the prior 11-months return 
excluding September. Shum is the score from the model in Shumway (2001). NITA in column 
Orthogonalised reports when Shum is orthogonalised by NITA. NITA is net income available to common 
shareholders over book value of total assets. Latest accounting data is taken with a minimum lag of five 
months between financial year-end and portfolio formation (end of September from 1985 to 2009), 
market data is taken at portfolio formation. All variables are winsorised at the 5.0% level, scores are 
winsorised at ±18.4207. The return of the month of failure is set to -100.0%. 
  
γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 γ5 γ6 
Model  Orthogonalised  BETA SIZE BM PYR Shum NITA 
1 - -0.09 -0.12 0.15 0.17 -0.18 
     (1.32) (1.84) (1.87) (1.28) (2.07)  
2 NITA -0.14 -0.06 0.20 0.38 -0.07 
   (1.98) (0.88) (2.21) (2.66) (0.91) 
3 NITA -0.10 -0.11 0.17 0.23 -0.17 2.30 
    (1.54) (1.68) (1.87) (1.66) (1.54) (2.08) 
 
Table 32 documents the comprehensive analysis on z-score. Model 1 repeats the basic 
cross-sectional regression in Table 21 Chapter 6 (Model 7) showing a significant 
z-score (t = 3.08). Model 2 includes the z-score orthogonalised by PBTCL i.e. the 
distress information unrelated to profitability. Similar to the orthogonalised Shum 
measure, Model 2 shows that the remaining distress related information is not 
significant (t = 1.21) in explaining the cross-section of stock returns. The common risk 
factors BETA, SIZE, BM, and PYR (t = 1.68, 0.55, 2.73, and 2.37) show similar 
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significance levels as Model 1 and, also, similar to the results in Model 2 in Table 31.
35
 
When PBTCL is added in Model 3, significance levels hardly change but PBTCL is 
positive and significant (t = 2.72). Model 4 further adds NCI with a significant 
coefficient (t = 1.97) while PBTCL remains highly significant (t = 2.41) as well. 
In Model 5 to 7 I repeat the analysis for the z-score measure orthogonalised by NCI. 
Likewise, in Model 5 the orthogonalised (by NCI) z-score measure is insignificant 
(t = 0.45). While the risk factors BETA and SIZE are insignificant (t = 1.66 and 0.54 
respectively), BM and PYR remain significant (t = 2.74 and 2.37 respectively). Adding 
NCI to the pricing equation in Model 6 returns a significant (t = 2.14) and positive 
coefficient while the significance of the coefficients of the risk factors as well as the 
orthogonalised z-score (by NCI) remain unchanged. Model 7 combines the 
orthogonalised z-score, PBTCL and NCI and shows that both z-score and NCI are 
insignificant (t = 0.04 and 1.90 respectively) while PBTCL is highly significant 
(t = 2.39).  
In Model 8 to 10 I present the results for the z-score measure that is orthogonalised by 
both PBTCL and NCI and generally corroborate prior findings. Model 10 shows that the 
orthogonalised measure is insignificant (t = 0.18) while profitability is highly significant 
(t = 2.37) and NCI returns a marginally significant coefficient (t = 1.98). 
                                                 
35
 The models are similar as both contain only the distress related information that is unrelated to 
profitability. Thus, I expect similar significance for the common risk factors and the orthogonalised 
models.  
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Table 32 Profitability and z-score (Taffler, 1983) 
This table presents results from cross-sectional regressions on individual stock returns of UK non-
financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. I employ the method of 
Fama and MacBeth (1973) as defined in Eq. (24) and add various variables to the basic model: 
                                         (    )          (  )            , 
where subscript t denotes the portfolio year starting at the beginning of October each year from 1985 to 
2009 and t+m for integer m = 1 to 12 denotes the month-ends of the portfolio year. BETA is the beta 
factor calculated for each firm according to Dimson (1979) over the previous 24 months (± 1 month lag). 
SIZE is the natural log of the market value of common equity (MV). BM is the natural log of book value 
of shareholders’ equity less preference shares and minorities over MV. PYR is the prior 11-months return 
excluding September. Z-score is from Taffler (1983). PBTCL (NCI) in column Orthogonalised reports 
when z-score is orthogonalised by PBTCL (NCI). PBTCL is profit before tax over current liabilities. NCI 
is the no-credit interval calculated as (quick assets – current liabilities) / ((sales – profit before tax – 
depreciation) / 365). Latest accounting data is taken with a minimum lag of five months between financial 
year-end and portfolio formation (end of September from 1985 to 2009), market data is taken at portfolio 
formation. All variables are winsorised at the 5.0% level, scores are winsorised at ±18.4207. The return of 
the month of failure is set to -100.0%. 
  
γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 γ5 γ6 γ7 
Model  Orthogonalised  BETA SIZE BM PYR Z-score PBTCL NCI 
1 - -0.11 -0.04 0.19 0.33 -0.02 
      (1.58) (0.78) (2.33) (2.07) (3.08)   
2 PBTCL -0.12 -0.03 0.22 0.40 0.01 
    (1.68) (0.55) (2.73) (2.37) (1.21) 
3 PBTCL -0.10 -0.05 0.21 0.34 0.01 0.51 
   (1.49) (0.99) (2.63) (2.13) (1.23) (2.72) 
4 PBTCL -0.11 -0.04 0.21 0.32 0.01 0.47 0.00 
    (1.59) (0.82) (2.63) (1.96) (1.27) (2.41) (1.97) 
5 NCI -0.12 -0.03 0.22 0.40 0.00 
    (1.66) (0.54) (2.74) (2.37) (0.45) 
6 NCI -0.12 -0.02 0.22 0.37 0.00 
 
0.00 
  (1.72) (0.40) (2.73) (2.16) (0.45) (2.14) 
7 NCI -0.11 -0.04 0.21 0.32 0.00 0.46 0.00 
    (1.56) (0.82) (2.64) (1.97) (0.04) (2.39) (1.90) 
8 PBTCL+NCI -0.12 -0.03 0.22 0.40 0.00 
    (1.73) (0.51) (2.59) (2.43) (0.11) 
9 PBTCL+NCI -0.11 -0.05 0.21 0.34 0.00 0.50 
   (1.54) (0.94) (2.50) (2.18) (0.19) (2.67) 
10 PBTCL+NCI -0.11 -0.04 0.21 0.32 0.00 0.46 0.00 
    (1.63) (0.78) (2.51) (2.02) (0.18) (2.37) (1.98) 
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Table 33 presents the results for the market-based BS measure (not orthogonalised) 
when profitability (PBTCL and NITA) and firm-liquidity (NCI) are included in the 
regression models. BS itself is weakly significant with a t-statistic of 1.91 (Model 1). 
However, Model 2 and 4 include the profitability factor PBTCL which half the 
coefficient of BS. In contrast, PBTCL is highly significant (t = 2.63 and 2.37 
respectively). NCI is irrelevant in explaining the cross-section of subsequent stock 
returns (t = 1.64, Model 3). Model 5 presents the coefficients and significance when 
NITA (t = 1.90), the profitability factor from Shum, is included and corroborates the 
findings.  
Table 33 Profitability and Bharath and Shumway (2008) 
This table presents results from cross-sectional regressions on individual stock returns of UK non-
financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. I employ the method of 
Fama and MacBeth (1973) as defined in Eq. (24) and add various variables to the basic model: 
                                         (    )          (  )            , 
where subscript t denotes the portfolio year starting at the beginning of October each year from 1985 to 
2009 and t+m for integer m = 1 to 12 denotes the month-ends of the portfolio year. BETA is the beta 
factor calculated for each firm according to Dimson (1979) over the previous 24 months (± 1 month lag). 
SIZE is the natural log of the market value of common equity (MV). BM is the natural log of book value 
of shareholders’ equity less preference shares and minorities over MV. PYR is the prior 11-months return 
excluding September. BS is the score from the market-based model in Bharath and Shumway (2008). 
PBTCL is profit before tax over current liabilities. NCI is the no-credit interval calculated as (quick assets 
– current liabilities) / ((sales – profit before tax – depreciation) / 365). Latest accounting data is taken with 
a minimum lag of five months between financial year-end and portfolio formation (end of September 
from 1985 to 2009), market data is taken at portfolio formation. NITA is net income available to common 
shareholders over book value of total assets. All variables are winsorised at the 5.0% level, scores are 
winsorised at ±18.4207. The return of the month of failure is set to -100.0%. 
 
γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 γ5 γ6 γ7 γ8 
Model  BETA SIZE BM PYR BS PBTCL NCI NITA 
1 -0.10 -0.06 0.24 0.26 -0.02 
     (1.52) (1.16) (3.03) (1.74) (1.91)    
2 -0.10 -0.07 0.23 0.26 -0.01 0.46 
  
 
(1.45) (1.30) (2.85) (1.70) (1.30) (2.63) 
3 -0.10 -0.06 0.22 0.26 -0.01 0.43 0.00  
 
(1.58) (1.12) (2.81) (1.69) (1.03) (2.37) (1.64)  
4 -0.10 -0.08 0.24 0.24 -0.02 
  
1.53 
  (1.41) (1.40) (2.96) (1.63) (1.68)   (1.90) 
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The results from the cross-sectional regressions with a focus on profitability can be 
summarised as follows: (i) NITA drives the premium earned by Shum, (ii) PBTCL and 
NCI drive the premium earned by z-score, however, PBTCL is more robust than NCI, 
and (iii) the marginal distress effect of BS is captured by PBTCL.  
As such, I further corroborate the findings in the previous sub-chapter as I find 
supporting evidence for proposition P9, that profitability drives the negative distress 
risk premium. 
8.5 Time-Series Regressions 
The previous sub-chapter provides a detailed cross-sectional analysis of the distress risk 
premium. The major conclusion from these tests is that profitability drives the distress 
risk premium. In the following, I complement the cross-sectional tests with time-series 
regression analysis. 
To be consistent with previous analysis, I estimate the risk-adjusted returns using the 
Fama and French (1993) model as well as the Carhart (1997) model. Similar to the 
cross-sectional tests, my objective is to test whether profitability drives the distress risk 
premium. For this purpose, I amend the Carhart (1997) model by a fifth factor that 
accounts for profitability see Eq. (28). See Chapter 4 for details on the formation of the 
profitability factor PMU. 
8.5.1 Five Factor Profitability Model 
The introduction of the profitability factor PMU and the five factor model is solely for 
providing robustness tests of the results documented in the previous sub-chapter. My 
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intention is not on providing a new asset pricing model (including the theoretical 
reasons behind it) but on testing the role of profitability in asset pricing.  
Table 34 reports the Spearman and Pearson correlation coefficients of the common risk 
factors and PMU. The table demonstrates that HML and WML are moderately 
correlated (Spearman -0.45, Pearson -0.61). Importantly, PMU is only moderately 
correlated with the Carhart factors: the highest correlation of PMU is with SMB 
(Spearman -0.41, Pearson -0.46). As such, PMU has less in common with the common 
risk factors using correlation analysis.  
Table 34 Profitability Factor: Correlation Common Risk Factors 
This table presents correlation coefficients factors formed by using UK non-financial firms listed in the 
Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. The lower-left side of the matrix presents 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients. The upper-right side of the matrix presents Pearson correlation 
coefficients. RmRf is the monthly return difference of the FTSE All Share Index and the one-month UK 
Treasury Bill rate. SMB is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor, HML the return on 
the mimicking portfolio for the value premium, WML is the return on the mimicking portfolio for return 
momentum, and PMU is the return on the mimicking portfolio for profitability effect. Factors are formed 
following the procedure in Fama and French (1996). 
Variable  RmRF SMB HML WML PMU 
RmRF 1 -0.11 -0.05 -0.12 -0.35 
SMB -0.15 1 -0.22 -0.04 -0.46 
HML 0.01 -0.11 1 -0.61 0.14 
WML -0.09 -0.06 -0.45 1 0.12 
PMU -0.33 -0.41 0.07 0.13 1 
 
In order to test the information carried by PMU and whether it is already captured by 
the common risk factors, I conduct time-series regressions using PMU as dependent 
variable and the common risk factors as independent variables. Model 1 in Table 35 
provides the coefficients of time-series regressions that use PMU as dependent variable 
and the common risk factors as independent variables. Model 1 represents the standard 
CAPM. While RmRf is significant, the significant intercept (t = 3.22) reveals that 
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CAPM is unable to fully explain PMU. Also, the negative loading on RmRF shows that 
more profitable firms have lower exposure to the market factor than less profitable 
firms. Model 2 employs the factors of the Fama and French (1993) model. While RmRf 
(t = 8.59) and SMB (t = 10.38) significantly contribute to explaining PMU returns, the 
intercept is again statistically highly significant (t = 3.88). Both RmRf and SMB are 
negatively related with PMU, while HML is positively but insignificantly related with 
PMU. The returns show that while more profitable firms have lower betas and higher 
market capitalisation, they still earn higher returns. In Model 3 I add the momentum 
factor WML and find it to be insignificant (t = 1.49). While the other common risk 
factors remain unchanged (t = 8.04, 9.68, and 1.13 respectively), PMU earns still a risk-
adjusted return of 46 bps per month (t = 3.50) that is unexplained by the common risk 
factors. As such, PMU has potential in explaining the significant negative distress risk 
premium found in the decile portfolios in Chapter 6.  
Table 35 Profitability Factor: Time-Series Regression Common Risk Factors 
The table presents summary statistics of time-series regressions of factors based on UK non-financial 
firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. I use monthly time-series 
regression from October 1985 to September 2010 as defined in Eq. (29): 
                                                              , 
where          is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the profitability effect during month m of 
portfolio year t,         is the return difference of the FTSE All Share Index and the one-month UK 
Treasury Bill rate,        the return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor,        the return 
on the mimicking portfolio for the value premium,        the return on the mimicking portfolio for 
return momentum, and  i,t+m is the error term. The factors are formed following Fama and French (1996). 
I report the intercept and the coefficients of the factors as well as the respective t-statistics.  
Model Ind Var  1  MKT  SMB  HML  WML 
1 PMU 0.48 -0.20 
     (3.22) (6.40) 
2 PMU 0.49 -0.23 -0.34 0.01 
   (3.88) (8.59) (10.38) (0.21) 
3 PMU 0.46 -0.22 -0.32 0.06 0.06 
    (3.50) (8.04) (9.68) (1.13) (1.49) 
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8.5.2 Decile Portfolios on Distress Risk 
In this sub-chapter I again use the decile portfolios obtained from sorts on Shum, 
z-score and BS respectively. Table 36 reports only the H-L premia for a portfolio long 
on the high distress risk decile and short on the low distress risk decile after the risk-
adjustment using the Fama and French (1993) model and the Carhart (1997) model (see 
Chapter 6) as well as the five factor model including PMU. The risk-adjusted returns 
using Fama and French (1993) model show a strong negative distress risk premium 
regardless of the distress risk proxy and weighting-scheme: for Shum, the premia 
are -131 bps (t = 5.14) and -77 bps (t = 3.12) using value- and equal-weights 
respectively, for z-score they are -57 bps (t = 2.12) and -89 bps (t = 4.50), and for 
BS -92 bps (t = 3.08) and -89 bps (t = 3.78). Using the Carhart risk-adjustments, the 
H-L premia is still highly negative using Shum (-104 bps, -62 bps on value- and equal-
weights respectively), z-score (-57 bps, -93 bps), or BS (-54 bps, -74 bps). Importantly, 
except for the value-weighted BS premium, the premia are highly significant (Shum: 
t = 4.15 and 2.49; z-score: t = 2.07 and 4.59; BS: t = 1.88 and 3.14). Including the PMU 
factor in the Carhart model reduces the H-L premia heavily for all distress risk proxies, 
i.e. Shum is reduced to -73 bps and -40 bps, z-score to -21 bps, and -70 bps, and BS 
to -36 bps and -66 bps respectively. More importantly, the premia is insignificant for 
equally-weighted returns on Shum (t = 1.62) and value-weighted returns on z-score 
(t = 0.80) and BS (t = 1.25). The other distress risk premia remain highly significant, i.e. 
value-weighted returns on Shum (t = 3.05) and using equally-weighted returns on 
z-score (t = 3.59) and BS (t = 2.74). Novy-Marx (2010) reports similar results using 
time-series regressions on value-weighted portfolio returns (decile portfolios using o-
score and CHS) in time-series regressions including PMU. My analysis clearly shows 
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that including PMU leaves half of the coefficients significant but reduces the negative 
distress risk premium substantially and thus, profitability accounts for a large part of the 
negative distress risk premium in time-series regressions. 
Table 36 Profitability Factor: Decile Portfolios Distress Risk Premium 
The table presents summary statistics of time-series regressions based on UK non-financial firms listed in 
the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. At the end of each September from 1985 to 
2009 (portfolio formation), I rank the sample firms on default probability and sort into equally populated 
decile portfolios. Default probability obtained from the model in Shumway (2001) (Shum), the z-score 
(Taffler, 1983), the market-based model in Bharath and Shumway (2008) (BS). In order to avoid look-
ahead bias, I take the coefficients from failure indicators and predictor variables that are known at 
portfolio formation. I only report the intercepts β1 and the corresponding t-statistics in brackets for the H-
L portfolio long on the high decile distress risk portfolio and short on the low distress decile portfolio. I 
employ the model of Fama and French (1993) (excl.        and       ), Carhart (1997) (excl. 
      ), and the five factor model including the profitability factor PMU as defined in Eq. (28): 
      -                                                                         , 
where        is the return on portfolio i during month m (integer 1 to 12) in portfolio year t,        the 
one-month UK Treasury Bill rate at the beginning of month t+m,         the return difference of the 
FTSE All Share Index and the one-month UK Treasury Bill rate during month t+m,        the return on 
the mimicking portfolio for the size factor during month t+m,        the return on the mimicking 
portfolio for the BM factor during month t+m and        the return on the mimicking portfolio for the 
return momentum factor during month t+m, and          the return on the mimicking portfolio for the 
profitability effect during month t+m. VW indicates value-weighted returns while EW indicates equally-
weighted returns. The return of the month of failure is set to -100.0%.  
 
Shum   Z-score   BS 
Model  VW EW 
 
VW EW 
 
VW EW 
Fama and French -1.31 -0.77 
 
-0.57 -0.89 
 
-0.92 -0.89 
 
(5.14) (3.12) (2.12) (4.50) (3.08) (3.78) 
Carhart -1.04 -0.62 
 
-0.57 -0.93 
 
-0.54 -0.74 
 
(4.15) (2.49) (2.07) (4.59) (1.88) (3.14) 
Five Factor PMU -0.73 -0.40 
 
-0.21 -0.70 
 
-0.36 -0.66 
  (3.05) (1.62)   (0.80) (3.59)   (1.25) (2.74) 
 
8.5.3 3x3 Portfolios on Distress Risk and Profitability 
The previous results confirm the importance of profitability in explaining subsequent 
stock returns. To further analyse the relation of profitability, distress risk, and stock 
returns, I use a 3x3 independent sort on distress risk and profitability. That is, at the 
beginning of each portfolio year I rank the stocks on either of the distress risk measures 
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(Shum, z-score and BS) and split them equally into terciles. Independently, I rank the 
stocks on PBTCL and split them equally into terciles. I form a nine-portfolio-matrix at 
the intersections of the tercile portfolios. The following tables present for each sort (i) 
the characteristics of the nine-portfolio-matrix, (ii) the returns of the tercile portfolios 
and (iii) the return matrix of the nine-portfolios-matrix. Each sort is displayed from low 
(L) to high (H). Characteristics are time-series averages while returns are value-
weighted and risk-adjusted using the models of Fama and French (1993), Carhart 
(1997), and the five factor model including PMU introduced above (see Eq. (28)).  
8.5.3.1 Portfolios on Shumway (2001) and Profitability 
Table 37 presents the summary statistics of portfolios formed on independent sorts on 
Shum and PBTCL. Unsurprisingly, Panel A shows that the diagonal portfolios are the 
most populated (202, 135, 186).
36
 Further, the high distress risk portfolios have the 
highest failure rates, albeit there is a clear reduction in distress risk with profitability 
(3.13% for low profitability to 0.85% for high profitability). All other portfolios have a 
substantially lower than average failure rate (recall that the sample failure rate is 
0.91%). Controlling for distress risk, BETA decreases monotonically with profitability 
but controlling for profitability, the relation between distress risk and BETA is mixed. 
The SIZE matrix shows that profitable firms as well as high distress risk firms tend to 
be smaller. Remarkably, the average market capitalisation of the high distress risk 
portfolios is only £ 58m. The BM ratio increases monotonically with increasing distress 
risk while there is a U-shape relation between profitability and BM once I control for 
                                                 
36
 The Pearson correlation coefficient between Shum and PBTCL is -0.63 (see Table 43A in the appendix 
to this chapter). 
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distress risk.
37
 The pattern on prior-year returns clearly shows that controlling for 
PBTCL, distressed firms are past losers while controlling for distress risk, more 
profitable firms underperform less profitable firms in the year prior to portfolio 
formation.  
As such, controlling for profitability, distressed firms have higher betas, smaller size, 
higher BM ratios, and lower prior-year returns. Controlling for distress risk, profitable 
firms have lower failure rates, lower beta, smaller market capitalisation, and they have 
lower prior-year returns. 
                                                 
37
 An inspection of the average BM ratios of decile PBTCL portfolios does not confirm this. As such, the 
U-shaped relation is due to the coarse ranking and the distress risk sort. 
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Table 37 Profitability Factor: 3x3 Shum-PBTCL Characteristics 
The table presents summary statistics of UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. At the end of each September from 
1985 to 2009 (portfolio formation), I rank the sample firms on the Shumway (2001) model and sort into equally populated tercile portfolios. Independently, I rank the 
sample firms on profitability (PBTCL) and sort into equally populated tercile portfolios. I form nine portfolios at the intersections of the tercile portfolios. L indicates 
low, M medium and H high default probability (profitability). H-L is the difference between the high portfolio and the low portfolio in the respective row or column. In 
order to avoid look-ahead bias, I take the coefficients from failure indicators and predictor variables that are known at portfolio formation. I report summary statistics 
including Fail Rate (in per cent), the number of portfolio failures divided by the number of portfolio observations (Obs). BETA is the beta factor calculated for each 
firm according to Dimson (1979) over the previous 24 months (± 1 month lag). SIZE is the market value of common equity (MV). BM is book value of shareholders’ 
equity less preference shares and minorities over MV. PYR (in per cent) is the prior 11-months return excluding September. Latest accounting data is taken with a 
minimum lag of five months between financial year-end and portfolio formation, market data is taken at portfolio formation. All variables are winsorised at the 5.0% 
level.  
  PBTCL   PBTCL   PBTCL 
Shum L M H H-L 
 
L M H H-L 
 
L M H H-L 
 
Avg Obs 
 
Fail Rate 
 
BETA 
L 21 90 186 164 
 
0.19 0.04 0.02 -0.17 
 
1.23 1.09 1.01 -0.22 
M 74 135 87 13 
 
0.33 0.24 0.09 -0.23 
 
1.22 1.07 0.97 -0.25 
H 202 71 24 -178 
 
3.13 1.13 0.85 -2.28 
 
1.19 1.14 1.13 -0.06 
H-L 181 -19 -162 
  
2.94 1.09 0.83 
  
-0.04 0.05 0.12 
 
 
SIZE 
 
BM 
 
PYR 
L 889 860 686 -203 
 
0.67 0.53 0.53 -0.13 
 
41.15 33.43 28.00 -13.16 
M 314 254 196 -118 
 
0.77 0.67 0.73 -0.04 
 
29.71 18.34 8.10 -21.62 
H 59 68 48 -11 
 
1.01 0.90 0.99 -0.02 
 
-4.17 -6.87 -14.59 -10.42 
H-L -831 -792 -639     0.34 0.37 0.46     -45.33 -40.30 -42.59   
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Table 38 presents the intercepts and t-statistics for portfolio regressions using the 
models in Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997) and the five factor model including 
PMU. As I use a tercile sort on each variable, I report the results of the tercile portfolios 
and the matrix formed at the intersections of the tercile portfolios below. Similar to the 
decile portfolios, the results using the Fama and French (1993) model show a negative 
distress risk premium of -50 bps (t = 2.57). There is also a profitability effect as more 
profitable firms outperform less profitable firms by 47 bps per month (t = 3.13). The 
matrix below combines the two sorts and confirms that both effects are driven by the 
low distress risk-high profitability portfolio which earns a risk-adjusted return of 28 bps 
per month (t = 3.05). Controlling for profitability, the distress risk premium is negative 
but insignificant (t-statistic ranging from 1.38 to 1.80) and controlling for distress risk, 
the profitability effect is positive but insignificant (t-statistic ranging from 0.26 to 1.49). 
As such, the two effects are closely related to each other because controlling for distress 
(profitability) diminishes the return impact of profitability (distress). Using the Carhart 
(1997) model, the distress effect (Shum) is still negative (-25 bps per month) but 
insignificant (t = 1.34). Recalling from Table 15 in Chapter 6 that the returns on the H-L 
portfolio using decile portfolios is significant (-104 bps, t = 4.15), the distress risk 
premium diminishes most probably because the tercile sorting is too coarse. While the 
profitability effect is reduced to 41 bps per month with the inclusion of the momentum 
factor, it is still highly significant (t = 2.69). Again, it is the low distress risk-high 
profitability portfolio that drives the relative distress effect and profitability effect 
(24 bps per month, t = 2.65) while none of the other portfolios earn abnormal returns. 
Interestingly, the inclusion of WML leads to a profitability effect in the medium distress 
risk portfolio (54 bps, t = 2.14). Using the five factor model including PMU, the distress 
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effect completely vanish (0 bps, t = 0.01) and the profitability effect becomes 
insignificant as well (-4 bps, t = 0.41). Looking at the matrix, the profitability factor 
PMU is able to account for the high returns earned by the low distress risk-high 
profitability portfolio (12 bps, t = 1.40) while all other portfolios, including H-L, are 
insignificant as well.  
Table 38 therefore shows that the profitability factor PMU is able to reduce the distress 
risk premium and to account for the profitability premium driven mostly by the low 
distress risk-high profitability portfolio. 
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Table 38 Profitability Factor: 3x3 Shum-PBTCL Returns 
The table presents summary statistics of time-series regressions based on UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. At 
the end of each September from 1985 to 2009 (portfolio formation), I rank the sample firms on the Shumway (2001) model and sort into equally populated tercile 
portfolios. Independently, I rank the sample firms on profitability (PBTCL) and sort into equally populated tercile portfolios. I form nine portfolios at the intersections 
of the tercile portfolios. L indicates low, M medium and H high default probability (profitability). H-L is the difference between the high portfolio and the low portfolio 
in the respective row or column. In order to avoid look-ahead bias, I take the coefficients from failure indicators and predictor variables that are known at portfolio 
formation. I report portfolio intercepts β1 and the corresponding t-statistics in brackets for the asset pricing model of Fama and French (1993) (excl.        and 
      ), Carhart (1997) (excl.       ) as well as the five factor model containing the profitability factor PMU as defined in Eq. (28):  
                                                                                , 
where        is the return on portfolio i during month m (integer 1 to 12) in portfolio year t,        the one-month UK Treasury Bill rate at the beginning of month t+m, 
        the return difference of the FTSE All Share Index and the one-month UK Treasury Bill rate,        the return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor, 
       the return on the mimicking portfolio for the BM factor,        the return on the mimicking portfolio for the return momentum factor, and          the 
return on the mimicking portfolio for the profitability effect (all during month t+m). Returns are value-weighted. The return of the month of failure is set to -100.0%. 
  Fama and French (1993)   Carhart (1997)   Five Factor Model PMU 
All L M H H-L  L M H H-L  L M H H-L 
Shum 0.19 -0.14 -0.32 -0.50 
 
0.16 0.00 -0.09 -0.25 
 
0.11 0.11 0.11 0.00 
 
(2.51) (1.17) (1.70) (2.57) 
 
(2.11) (0.03) (0.50) (1.34) 
 
(1.42) (0.95) (0.63) (0.01) 
PBTCL -0.23 0.01 0.23 0.47 
 
-0.17 0.05 0.24 0.41 
 
0.16 0.05 0.12 -0.04 
 (1.69) (0.05) (2.74) (3.13)  (1.22) (0.56) (2.71) (2.69)  (1.50) (0.50) (1.48) (0.41) 
 
PBTCL 
 
PBTCL 
 
PBTCL 
Shum L M H H-L 
 
L M H H-L 
 
L M H H-L 
Low 0.02 0.07 0.28 0.26 
 
-0.01 0.07 0.24 0.26 
 
0.25 0.06 0.12 -0.12 
 (0.09) (0.70) (3.05) (1.49)  (0.08) (0.67) (2.65) (1.44)  (1.57) (0.56) (1.40) (0.85) 
Med -0.32 -0.11 0.08 0.40 
 
-0.25 0.06 0.28 0.54 
 
0.10 0.05 0.23 0.13 
 (1.60) (0.74) (0.45) (1.60)  (1.26) (0.42) (1.67) (2.14)  (0.58) (0.32) (1.35) (0.56) 
High -0.37 -0.24 -0.28 0.09 
 
-0.17 0.05 -0.11 0.06 
 
0.15 0.04 -0.20 -0.35 
 (1.59) (1.13) (0.93) (0.27)  (0.74) (0.25) (0.36) (0.18)  (0.68) (0.20) (0.66) (1.03) 
H-L -0.39 -0.31 -0.56 
  
-0.16 -0.02 -0.35 
  
-0.10 -0.02 -0.33 
   (1.38) (1.38) (1.80)     (0.57) (0.08) (1.14)     (0.34) (0.07) (1.03)   
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8.5.3.2 Portfolios on Z-score and Profitability 
Table 39 presents summary statistics of the tercile sorts on z-score and PBTCL. There is 
a high concentration of stocks in the high distress risk-low profitability portfolio (215) 
and low distress risk-high profitability portfolio (224). As expected, failure incidence is 
higher in the high distress risk-low profitability portfolio (2.95%). The low failure rate 
of the high distress risk-high profitability portfolio (0.0%) is most likely due to the low 
population of the portfolio (on average only 13 firms per year). Controlling for 
profitability, BETA is stable across distress risk portfolios but controlling for distress 
risk, it decreases with profitability (-0.29, -0.10, and -0.20 respectively). SIZE is more 
influenced by profitability because controlling for profitability, the size difference does 
not vary much with distress risk. Usually, size and distress risk are found to have a 
strong negative relation. Controlling for distress risk (profitability), BM decreases with 
profitability (distress risk) except for the high profitability portfolio. Again, this is 
unusual since one would expect BM to increase with distress risk.
38
 In contrast to the 
Shum sort, controlling for profitability, prior-year returns are stable across distress risk 
portfolios (except for low profitability) while controlling for distress risk, they increase 
with profitability (9.11%, 6.50%, and 13.09% respectively).  
As such, the patterns on z-score are less distinct as there is no difference in BETA, little 
increase in SIZE and stable PYR once controlled for profitability. However, 
profitability is positively related with the common risk factors: profitable firms have 
lower BETA, they are bigger, they have lower BM ratios, and higher prior-year returns. 
                                                 
38
 In Table 16 in Chapter 6, I show that SIZE is hump-shaped in decile z-score portfolios while BM is U-
shaped in decile z-score portfolios.  
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Table 39 Profitability Factor: 3x3 Z-score-PBTCL Characteristics 
The table presents summary statistics of UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. At the end of each September from 
1985 to 2009 (portfolio formation), I rank the sample firms on the z-score (Taffler, 1983) and sort into equally populated tercile portfolios. Independently, I rank the 
sample firms on profitability (PBTCL) and sort into equally populated tercile portfolios. I form nine portfolios at the intersections of the tercile portfolios. L indicates 
low, M medium and H high default probability (profitability). H-L is the difference between the high portfolio and the low portfolio in the respective row or column. In 
order to avoid look-ahead bias, I take the coefficients from failure indicators and predictor variables that are known at portfolio formation. I report summary statistics 
including Fail Rate (in per cent), the number of portfolio failures divided by the number of portfolio observations (Obs). BETA is the beta factor calculated for each 
firm according to Dimson (1979) over the previous 24 months (± 1 month lag). SIZE is the market value of common equity (MV). BM is book value of shareholders’ 
equity less preference shares and minorities over MV. PYR (in per cent) is the prior 11-months return excluding September. Latest accounting data is taken with a 
minimum lag of five months between financial year-end and portfolio formation, market data is taken at portfolio formation. All variables are winsorised at the 5.0% 
level.  
  PBTCL   PBTCL   PBTCL 
Z-score L M H H-L 
 
L M H H-L 
 
L M H H-L 
 
Avg Obs 
 
Fail Rate 
 
BETA 
L 23 50 224 201 
 
0.52 0.40 0.09 -0.44 
 
1.30 1.06 1.01 -0.29 
M 58 179 59 0 
 
0.21 0.38 0.20 0.00 
 
1.12 1.10 1.02 -0.10 
H 215 68 13 -202 
 
2.95 0.41 0.00 -2.95 
 
1.21 1.09 1.01 -0.20 
H-L 192 18 -211 
  
2.43 0.01 -0.09 
  
-0.09 0.03 0.00 
 
 
SIZE 
 
BM 
 
PYR 
L 148 251 440 292 
 
1.13 0.96 0.65 -0.48 
 
9.55 16.13 18.66 9.11 
M 194 407 686 492 
 
1.06 0.68 0.49 -0.56 
 
11.50 16.63 17.99 6.50 
H 194 440 419 225 
 
0.87 0.52 0.81 -0.06 
 
6.51 18.01 19.60 13.09 
H-L 46 189 -21     -0.26 -0.44 0.16     -3.04 1.88 0.94   
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Table 40 presents the regression of the sorts on z-score and PBTCL using the Fama and 
French (1993) model, the Carhart (1997) model and the five factor model including 
PMU. The portfolio long on distressed and short on non-distressed firms earns a 
negative monthly return of -33 bps (t = 2.69) while this return is primarily driven by the 
low distress risk portfolio (20 bps, t = 2.16). Note that the profitability premium (47 bps, 
t = 3.13) and terciles are, as expected, the same as in Table 38 Panel B.
39
 Again, the low 
distress risk-high profitability portfolio drives both return effects. While this portfolio 
earns a monthly return premium of 25 bps (t = 2.57), the other portfolios are all 
insignificant (except the profitability premium for the low distress risk portfolio (80 bps, 
t = 2.09)). The inclusion of the momentum factor by Carhart (1997) does not change the 
overall picture: the distress risk premium of -29 bps per month hardly changes and is 
still highly significant (t = 2.32) and, as noted earlier, the profitability effect is present 
(41 bps, t = 2.69). The return of the low distress risk-high profitability portfolio is still 
26 bps per month (t = 2.57) while the H-L profitability premium of the low distress risk 
firms is 83 bps (t = 2.12). The inclusion of PMU as a fifth factor is able to account for 
both the distress effect (-6 bps, t = 0.51) and the profitability effect (-4 bps, t = 0.41). 
Again, the returns earned by the low distress risk-high profitability portfolio are only 
13 bps per month and insignificant (t = 1.35). 
  
                                                 
39
 As I use independent sorts, the profitability effect remains constant while the returns on the distress sort 
change due to the different distress risk measure applied.  
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The results in Table 40 clearly show that, in contrast to the Fama and French (1993) and 
Carhart (1997) model, the five factor model including PMU is able to account for the 
high returns of the low distress risk-high profitability portfolio and thus, for both the 
distress and the profitability effect using tercile portfolios.  
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Table 40 Profitability Factor: 3x3 Z-score-PBTCL Returns 
The table presents summary statistics of time-series regressions based on UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. At 
the end of each September from 1985 to 2009 (portfolio formation), I rank the sample firms on the z-score (Taffler, 1983) and sort into equally populated tercile 
portfolios. Independently, I rank the sample firms on profitability (PBTCL) and sort into equally populated tercile portfolios. I form nine portfolios at the intersections 
of the tercile portfolios. L indicates low, M medium and H high default probability (profitability). H-L is the difference between the high portfolio and the low portfolio 
in the respective row or column. In order to avoid look-ahead bias, I take the coefficients from failure indicators and predictor variables that are known at portfolio 
formation. I report portfolio intercepts β1 and the corresponding t-statistics in brackets for the asset pricing model of Fama and French (1993) (excl.        and 
      ), Carhart (1997) (excl.       ) as well as the five factor model containing the profitability factor PMU as defined in Eq. (28): 
                                                                                , 
where        is the return on portfolio i during month m (integer 1 to 12) in portfolio year t,        the one-month UK Treasury Bill rate at the beginning of month t+m, 
        the return difference of the FTSE All Share Index and the one-month UK Treasury Bill rate,        the return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor, 
       the return on the mimicking portfolio for the BM factor,        the return on the mimicking portfolio for the return momentum factor, and          the 
return on the mimicking portfolio for the profitability effect (all during month t+m). Returns are value-weighted. The return of the month of failure is set to -100.0%. 
  Fama and French (1993)   Carhart (1997)   Five Factor Model PMU 
All L M H H-L  L M H H-L  L M H H-L 
Z-score 0.20 0.08 -0.13 -0.33 
 
0.21 0.10 -0.08 -0.29 
 
0.12 0.09 0.06 -0.06 
 
(2.16) (0.86) (1.25) (2.69) 
 
(2.21) (1.15) (0.78) (2.32) 
 
(1.24) (0.99) (0.57) (0.51) 
PBTCL -0.23 0.01 0.23 0.47 
 
-0.17 0.05 0.24 0.41 
 
0.16 0.05 0.12 -0.04 
 (1.69) (0.05) (2.74) (3.13)  (1.22) (0.56) (2.71) (2.69)  (1.50) (0.50) (1.48) (0.41) 
 
PBTCL 
 
PBTCL 
 
PBTCL 
Z-score L M H H-L 
 
L M H H-L 
 
L M H H-L 
Low -0.55 0.10 0.25 0.80 
 
-0.58 0.18 0.26 0.83 
 
-0.32 0.31 0.13 0.45 
 (1.43) (0.58) (2.57) (2.09)  (1.46) (1.02) (2.57) (2.12)  (0.81) (1.82) (1.35) (1.16) 
Med -0.12 0.03 0.15 0.28 
 
-0.03 0.08 0.17 0.20 
 
0.27 0.07 0.08 -0.19 
 (0.58) (0.30) (1.35) (1.15)  (0.13) (0.69) (1.46) (0.81)  (1.33) (0.62) (0.70) (0.84) 
High -0.19 -0.12 0.02 0.21 
 
-0.13 -0.05 -0.04 0.09 
 
0.22 -0.09 -0.03 -0.26 
 (1.24) (0.90) (0.06) (0.77)  (0.81) (0.38) (0.15) (0.33)  (1.76) (0.68) (0.14) (0.97) 
H-L 0.36 -0.21 -0.24 
  
0.45 -0.23 -0.29 
  
0.54 -0.40 -0.16 
   (0.87) (1.13) (0.89)     (1.07) (1.16) (1.08)     (1.26) (2.09) (0.59)   
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8.5.3.3 Portfolios on Bharath and Shumway (2008) and Profitability 
Table 41 provides summary statistics of the tercile sorts on BS and PBTCL. There is 
again high dependency between distress risk and profitability as the diagonal portfolios 
are the most populated (174, 118, 162). The failure rate of the high distress risk-low 
profitability portfolio clearly stands out (3.39%) and is reducing with lower distress risk 
and higher profitability. Controlling for profitability, BETA increases moderately with 
distress risk (0.01, 0.19, and 0.16 respectively). However, controlling for distress risk, 
profitability leads to a greater equity risk reduction (-0.23, -0.16, and -0.08 
respectively). SIZE is negatively related with distress risk (similar to Shum) and 
positively with profitability (similar to z-score). Controlling for profitability, BM is 
doubling (0.61, 0.52, and 0.55 respectively) in distress risk across the profitability sorts 
while it is hardly changing in profitability when controlled for distress risk. Similar to 
Shum, prior-year returns reduce with distress risk (-57.44%, -46.82%, and -41.96% 
respectively) and decrease with profitability.  
Table 41 therefore shows that distressed firms score high on the conventional risk 
measures, i.e. high beta, small size, high BM, and low prior-year returns, while the 
opposite is true for profitable firms (except for PYR). 
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Table 41 Profitability Factor: 3x3 BS-PBTCL Characteristics 
The table presents summary statistics of UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. At the end of each September from 
1985 to 2009 (portfolio formation), I rank the sample firms on the Bharath and Shumway (2008) model and sort into equally populated tercile portfolios. 
Independently, I rank the sample firms on profitability (PBTCL) and sort into equally populated tercile portfolios. I form nine portfolios at the intersections of the 
tercile portfolios. L indicates low, M medium and H high default probability (profitability). H-L is the difference between the high portfolio and the low portfolio in the 
respective row or column. In order to avoid look-ahead bias, I take the coefficients from failure indicators and predictor variables that are known at portfolio formation. 
I report summary statistics including Fail Rate (in per cent), the number of portfolio failures divided by the number of portfolio observations (Obs). BETA is the beta 
factor calculated for each firm according to Dimson (1979) over the previous 24 months (± 1 month lag). SIZE is the market value of common equity (MV). BM is 
book value of shareholders’ equity less preference shares and minorities over MV. PYR (in per cent) is the prior 11-months return excluding September. Latest 
accounting data is taken with a minimum lag of five months between financial year-end and portfolio formation, market data is taken at portfolio formation. All 
variables are winsorised at the 5.0% level.  
  PBTCL   PBTCL   PBTCL 
BS L M H H-L 
 
L M H H-L 
 
L M H H-L 
 
Avg Obs 
 
Fail Rate 
 
BETA 
L 39 95 162 123 
 
0.31 0.08 0.02 -0.28 
 
1.19 1.00 0.95 -0.23 
M 83 118 95 11 
 
0.67 0.17 0.00 -0.67 
 
1.20 1.09 1.04 -0.16 
H 174 82 39 -135 
 
3.39 1.07 0.71 -2.68 
 
1.20 1.19 1.12 -0.08 
H-L 135 -13 -123 
  
3.09 0.99 0.68 
  
0.01 0.19 0.16 
 
 
SIZE 
 
BM 
 
PYR 
L 413 558 561 149 
 
0.51 0.45 0.49 -0.02 
 
46.89 38.27 30.32 -16.57 
M 282 419 482 200 
 
0.74 0.67 0.71 -0.03 
 
27.06 17.52 11.55 -15.51 
H 83 160 197 114 
 
1.11 0.97 1.04 -0.08 
 
-10.55 -8.55 -11.65 -1.10 
H-L -330 -398 -364     0.61 0.52 0.55     -57.44 -46.82 -41.96   
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Table 42 presents the results for the sorts on BS and PBTCL. For the Fama and French 
(1993) risk-adjustment, the H-L portfolio on the tercile BS sort provides a substantial 
negative premium of -81 bps per month (t = 4.14). As illustrated on the other two sorts, 
the profitability effect is 47 bps per month (t = 3.13). The low distress risk-high 
profitability portfolio again earns a positive return of 40 bps (t = 3.97) driving the 
distress anomaly for profitable firms (-87 bps, t = 3.12). The pendant portfolio of high 
distress risk-low profitability earns a substantial return of -72 bps per month (t = 3.08) 
driving the distress anomaly for unprofitable firms (-98 bps, t = 3.38). The Carhart 
(1997) model reduces the distress risk premium to -43 bps (t = 2.57, profitability effect 
is 41 bps, t = 2.69). The premium earned by low distress risk-high profitability firms is 
reduced but still 30 bps per month (t = 3.08). The high distress risk-low profitability 
portfolio is also heavily reduced to -48 bps but it remains significant (t = 2.10) and the 
distress effect is only present in the low profitability portfolio (-62 bps, t = 2.23). 
Similar, to the Fama and French (1993) risk-adjustment, the distress and the 
profitability effect are driven mostly by the high returns of low distress risk-high 
profitability firms and by the low returns of the high distress risk-low profitability firms. 
The PMU factor is, again, able to account for the distress risk premium as it is reduced 
to -27 bps per month (t = 1.64, profitability effect: -4 bps, t = 0.41). In contrast to 
Tables 38 and 40, PMU is unable to reduce the returns of the low distress risk-high 
profitability to an insignificant level (21 bps, t = 2.13). However, its pendant portfolio is 
insignificant (-9 bps, t = 0.43) with the inclusion of PMU and thus, the overall distress 
and profitability effect is insignificant.  
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Overall, characteristics show that high distress risk (low profitability) stocks score high 
on common risk factors while there is a puzzling mispricing for low distress risk-high 
profitability firms. The PMU factor is once again able to account for the distress (BS) 
and profitability effect using a tercile sort. In addition to the sorts on Shum and z-score, 
the results in Table 42 provide evidence that PMU is able to reduce the effects on both 
ends, i.e. low distress risk-high profitability and vice versa.  
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Table 42 Profitability Factor: 3x3 BS-PBTCL Returns 
The table presents summary statistics of time-series regressions based on UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock Exchange. At 
the end of each September from 1985 to 2009 (portfolio formation), I rank the sample firms on the Bharath and Shumway (2008) model and sort into equally populated 
tercile portfolios. Independently, I rank the sample firms on profitability (PBTCL) and sort into equally populated tercile portfolios. I form nine portfolios at the 
intersections of the tercile portfolios. L indicates low, M medium and H high default probability (profitability). H-L is the difference between the high portfolio and the 
low tercile portfolio in the respective row or column. In order to avoid look-ahead bias, I take the coefficients from failure indicators and predictor variables that are 
known at portfolio formation. I report portfolio intercepts β1 and the corresponding t-statistics in brackets for the asset pricing model of Fama and French (1993) (excl. 
       and       ), Carhart (1997) (excl.       ) as well as the five factor model containing the profitability factor PMU as defined in Eq. (28): 
                                                                                , 
where        is the return on portfolio i during month m (integer 1 to 12) in portfolio year t,        the one-month UK Treasury Bill rate at the beginning of month t+m, 
        the return difference of the FTSE All Share Index and the one-month UK Treasury Bill rate,        the return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor, 
       the return on the mimicking portfolio for the BM factor,        the return on the mimicking portfolio for the return momentum factor, and          the 
return on the mimicking portfolio for the profitability effect (all during month t+m). Returns are value-weighted. The return of the month of failure is set to -100.0%. 
  Fama and French (1993)   Carhart (1997)   Five Factor Model PMU 
All L M H H-L  L M H H-L  L M H H-L 
BS 0.31 -0.13 -0.49 -0.81 
 
0.23 -0.01 -0.21 -0.43 
 
0.19 -0.01 -0.08 -0.27 
 
(3.63) (1.29) (2.84) (4.14) 
 
(2.68) (0.12) (1.31) (2.57) 
 
(2.21) (0.12) (0.52) (1.64) 
PBTCL -0.23 0.01 0.23 0.47 
 
-0.17 0.05 0.24 0.41 
 
0.16 0.05 0.12 -0.04 
 (1.69) (0.05) (2.74) (3.13)  (1.22) (0.56) (2.71) (2.69)  (1.50) (0.50) (1.48) (0.41) 
 
PBTCL 
 
PBTCL 
 
PBTCL 
BS L M H H-L 
 
L M H H-L 
 
L M H H-L 
Low 0.26 0.18 0.40 0.14 
 
0.14 0.13 0.30 0.17 
 
0.34 0.11 0.21 -0.14 
 (1.43) (1.77) (3.97) (0.77)  (0.76) (1.31) (3.08) (0.91)  (1.95) (1.09) (2.13) (0.84) 
Med -0.35 -0.10 -0.02 0.32 
 
-0.27 0.01 0.12 0.39 
 
-0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 
 (2.06) (0.79) (0.18) (1.70)  (1.60) (0.09) (0.95) (2.03)  (0.09) (0.08) (0.00) (0.09) 
High -0.72 -0.25 -0.47 0.25 
 
-0.48 0.04 -0.14 0.35 
 
-0.09 0.01 -0.21 -0.12 
 (3.08) (1.17) (1.78) (0.84)  (2.10) (0.19) (0.53) (1.13)  (0.43) (0.06) (0.81) (0.43) 
H-L -0.98 -0.42 -0.87 
  
-0.62 -0.10 -0.44 
  
-0.43 -0.10 -0.41 
   (3.38) (1.87) (3.12)     (2.23) (0.46) (1.70)     (1.55) (0.47) (1.57)   
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8.6 Summary and Discussion of Findings 
8.6.1 Summary of Findings 
This chapter provides new evidence on the drivers of distress risk pricing. The cross-
sectional regressions of the individual component parts of the distress risk measure 
unravel the negative distress risk premium by showing that it is driven by profitability 
and firm-liquidity. For the measure of Shumway (2001), the profitability factor NITA is 
highly significant, for z-score (Taffler, 1983) PBTCL as well as NCI are highly 
significant in explaining the cross-section of subsequent stock returns.   
These findings are further corroborated using orthogonalised distress risk measures. I 
orthogonalise the distress risk measures Shum by NITA and z-score by PBTCL and 
NCI respectively. The results show that the distress information unrelated to 
profitability is not significant in explaining the cross-section of subsequent stock 
returns. As such, Shum orthogonalised by NITA and z-score orthogonalised by PBTCL 
and NCI are insignificant. At the same time, profitability (NITA and PBTCL) retains its 
explanatory power while NCI is less significant. As a robustness test, I show that 
profitability reduces the coefficient of the measure of Bharath and Shumway (2008). 
Overall, the findings argue that profitability drives the distress risk premium. 
The results using time-series regressions confirm these findings by introducing a 
profitability factor PMU, the return on the mimicking portfolio for the profitability 
effect. The tests show that the factors of the common asset pricing models, i.e. CAPM, 
Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997), are unable to account for the pricing 
related information carried by PMU. Using decile sorts on the distress risk proxies, I 
find that there is a significant distress risk premium after risk-adjustments following 
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Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) and independent of the weighting-scheme. 
The inclusion of PMU is able to reduce the premia substantially albeit it remains 
significant for some proxies.  
In addition to the decile sorts I test the five factor model including PMU using 
independent 3x3 sorts on PBTCL and distress risk measure. The results show both a 
profitability and a distress risk premium on tercile portfolios using the Fama and French 
(1996) and the Carhart (1997) model. Both effects are intimately related to each other 
and driven by the positive abnormal returns of stocks with low distress risk and high 
profitability. This finding is robust to how distress risk is measured (i.e. Shum, z-score 
and BS). The five factor model including PMU is able to account for both the distress 
anomaly and the profitability effect. However, unlike the cross-sectional tests, the time-
series results are unable to distinguish between distress and profitability because the two 
are very closely related to each other. 
Anginer and Yildizhan (2010) report similar results using time-series regressions and 
argue that the distress risk premium (measured by Campbell et al., 2008) is insignificant 
once it is controlled for profitability. However, there are a number of problems with 
their results: First, profitability and distress are highly correlated. As such, their results 
are likely to suffer from a similar problem as my 3x3 sorts using time-series regressions 
(e.g. illustrated by the concentration of firms in the diagonal portfolios from high 
distress risk-low profitability to low distress risk-high profitability). Second, Anginer 
and Yildizhan (2010) use sequential sorts which are unable to control for the 
profitability effect (see as well the discussion of Vassalou and Xing (2004) in 
Chapter 2). Novy-Marx (2010) provides a five factor model similar to the one I apply. 
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In line with my results, he finds that the distress risk premium (decile portfolios) 
proxied by o-score and the measure of Campbell et al. (2008) is insignificant when a 
fifth profitability factor is included. Again, since distress and profitability are highly 
correlated, Novy-Marx (2010) does not disentangle the two. Both, Anginer and 
Yildizhan (2010) and Novy-Marx (2010) fail to provide cross-sectional evidence to 
differentiate whether it is distress risk driving profitability or vice versa. As such, my 
results contribute to literature as, in contrast to previous studies, my cross-sectional 
results show successfully that profitability drives the distress risk premium in 
subsequent stock returns. 
8.6.2 Discussion of Findings 
Existing literature attributes the negative return premium associated with bankruptcy 
risk proxies to distress risk (e.g. Campbell et al., 2008). However, I find that while 
Shum subsumes all failure related information in z-score, z-score subsumes all returns 
related information in Shum, raising the possibility that the observed distress risk 
premium may be driven by something other than distress risk itself. I unravel the 
distress risk measure premium by breaking down the hybrid model (Shumway, 2001) 
(Shum), the accounting-based z-score (Taffler, 1983), and the market-based model in 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) (BS) into their individual component parts to test each for 
their impact on subsequent stock returns. I show that the distress risk anomaly is caused 
by the profitability element of the distress risk measures and once I control for 
profitability, the distress anomaly is non-existent. Thus, the negative return premium 
associated with higher bankruptcy risk is not due to distress risk but due to profitability.  
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There are preliminary findings on the association between distress risk and profitability. 
Anginer and Yildizhan (2010) use time-series regressions and argue that controlling for 
profitability, the distress risk premium diminishes. However, distress risk is highly 
related with profitability and hence, the sequential sorts applied in their study are unable 
control for the two effects (see Table 3 in Anginer and Yildizhan (2010)). Similar to my 
findings in Chapter 8.5, Novy-Marx (2010) shows that the distress risk premium is 
captured by a five factor model including a profitability factor. However, this only 
shows that there is an association between distress risk and profitability. My study 
extends existing literature on the relation between distress risk and profitability by 
showing that it is profitability that drives the distress risk anomaly.  
The implication of my finding is that distressed firms earn lower returns because they 
are relatively unprofitable. More profitable (unprofitable) firms earn higher (lower) 
subsequent stock returns after controlling for well-accepted risk measures (i.e. beta, 
size, BM and momentum). This is surprising since Fama and French (1992; 2008) show 
that the pricing related information of profitability is less robust once controlled for size 
and BM.  
Fama and French (2006), Novy-Marx (2010) and Chen, Novy-Marx and Zhang (2011) 
discuss the implications of profitability within the valuation framework which defines 
current market prices as the discounted value of future pay-offs.
40
 Controlling for 
current prices, more profitable (unprofitable) firms have higher (lower) discount rates 
                                                 
40
 Wu, Zhang and Zhang (2010) make a similar argument using q-theory. 
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i.e. higher (lower) expected returns.
41
 However, the valuation framework assumes that 
current market prices are unbiased and it suffers from not considering the uncertainty 
attached to future payoffs. Clearly, the valuation framework is unable to determine the 
risk association with profitable firms. And indeed, Fama and French (2006) refer to 
Campbell and Shiller (1988) who argue that the valuation framework is a tautology that 
defines the internal rate of return and that tests of the valuation framework are unable to 
tell whether the prices are determined on rational or biased judgements. Essentially, the 
question that the valuation framework is unable to answer is why are profitable firms 
more risky?  
Indeed, the results in Chapter 6 provide no evidence for a risk-based explanation for the 
underperformance of unprofitable (i.e. distressed firms) because such firms have higher 
betas, lower market capitalisation and higher BM, all characteristics associated with 
higher risk. My results therefore seem to be counterintuitive from a risk-based 
perspective.  
However, my findings fit well into existing research on the implications of earnings 
variables on stock returns. Haugen and Baker (1996) argue for the predictability of 
future returns based on variables that are able to describe historic returns. They find 
that, among others, the earnings to price and cash flow to price ratios are positively 
related to future stock returns. They do not find evidence for a risk-based explanation of 
the return differences, and argue that the predictability of stock returns is due to biases 
                                                 
41
 Agarwal, Bellotti, Nash and Taffler (2010) and Agarwal, Taffler and Brown (2011) also find that more 
profitable firms also tend to have lower cost of equity but they do not test for the relation of profit and 
subsequent stock returns. Also, in terms of sample the two papers are different to my study. For instance, 
Agarwal et al. (2010) use a three year sample of US data (years 2000 to 2002) and Agarwal et al. (2011) 
select the ten largest companies from around 25 industry sectors. 
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in market pricing. Although Hanna and Ready (2005) show that the return difference 
found in Haugen and Baker (1996) diminishes once controlled for transaction costs and 
momentum, they also note that irrational pricing might still take place within the 
transaction cost boundaries.  
Similarly, Sloan (1996) claims that stock prices act as if investors fixate on earnings. He 
argues that the persistence of earnings is only provided for earnings with a low accruals 
(high cash flow) component. Looking at the market price reaction to earnings, he 
demonstrates that firms whose earnings have low accruals component earn as well high 
stock returns. This suggests that the positive profitability-return relation is due to the 
negative accruals-return relation (positive cash flow-return relation). Following its 
initial discovery in Sloan (1996), the accruals anomaly became well established in the 
literature (e.g. Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998; Fama and French, 2008; Hirschleifer, 
Teoh and Yu, 2011). In explaining this empirical pattern, the literature generally argues 
that investors are unable to fully reflect the information contained in the earnings 
components accruals and cash flow. Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan (2001) reach a 
similar conclusion for sell-side analysts and auditors. 
However, the misjudgement of the investors on the firms’ earnings is to some extent 
intentional since there is prevailing evidence that firms hamper a fair judgement as they 
‘window-dress’ their accounts. For instance, Rosner (2003) and Charitou, Lambertides 
and Trigeorgis (2007) argue that failed firms significantly used accruals to manage their 
earnings upwards in the years preceding bankruptcy. Specifially for the UK, Lara, Osma 
and Neophytou (2009) demonstrate that up to five years prior to the bankruptcy event, 
firms are likely to fully exhaust possibilities of accruals management before they 
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aggressively manipulate real operations to make earnings look higher as they actually 
are. Therefore, it is likely that distressed firms in particular are affected by the low 
returns associated with the accruals anomaly. 
Beside the predictability of abnormal stock returns related to earnings variables (more 
precisely, the earnings components accruals and cash flows), literature documents as 
well a return predictability following earnings announcements dates. This literature 
strand goes back to Ball and Brown (1968), however, in more recent years the finding 
that firms announcing positive (negative) unexpected earnings drift upwards 
(downwards) for an extended period after the announcement date has been frequently 
confirmed (among others Bernard and Thomas, 1990; Ball and Bartov, 1996; Chordia 
and Shivakumar, 2006).
42
 Liu, Strong and Xu (2003) use UK data and, in line with the 
findings in the US, they document a robust disproportionately post-earnings 
announcement drift. Similar to others, they further argue that the post-earnings 
announcement drift is due to investors' failure of fully realising the implications of 
current earnings for future earnings and that their prior incorrect beliefs are updated. 
This argument is corroborated by Sloan (1996) who shows that the accruals component 
of earnings is faster mean-reverting than the cash flow component, suggesting that firms 
with high accruals are stronger affected by the post-earnings announcement drift.  
                                                 
42
 Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) use the commonly applied standardised unexpected earnings (SUE) 
measure. Similar to Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996), they classify their research under earnings 
momentum. Myers, Myers and Skinner (2007) define earnings momentum as the long strings of 
consecutive increases in earnings per share and report a positive relation with subsequent stock returns. 
Independent of the various definitions, the referenced studies share the common theme of underreaction 
to earnings related information.  
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To some extent, the underreaction to earnings news, or to bad news in general, has been 
researched in the distress risk literature as well. For instance, Taffler et al. (2004) for the 
UK and Kausar et al. (2009) for the US observe an underreaction to first time going-
concern modified (GCM) audit reports issue as those firms experience a significant 
downward price drift in the twelve months subsequent to the GCM audit report. They 
further show that the GCM audit report drift is among others robust to, the post-earnings 
announcement drift. A similar underreaction to distress-related news is documented by 
Dichev and Piotroski (2001). They find a significant underreaction to rating downgrades 
for small and low rated firms in the year subsequent to the rating downgrade. They 
argue that a large part of the abnormal return is earned subsequent to deteriorating 
earnings announcements. In contrast to that, Griffin and Lemmon (2002) using o-score 
and Campbell et al. (2008) using their hazard model observe a positive return premium 
following earnings announcements. Campbell et al. (200 : p. 29 0) argue that “possibly 
because the ability to announce earnings is itself good news for companies that are in 
severe financial difficulty”. On the other hand, Ang (2012) shows that the positive 
returns of earnings surprises and post-earnings announcements dates is driven by firms 
that are subsequently delisted. Moreover, Ang (2012) argues for a “negative pre-
delisting drift” that even accounts for the anomalous return premium earned by 
alternative distress measures. However, the findings of Ang (2012) (i) are essentially 
what would be expected when failure-related delistings are excluded as (parts of) the 
most severely distressed firms are eliminated and (ii) are derived with substantial look-
ahead bias. More clean evidence that the distress anomaly is driven by the underreaction 
to earnings news is provided by Balakrishnan, Bartov and Faurel (2010). They 
demonstrate that the negative post-earnings announcement drift of firms reporting 
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extremely deteriorating earnings is robust to the negative returns earned by distressed 
firms (measured by z-score).  
In summary, this chapter suggests that there is rather a profitability effect than a distress 
anomaly: the low returns of distressed firms are due to the low profitability. The 
common risk measures beta, size, BM and prior-year returns fail to provide first 
evidence for a risk-based explanation. However, existing research on earnings and 
earnings announcement shows that investors fail to fully account for the information 
provided in current earnings. The prevailing argument is that this underreaction causes 
the observed negative return drift of unprofitable firms. Several studies show that there 
is as well an underreaction to GCM audit reports (Taffler et al., 2004; Kausar et al. 
2009) or rating downgrades (Dichev and Piotroski, 2001). While Griffin and Lemmon 
(2002) and Campbell et al. (2008) find no evidence for the post-earnings announcement 
drift to explain the return premium earned by the distress measure, Balakrishnan et al. 
(2010) argue that the earnings announcement drift is found to be robust to the distress 
anomaly. As such, the main finding presented in this chapter, that the distress anomaly 
is driven by profitability, cannot be explained from a risk-based perspective. Although 
existing literature is yet discordant in linking the two return patterns, my results 
conjecture that the distress anomaly is a manifestation of the underreaction to current 
earnings news.  
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8.7 Appendix 
Table 43A Variables Distress Risk Models: Correlation 
This table presents time-series averages of correlation coefficients for variables of UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the London Stock 
Exchange. The lower-left (upper right) side of the matrix presents Spearman rank (Pearson) time-series average correlation coefficients calculated at the end of each 
September from 1985 to 2009 (portfolio formation). Shum is the score from the model in Shumway (2001) which includes NITA net income available to common 
shareholders over book value of total assets, T TA (T MTA) book value of total assets excluding total common shareholders’ equity over book value of total assets 
(book value of total liabilities plus market value of common equity), EXRET log excess return over the FTSE All Share Index over the 12 months prior to September, 
SIGMA annualised standard deviation of daily returns for the three months prior to September, RSIZE log of firm MV over FTSE All Share Index MV. Z score 
(Taffler, 1983) contains PBTCL profit before tax over current liabilities, CATL current assets over total liabilities, CLTA current liabilities over total assets, NCI no-
credit interval calculated as (quick assets – current liabilities) / ((sales – profit before tax – depreciation) / 365). BS score (Bharath and Shumway, 2008) includes ER1y 
prior-year return, TLMTA and SIMGA. Latest accounting data is taken with a minimum lag of five months between financial year-end and portfolio formation, market 
data is taken at portfolio formation. All variables are winsorised at the 5.0% level, scores are winsorised at ±18.4207. 
  Shum NITA TLTA EXRET SIGMA RSIZE Z PBTCL CATL CLTA NCI BS ER1y TLMTA SIGMA 
Shum 1 -0.64 0.42 -0.58 0.69 -0.71 0.51 -0.63 -0.10 0.37 -0.14 0.77 -0.51 0.61 0.69 
NITA -0.58 1 -0.18 0.22 -0.40 0.32 -0.55 0.79 0.10 -0.07 0.06 -0.40 0.18 -0.38 -0.40 
TLTA 0.39 -0.19 1 -0.06 0.09 0.09 0.51 -0.34 -0.54 0.64 -0.36 0.25 -0.04 0.57 0.09 
EXRET -0.51 0.18 -0.04 1 -0.33 0.21 -0.15 0.20 0.02 -0.04 0.04 -0.60 0.96 -0.33 -0.33 
SIGMA 0.64 -0.34 0.07 -0.26 1 -0.54 0.26 -0.38 0.07 0.16 -0.01 0.69 -0.24 0.28 1.00 
RSIZE -0.73 0.32 0.09 0.23 -0.52 1 -0.15 0.31 -0.25 -0.13 -0.04 -0.48 0.19 -0.27 -0.52 
Z-score 0.52 -0.53 0.56 -0.12 0.25 -0.17 1 -0.71 -0.39 0.48 -0.62 0.33 -0.12 0.43 0.25 
PBTCL -0.65 0.79 -0.37 0.17 -0.39 0.34 -0.74 1 0.10 -0.35 0.16 -0.42 0.15 -0.43 -0.39 
CATL -0.05 0.19 -0.45 0.02 0.10 -0.25 -0.35 0.07 1 -0.08 0.47 -0.09 0.03 -0.40 0.10 
CLTA 0.34 -0.02 0.63 -0.03 0.15 -0.13 0.55 -0.39 0.06 1 -0.34 0.20 -0.02 0.28 0.15 
NCI -0.13 0.12 -0.35 0.05 0.00 0 -0.63 0.19 0.47 -0.32 1.00 -0.12 0.04 -0.30 0.00 
BS 0.80 -0.43 0.26 -0.61 0.74 -0.51 0.37 -0.47 -0.08 0.20 -0.14 1 -0.57 0.60 0.74 
ER1y -0.51 0.18 -0.04 1.00 -0.26 0.22 -0.12 0.17 0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.61 1 -0.30 -0.26 
TLMTA 0.58 -0.47 0.55 -0.30 0.24 -0.27 0.48 -0.48 -0.36 0.26 -0.31 0.61 -0.31 1 0.24 
SIGMA 0.64 -0.34 0.07 -0.26 1.00 -1 0.26 -0.38 0.07 0.16 -0.01 0.69 -0.24 0.28 1.00 
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CHAPTER 9:  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
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9.1 Introduction 
In sharp contrast to the basic risk-return relation hypothesised in theoretical finance, 
distressed firms underperform non-distressed firms (e.g. Dichev, 1998; Griffin and 
Lemmon, 2002; Agarwal and Taffler, 2008b). Since literature agrees on this empirical 
evidence, more recent studies propose explanations to solve this puzzle (e.g. Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; Han and Kumar, 2011; Garlappi and Yan, 2011). There has been 
very little work on whether these explanations are actually able to capture the negative 
distress risk premium. In addition to that, existing studies do not explore the drivers of 
the distress risk premium. The analysis in this thesis aims to fill this gap by (i) testing 
whether the distress risk premium is sensitive to the distress risk measure, (ii) testing for 
the validity of the proposed explanations, and (iii) testing for the drivers of the negative 
distress risk premium. 
Researching the pricing of distress risk requires potent distress risk proxies. The basic 
approaches forecast bankruptcies using accounting data, market data or both. The 
performance of those models is tested by assessing their forecasting accuracy, the 
bankruptcy related information they carry, and their economic value when differential 
misclassification costs are incurred. However, existing studies fail to comprehensively 
incorporate all three available approaches in a unified test using the three different 
available performance measures. The analysis in this thesis aims to fill this gap in 
literature by (i) combining hybrid, accounting-based, and market-based bankruptcy 
prediction approaches in a unified test and (ii) by assessing the performance using the 
three major testing procedures examining forecasting accuracy, bankruptcy related 
information, and differential misclassification costs of the three approaches.  
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The tests are based on UK non-financial firms listed in the Main market segment of the 
London Stock Exchange anytime between 1985 and 2010. It includes 22,217 
observations with 2,428 unique firms of which 202 failed.  
9.2 Summary and Discussion of Findings 
Bankruptcy Prediction 
The analysis on bankruptcy prediction models uses the hybrid models in Shumway 
(2001) (Shum), Campbell et al. (2008) and Christidis and Gregory (2010). In addition, I 
include the accounting-based z-score model of Taffler (1983) as well as the market-
based model of Bharath and Shumway (2008) (BS).  
The test of forecasting accuracy using receiver operating characteristic curves 
demonstrates a clear outperformance of the hybrid models. Hybrid models have a 
significantly higher forecasting accuracy than both z-score and BS. However, between 
the hybrid models there is little to differentiate. As such, it is the general approach of 
using both accounting and market data that leads to a superior forecasting accuracy. 
There is also a significant outperformance of the market-based BS model over the 
accounting-based z-score, though, the outperformance is limited to the more recent 
years in the sample period.  
The information content tests document that all bankruptcy prediction models carry 
significant bankruptcy related information individually. Testing the incremental 
information of the models, the hybrid models clearly outperform the accounting-based 
and market-based approaches. Combining one of the hybrids with either z-score or BS, 
the results unanimously show that all three hybrids tested here subsume the information 
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carried by both the z-score and BS. Similar to the forecasting accuracy, z-score and BS 
come second. Testing them together in the logit regression, both have significant 
bankruptcy related information. As Agarwal and Taffler (2008a) note, z-score and BS 
carry complementary information about future bankruptcy.  
While the outperformance of the hybrid approach is clear in general, it is hard to 
distinguish between the three hybrid models. In the last test I assess the economic value 
of the three hybrids in an illustrative credit loan market with differential 
misclassification costs. The results show that the bank using the Shum model offers the 
lowest credit spreads, the biggest market share as well as the highest credit quality 
portfolio. This results in the highest return on risk-weighted assets for the Shum model. 
It follows that: while the forecasting accuracy tests were unable to distinguish between 
the hybrids, the economic value under differential misclassification costs provides clear 
evidence for the superiority of Shum. Interestingly, Shum is the first and the most 
parsimonious hybrid model of the three models tested. 
Overall, my results show that the hybrid models, and in particular the model in 
Shumway (2001), are the best approach in predicting bankruptcies. 
Distress Risk Premium 
The bankruptcy prediction tests mark the clear outperformance of the Shum model over 
all other approaches. Therefore, I include Shum in the pricing tests as a hybrid-based 
distress risk proxy. To test for any difference between the different bankruptcy 
prediction approaches, I continue as well with z-score and BS in the pricing analysis.  
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The characteristics on decile distress risk portfolios demonstrate that, in general, 
distressed stocks score high on the conventional risk measures BETA, SIZE, BM, and 
PYR. Although the conventional risk measures are associated with higher returns, the 
time-series regressions show that distressed stocks earn lower returns than non-
distressed stocks. For robustness, I use both the Fama and French (1993) and the 
Carhart (1997) risk-adjustment as well as value- and equally-weighted returns. The H-L 
premium, i.e. the return long on distressed and short on non-distressed firms, is 
significantly negative and independent of the distress risk proxy I employ.  
The cross-sectional results on individual securities corroborate these findings. 
Consistent with the majority of prior studies, I find no evidence for the distress 
hypothesis of Chan and Chen (1991) and Fama and French (1992) that SIZE and BM 
are proxies for distress risk. Using the common risk factors, the premium on Shum and 
z-score is highly significant while the premium on BS is significant at the 10% level.  
Due to the low correlation between z-score and the other bankruptcy prediction models 
and risk factors, I combine z-score with each of the other measures. Based on its 
forecasting accuracy, Shum is expected to be the most relevant in pricing of distress 
risk. In contrast to that, z-score – the weakest bankruptcy predictor - subsumes the 
pricing related information of Shum and BS. This is a remarkable new finding as it 
suggests that while the distress risk measures are priced, distress risk may not be driving 
the observed ‘negative distress risk premium’. This raises the possibility that it may not 
be the composite distress risk measure but one or more elements of the distress risk 
measures that drive the relation between distress risk and stock returns. 
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Overall, my results confirm existing evidence by showing that there is a negative 
distress risk premium. Moreover, I present evidence that the distress risk premium is 
robust to the distress risk proxy applied but, against expectations, the best bankruptcy 
proxy does not have the most distinct premium raising doubts on whether it is really 
distress risk that drives the premium.  
Potential Explanations 
The analysis explores the potential of shareholder advantage, limits of arbitrage and 
gambling retail investors to explain the negative distress risk premium.  
The main predictions of the shareholder advantage valuation model of Garlappi et al. 
(2008) and Garlappi and Yan (2011) are that both equity beta and the value premium 
are hump-shaped with increasing distress risk. My results reject these predictions: 
equity beta increases linearly with distress risk measured by Shum, z-score and BS. 
While Garlappi and Yan (2011) report a clear hump-shape for the value-premium and 
distress risk, my results provide no evidence for such a relation. I sort into decile 
distress portfolios and independently into equally populated BM portfolios. The 
resulting value premium for each distress decile has no relation with distress risk. The 
graphs I present in Chapter 7 show a value premium that oscillates between the low and 
high distress risk premium. The predictions of Garlappi and Yan (2011) in respect to 
beta and value premium are rejected independently of the distress risk proxy and the 
weighting-scheme I apply.
43
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 The only weak indication of hump-shaped relation comes from using BS as a bankruptcy risk proxy 
and equally-weighted portfolio returns.  
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Franks and Nyborg (1996) argue that the UK bankruptcy regime is more creditor-
friendly. Kaiser (1996) and Agarwal and Taffler (2008b) find that UK stockholders are 
generally passed over in terminal payments These bankruptcy regime factors further 
corroborate my empirical findings that the negative distress risk premium in the UK is 
unlikely to be driven by the shareholder advantage effect.  
The difference in results could also be due to sample and method. Dichev (1998) finds a 
hump-shaped distress risk-return relation only to be true for NASDAQ stocks using 
z-score. As such, the findings of Garlappi and Yan (2011) could be driven by a class of 
small stocks listed at NASDAQ. Since I exclude AIM, i.e. the equivalent to NASDAQ, 
this might explain why my results do not support the findings in Garlappi and Yan 
(2011). Alternatively, the shareholder advantage might be a myopic view on reality. 
Zhang (2012) argues that the model of Garlappi and Yan (2011) assumes that there are 
no renegotiation frictions. However, Zhang (2012) shows that such frictions exist and 
have an effect on the shareholder advantage.  
Limits of arbitrage are, inter alia, proxied by a low share price, high idiosyncratic 
volatility, high idiosyncratic skewness, high bid-ask spread, low institutional ownership, 
and low analyst coverage. Han and Kumar (2011) construct their lottery-index with the 
variables share price, idiosyncratic volatility, and idiosyncratic skewness. As such, the 
characteristics of stocks with high limits of arbitrage and stocks with high lottery 
features are congruent. Han and Kumar (2011) provide direct evidence for the 
connection as they note that lottery stocks are not only dominated by retail investors, 
they also face high limits of arbitrage. Similarly, Coelho et al. (2010) conclude that the 
post-Chapter 11 filing drift is caused by both gambling retail investors and limits of 
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arbitrage. As such, there is one symptom for two potential causes while, clearly, there 
has to be a mispricing (e.g. due to gambling motivated investors) in first place before 
limits of arbitrage hinder sophisticated investors to correct the mispricing.  
I construct a lottery-index (LOTT) following Han and Kumar (2011). Ranking on decile 
portfolios, I show that lottery-type stocks share common characteristics with distressed 
firms: I find them to be small, having high BM ratios and low prior-year returns. 
Moreover, default probability increases monotonically in LOTT. I conduct ROC curve 
analysis using LOTT as well and find that the AUC is 0.80 showing a high accuracy in 
bankruptcy forecasting. For comparison, the AUC of Shum is 0.90, for z-score it is 
0.81, and for BS it is 0.87.  
Although there is a high commonality between LOTT and distress risk, the H-L 
premium in time-series regressions (decile portfolios) is insignificant for value-
weighted returns. The cross-sectional regressions confirm that neither the individual 
components nor the composite measure LOTT is significant in subsequent stock returns. 
Combining LOTT with each of the distress risk measures returns insignificant 
coefficients for LOTT while the negative distress risk premium remains robust. As 
such, the tests provide no evidence that limits of arbitrage or gambling retail investors 
drive the overpricing of distressed firms. Moreover, while LOTT is a fairly good 
bankruptcy predictor, its irrelevance in subsequent stock returns further corroborates the 
indication that it might not be distress risk that is priced. 
Overall, my results show that in the UK there is no shareholder advantage effect as 
proposed by Garlappi and Yan (2011). Moreover, there is no evidence that limits of 
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arbitrage hinder sophisticated investors to correct the overpricing of distressed stocks or 
that gambling retail investors drive the overpricing of distressed firms in the first place.  
Drivers of Negative Distress Risk Premium 
The potential explanations fail to account for the negative distress risk premium. 
Moreover, the analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 provide first indication that the relation 
between distress risk and stock returns might not be as hitherto assumed in literature: I 
find that while Shum subsumes all failure related information in z-score, z-score 
subsumes all returns related information in Shum. Also, LOTT is a fairly good failure 
predictor but not relevant in the pricing of stock returns.  
In this thesis, I explore the drivers of the distress risk premium by breaking the distress 
risk measures down into its individual variables to unravel the premium by testing their 
influence on stock prices using cross-sectional regressions. For Shum, the profitability 
ratio NITA is highly significant, while for z-score, the profitability ratio PBTCL and the 
firm-liquidity ratio NCI are highly significant in addition to the common risk factors. 
Further, the coefficient of the Shum measure orthogonalised by NITA is insignificant 
while NITA remains highly significant. Similarly, z-score orthogonalised by PBTL is 
insignificant while PBTCL is highly significant. For NCI, the results are less strong. As 
a robustness test, I show that profitability reduces the coefficient of the measure of BS. 
These findings argue that profitability drives the distress risk premium. 
I employ a five factor model including a profitability factor (PMU) formed following 
Fama and French (1993). An analysis of the risk factor shows that PMU is unrelated to 
the common risk factors and the returns on PMU are not fully explained by BETA, 
SMB, HML, and WML. The results using time-series regressions confirm the important 
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role of profitability. I find that independent of how I measure distress, PMU is able to 
reduce the distress risk premia (decile sorts on Shum, z-score, and BS, value- and 
equally-weighted returns), although the H-L premia remain significant in half of the 
cases.  
In addition to the decile sorts, I test the five factor model using independent 3x3 sorts on 
PBTCL and distress risk proxies. The results provide both a profitability and a distress 
risk premium on the tercile portfolios using the Fama and French (1993) and the Carhart 
(1997) model. For all distress risk proxies I use, both the profitability and the distress 
effect are intimately related to each other and driven by the positive abnormal returns 
earned by stocks with low distress risk and high profitability. The five factor model 
including PMU is able to account for both the distress anomaly and the profitability 
effect. However, unlike the cross-sectional tests, the time-series results are unable to 
distinguish between distress and profitability because the two are very closely related to 
each other. 
Overall, my results show that the high stock returns of profitable firms relative to 
unprofitable firms drive the negative distress risk premium. This is counterintuitive as 
profitable firms score high on the conventional risk measures. Subsequently, this 
suggests that current risk-based explanations might fail in explaining the findings in this 
study.  
Similar to my findings, existing literature finds profitability to be positively related with 
stock returns (e.g. Haugen and Baker, 1996). There is as well an extant literature on 
earnings and, in particular, earnings news suggesting that investors are unable to 
account for the information in current earnings for future earnings (e.g. Sloan, 1996). 
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The prevailing argument is that this underreaction causes the observed post-earnings 
announcement drift (e.g. Liu et al, 2003).  
The underreaction has been, to some extent, observed in the context of distress risk. 
However, existing literature provides mixed results. On the one hand, Taffler et al. 
(2004) and Kausar et al. (2009) show that the post-GCM audit report drift is robust to 
the post-earnings announcement drift and similarly, Griffin and Lemmon (2002) as well 
as Campbell et al. (2008) show that the distress anomaly is robust to the post-earnings 
announcement drift. On the other hand, Dichev and Piotroski (2001) demonstrate that 
the negative returns of rating downgrades are concentrated around earnings 
announcements while Balakrishnan et al. (2010) show that the earnings announcement 
drift is robust to the distress anomaly.  
These findings show that literature is ambiguous in bringing together the underreaction 
to distress news and profitability related news. However, my findings provide a way 
forward for future research as they unambiguously show that there is an association 
between distress risk and profitability.  
9.3 Limitations of Research 
Like other empirical studies in finance, the results presented in this thesis contain some 
limitations.  
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I use a portfolio formation date at the end of September. This date is the information 
cut-off date for e.g. industry or market segment affiliation.
44
 The use of annual portfolio 
formation dates implicitly assumes that firms do not change their industry or market 
segment affiliation between the portfolio formation dates. Monthly or quarterly cut-off 
dates (firms listed in the Main market segment publish accounting data on a quarterly 
basis) could improve results.  
Importantly, I assume that accounting data is available five months after the end of the 
financial year. Thus, I incorporate the firm in the September portfolio formation if the 
financial year-end was at the end of April latest. Obviously, this omits taking into 
account the actual publication dates of accounting information. 
Similar to other studies, the pricing analysis assumes that realised returns equal 
expected returns. Elton (1999) provides arguments that raise doubts about the validity of 
this assumption. 
This study uses independent sorts on profitability and distress risk (3x3 matrix in 
Chapter 8). The general reason of using sorts is to control for one variable while 
observing the effects of the other variable. Since profitability and distress are highly 
correlated, the effects will always be overlapping.  
I use share price, idiosyncratic volatility and idiosyncratic skewness as proxies for both 
limits of arbitrage and lottery features. There are additional variables such as 
institutional shareholders or liquidity measures. Employing these would lead to more 
                                                 
44
 Industry affiliation is important because I exclude financial firms. Market segmentation is important as 
discussed in Chapter 4 (I restrict my sample to the Main market segment).  
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robust findings. However, the availability of this data for the UK market limits this 
robustness test. 
9.4 Contributions to Knowledge and Practice 
The thesis has two original contributions. First, the analysis of bankruptcy prediction 
models contributes in two ways as it compares all available approaches as well as using 
the available testing procedures. As such, the results of this study contribute to the 
literature of bankruptcy prediction. In a more narrow sense, my analysis contributes to 
the UK-specific literature on hybrid models as I show that the most parsimonious and 
original hybrid model of Shumway (2001) outperforms the hybrid model of Christidis 
and Gregory (2010). 
In the context of bankruptcy prediction the thesis also has practical relevance. With the 
introduction of the Basel II Accord, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
allows banks to develop their own credit rating models in the Internal Ratings Based 
framework. This study provides evidence on the performance of models to assess the 
counterparty risk, especially when testing the economic value with differential 
misclassification costs, a problem area of particular importance for financial institutions 
and regulators. 
Second, until now, the return drivers of the negative distress risk premium were not 
fully understood. Therefore, the second original contribution of my thesis is within the 
pricing of distress risk. First, I test various potential explanations for the 
underperformance of distressed firms. Second, I break the distress risk proxy down into 
its component parts and identify the drivers of the negative distress risk premium. In 
doing so, I provide a direct link between distress risk and profitability. This is an 
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important contribution to existing literature as it moderates previous findings on the 
distress risk pricing.  
As my findings identify the drivers of the negative distress risk premium, its increasing 
the understanding of the returns that were until now associated with distress risk. 
Moreover, I show that a model employing an additional profitability factor leads to less 
pricing deviation than the standard model of Carhart (1997). These findings are of 
practical relevance for stock market investors such as fund managers.   
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